

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan  
1 - Liaison

May 31, 1967

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

## "REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY"

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past has prepared a document entitled "Reflections on Soviet Foreign Policy."

The author of this document has had over forty years' experience in the international communist movement, has held lengthy discussions with leading figures in the international communist movement, and had personal discussions with top leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over a number of years. He is widely respected in the international communist movement for his political acumen. The following are salient points in this document.

No matter what position Soviet leaders adopt, belligerent or peaceful, the guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy is national self-interest. Through the use of "proletarian internationalism," the Soviets attempt to keep other communist parties in line; however, the principles of internationalism are never allowed to interfere with the best national interest of the Soviet Union. Even the struggle with Communist China is based on national interests, not ideology.

The Soviet Union has succeeded, to a large extent, in branding the United States as an aggressor for its actions in Vietnam. Soviet people are genuinely aroused over the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union is under pressure to take necessary steps to relieve the pressure on North Vietnam. While Communist China has been reluctant to cooperate with the Soviets in the transport of Soviet materiel to North Vietnam through Communist China, it too is under pressure from other communist countries to change tactics. This pressure under a common cause may force

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

100-428091

RCP:dmk

(11) Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

6 JUL 7 1967

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

65 JUN 15 1967

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY"

Communist China and the Soviet Union to reach some accord with respect to aid for North Vietnam.

While all evidence indicates communist countries no longer bow to the commands of the Soviets as they once did and nationalism is making inroads in the communist world, it would be folly to presume that the communist community of nations is breaking up. The United States should develop a policy to deepen the rift between the so-called satellites and the Soviets by weakening their dependence on the Soviets. These countries should be treated as autonomous nations for they too jealously guard their national sovereignty even after so many years of domination by the Soviets.

The world has three communist centers of influence at this time: Moscow, Peking, and Havana, Cuba. United States foreign policy should endeavor to force comparisons by indigenous communist parties with neighboring capitalist countries. In such comparisons communist states always suffer. Cuban demands for immediate revolutions in Latin America are causing a split with the Soviets and alienating the communist parties of South America. The United States should accuse the Soviets of spreading armed conflict unless they show by deeds that they do not endorse these demands for revolution. The United States should initiate action in foreign policy rather than rely only on reaction.

A copy of the document is enclosed. It should be noted that the views expressed in the document are those of the author alone and are not opinions or evaluations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The document has not been edited.

Enclosure

NOTE: See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Solo, Internal Security - Communist," dated 5/29/67, prepared by RCP:dmk.

Classified "~~Confidential~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could result in the identification of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

This document contains neither  
recommendations nor conclusions of  
the FBI. It is the property of  
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be  
distributed outside your agency.

100-4428091-6311  
ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
BASIC POLICY OF SOVIET UNION	
Public Statements of Soviet Policy--Peace	1
Paramount Elements of Soviet Foreign Policy: United States-Soviet Relations and Avoiding World War	3
Soviet Concern Over West Germany	4
PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS: KEYSTONE OF SOVIET POLICY	
Historical Precedents	4
Soviet Pursuit of National Interests Through Relations with Anti-Communist States	7
Khrushchev Removal Related to National Interests	7
Soviet Split With China Based Upon National Interests	8
Soviet National Interest Takes Precedence Over "Internationalism"	9
Importance of "Internationalism" in World Communist Movement, and Soviet Use of This Policy to Advance Soviet National Interest	9
Domestic Factors Affecting Soviet National Interests	12
Soviet Failure to Solve The Crisis in Agriculture	13
Additional Strains on Soviet Economy: Foreign Aid, Arms Race	14
Necessity of Communist "Example" of Abundance in Soviet Union	14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Survival of Soviet Leadership Requires Solution  
of Economic Problems 15

Soviet Young Leadership and Youth 15

Patriotism and Peaceful Desires of Soviet  
People--Can United States Exploit by Appeal  
to Their National Interests? 17

#### SOVIET SUPPORT OF "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"

While Basic Policy is Peace, Soviet Union  
Endorses "Wars of National Liberation" 18

"Wars of National Liberation"--Roots and  
Countermeasures 19

Lessons of Wars of Liberation (Spain, Korea):  
Soviet Union Not Directly Involved 21

#### VIETNAM

Soviet Union Wants Vietnam Peace But Must  
Give Aid to North Vietnam 22

Recent Increase in Soviet Militancy Noted  
on Vietnam, But Fear of War's Spread Remains 23

Propaganda Advantage to Soviet Union as  
Result of United States' Involvement in  
Vietnam 24

Reaction of Soviet People to Vietnam War 25

Pressure on Soviet Union Regarding Vietnam--  
From East Europe; From China 25

Possibility of Soviet-Chinese Agreement to  
Aid North Vietnam 26

Possibility of International Brigade for  
Vietnam 27

Necessity of United States' Presence in  
Vietnam 27

#### EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS

Nationalism Rampant 28

Effects of Nationalism on United States'  
Image 28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Soviet Efforts to Exploit Nationalism to Further Communism	29
Soviet Reverses Due to Nationalism	30
Breakup of East European Communist Monolith	30
Soviet Recognition of Effects of Nationalism	31
Eastern Europe Asserting Independence From Soviet Union	33

#### ISSUES AND METHODS FOR EXPLOITATION OF EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALISM

Not Open Anti-Soviet Campaign	33
A Closed Society Opens Slowly	34
Approach--Impression of Honoring Independence	35
Examples--Hungarian and Czech Attitudes	35
Gradual Relaxation of Restraints in Eastern Europe	36
Exploiting the Opening Door to the West	37

#### NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 39

#### SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Entire World Communist Movement Weakened	40
Sino-Soviet Differences: Charges and Counter-charges	40
Advantage to United States From Split	42
Chinese Splitting Activities	43
Cuban Splitting Activities	44
Resistance of Communist Parties to any New "International"	45
National Interests Produce "Many Roads to Communism"	46
Methods of Exploiting Split for United States' Advantage	47
Three "Centers": Moscow, Peking, Havana	48
Meeting the Cuban Threat in Venezuela	48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SOVIET-CUBAN SPLIT IN LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISM

Castro Fans the Flames of Revolt	50
Utilizing the Split for United States Advantage	50
Communist Party of Brazil Under Pressure	51
Issues in the Propaganda War: Cuban Dictatorship; Trade Unions' Right to Strike; Cuban Interference	52
Exploiting the Split to Curb Influence of Both Cuba and Soviet Union	53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## INTRODUCTION

The question of United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is a very broad one. This very posing of the problem is one-sided, for the question must also be asked: what is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its attitude towards the United States? This paper will try to put forward some ideas and attempt to answer some important questions in relation to foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union and other countries calling themselves socialist and which are now in the Soviet camp in one degree or another. This document is not a paper for a Ph.D. or for public discussion. Actually, the ideas put forth are based upon decades of study and experiences, brought up to date, resulting from contacts and travel over a period of years, including discussions with Soviet leaders and studies abroad through recent weeks in 1967. Every country calling itself socialist, except Albania, was actually visited and sessions held with the leadership. No "authorities" on this subject will be cited to "prove" a point.

## BASIC POLICY OF SOVIET UNION

### Public Statements of Soviet Policy - Peace

Past experience within the world communist movement makes manifest the lesson that party resolutions and speeches of leaders must be treated very seriously. To use an old cliché, one must "take them at their word." This does not mean that communist leaders are in the habit of disclosing secrets or taking anyone into confidence regarding important problems and their solutions. This would especially apply to questions relating to foreign policy. Yet, regardless of the still prevailing methods characteristic of a closed society, the communist leadership of the Soviet Union must state the general policy aims of a given historical period in order to mobilize the population for the carrying out of tasks in the sphere of international affairs and/or in the solution of economic and social problems within their own society. They do not always give the facts to their people, but they do indicate the road that must be traveled. In doing this, they must take into consideration the attitude of the people. They can control or suppress ideas or

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

opposing points of view, they can sometimes enforce obviously unjust codes and rules; but all of these things can only be done if they have the main body of the population agreeing with them or at least sympathetic to the basic goals.

In his opening remarks to the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which took place March 29 through April 8, 1966, Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, after stating the need for speeding communist construction, placed the question of current Soviet policy as follows:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has taken into consideration all the complications of the world situation in elaborating the course of the Party and the state in foreign policy; it has been guided by the vital interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and by the desire to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of communism and socialism in the countries of the world socialist community and to prevent the unleashing of a new world war."

Despite a lot of verbiage, lip service to the ideas of international solidarity or proletarian internationalism, and more words about loyalty to the cause of the struggles of the people of the world, the main emphasis was on the effort to avoid war. The Soviet people can easily understand the following: "...The Soviet Union consistently advocates normal, peaceful relations with capitalist countries and a settlement of controversial interstate issues by negotiation, not by war." No matter what else the leadership says, the Soviet people understand the essence of these last words. And this is why the word "peace" is a part of the daily, almost ritualistic salutation of the average Soviet citizen. This same general policy was reaffirmed and restated as current policy in editorials on the front page of Pravda, the official Soviet Party organ, on April 7 and 8, 1967, on the occasion of the First Anniversary of the XXIII Congress.

The foregoing is not meant to portray the Soviet Union as a pacifist state when one considers its Communist Party of nearly thirteen million members and a Young Communist League of more than twenty million members, which both function as organized and disciplined paramilitary organizations, in every sense of the word, plus a powerful military establishment equipped with modern weapons, including nuclear weapons. Nor must peace slogans be interpreted literally in disregard of increasing Soviet armaments and ambitions as they relate to Europe, and particularly as they may relate to the United States. However, their policy for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

peaceful coexistence as repeatedly enunciated by the Soviet leadership (which they claim beginning with Lenin and extending into the days of Nikita Khrushchev and now repeated by the new leadership of Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosygin) should be interpreted as their basic "unalterable" policy. In their own words they consider the policies of "peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems" as an integral part of the class struggle. The emphasis, however, is not on armed struggles but is on ideological and economic competition.

Paramount Elements of Soviet  
Foreign Policy: United States -  
Soviet Relations and Avoiding  
World War

---

Relations with the United States are in the center of foreign policy of the USSR. Everything that the Soviet Union does in the global field takes into consideration the role of the United States. This is not only a current or temporary policy. It is basic that the USA is the central focus in USSR world relations. It matters little whether they reach an agreement with France or engage in discussions with Great Britain; the important thing as far as the Soviet Union is concerned is the aims and attitudes of the United States. How to stabilize relationships with the USA and avoid a global conflict, particularly a nuclear war, is constantly discussed in Soviet society. The Soviet leaders do not hide this aim. They speak to their people quite frankly and openly about this aim. While it is true that the Soviets always present the United States as the villain--the imperialist troublemaker that is engaged in intrigue of some sort or another (and very often in this anti-American propaganda they take liberties with the truth)--they nevertheless would like to reach some kind of accommodation with the United States that would mean stability in foreign relations. They say that there are really only two powers that can determine the fate of the world at this stage in history--the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would like to avoid a general conflict or a collision with the United States in particular.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Soviet Concern Over  
West Germany

The Soviet leadership also fears the possibility of a two-front war and looks upon China as a powerful enemy by whom they will be confronted sooner or later; nevertheless, they believe that the chief enemy is still in Western Europe. The present strategic perspective of the USSR and some of their allies is the possibility of a major military confrontation between the United States and West Germany on the one side and the USSR and its allies on the other side. Even in their public speeches at so important a gathering as the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they spoke of the bilateral military alliance of the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, charging that this is a peculiar sort of alliance or partnership in which each wants to use the other for his own designs and that both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany seek to aggravate tensions in Europe. "These designs, whatever the motives of the partners may be, are spearheaded against the USSR and other socialist countries, against peace and security in Europe and the whole world." This is what Brezhnev said in his report to the Congress. Therefore, the Soviet leaders say that they will never agree or reconcile themselves to the West German militarists, with the support of the United States, receiving nuclear weapons.

Under present world conditions there seem to be no readily apparent avenues by which the United States can change this attitude of the Soviet Union which looks upon the United States as "the instigator of all aggression" in every part of the world. Perhaps an agreement or treaty concerning the proliferation of nuclear arms when adopted can lead to more confidence and trust in United States policy, not merely on the part of the Soviet Union and their allies but also in some other countries, even some that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who are also still fearful of a war of revenge launched by West Germany. North Atlantic Treaty Organization governments may deny this but an objective examination of the real thinking of the masses of people in Europe and Britain will show that there is greater fear of German strength than of the danger of communism.

PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS:  
KEYSTONE OF SOVIET POLICY

Historical Precedents

No matter what slogans the Soviet leaders use, no matter the maneuvers, belligerent or peaceful, they always keep

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in mind the national interests of the USSR, and this is borne out by an examination of Soviet policy over a period of many years.

In the first few years of the Soviet Revolution Soviet leaders openly spoke of international aims and talked about carrying the revolution by force to other countries, and this did happen. There were revolts in Hungary, Germany, and in the Far East, including China, all these with Soviet aid. The defeats suffered in these countries, the inability of the Communist International to rally the working classes in other parts of the world to follow the example of the October Revolution of 1917, and the economic chaos and famine resulting from these setbacks, caused Lenin to take another look at the prospects of world revolution and place the emphasis on economic development. Some of the present ambitious, industrial plans were given to the Bolshevik Party and to the Soviet Government in embryo form by Lenin.

After Lenin's death, the struggle within the Soviet Party and Government between Stalin and Trotsky was related to this question of "permanent revolution," now vulgarized by the Chinese. The Trotsky thesis was rejected, and the Stalin concept of "building socialism in one country" was policy until World War II. After the Trotskyist concept of "exporting revolution" was defeated, the ambitious Soviet five-year plans were initiated. But even prior to that, the Soviets tried to reach agreements, and did succeed in reaching agreements and signed treaties with many states in Europe and other countries on different continents. The Communist International, always an instrument of the Soviet Union, and other organizations like the Red International of Labor Unions, etc., created by the Soviet Union, were at the same time working to subvert society in other countries.

But in all of these activities, the Soviets never gave up their national interests. The Soviet Union received the unqualified endorsement of the world communist movement for all its policies. The justification was that since the Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world, encircled by enemies on all sides, it must receive the unconditional support of communists everywhere, even if Soviet aims hurt other countries. Communists in all countries, including the United States, were the chief apologists for the Bolshevik terror and oppression of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the population in the Soviet Union. Then, as now, the Soviets never consulted the other communist parties when they adopted policies that were in their own national interests. The liquidation of the kulaks, the big purges that took place under Stalin, were justified or camouflaged with the use of international revolutionary slogans that these terror campaigns were necessary to "defend the only socialist state" against aggressive imperialism.

When the Soviet State deemed it necessary to reach an understanding with Hitler Germany, they did not consult any communist party. On the contrary, they submitted to the demands of Hitler and even sacrificed many militant communists in Poland and Germany so that they could reach this agreement with the Nazis. The Soviet-Nazi pact, however, did cause a cleavage in the communist movement, but it was only temporary. For the communists at that time, still organized in the Communist International, saw in this pact a peaceful intent, namely, to combat the "allied imperialists" who had "betrayed" their agreements with the Soviet Union. In the Communist Party, USA, the shock was so great that the American communist leaders at that time tried to convince the membership that obviously there must have been some "secret clauses" in the Soviet-Nazi pact because the Soviet Union would never sign an agreement with the Nazis that would sacrifice revolutionary principles, etc. The Soviet Union through the use of demagoguery about "proletarian internationalism" and "peace" did keep the majority of the then existing communist parties in line. When the American communists used the slogan "the Yanks are not coming," this was giving aid and comfort to the national ambitions of the USSR under the guise of peace. When the Soviet Union was attacked by Hitler Germany, the United States communists answered Stalin's appeal by demanding immediate aid to the USSR and intervention on the side of the Soviets.

The restating of this question is necessary in order to emphasize again and again that regardless of the international trimmings in Soviet documents or slogans the national interests of the USSR come first. When World War II was coming to an end and the Soviets sent their armies into the neighboring states and set up puppet regimes, it was still with the same aim: the strengthening and protection of Soviet interests. This very nationalism of the Soviet Union led to contradictions and the subsequent loosening of the hold that they had upon what have come to be called the "satellites." To emphasize this question

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of national interests, it is well to remember that Stalin did not give unqualified support to the Chinese Communist Party. It was only when the Chinese communists were moving to take power despite the Soviet Union, that they received some aid from the Soviets. Even after the establishment of communist rule in China, Stalin held out against concessions to the Chinese. It was only much later that the Russians agreed to give back part of Manchuria and Port Arthur to the Chinese. Whatever agreements were signed with the satellite socialist states, they were always favorable to the USSR, whether it concerned economics, boundaries, or military matters.

Soviet Pursuit of National Interests  
Through Relations with Anti-Communist  
States

The Soviet Union has relations with many countries including countries that are still in a very unsettled state, countries that have problems with their neighbors and countries that suppress their communists. Yet, relations between the Soviet Union and these countries have very little to do with ideology, or liberty, or legality, or freedom for communist parties. To this day, Egypt does not permit a communist party, yet the relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union remain normal. There is no legal communist party in Algeria. When the Algerian Government of Ben Bella was overthrown, the Soviet Union did not break with the Boumedienne Government. When the communists of Iraq were executed and thrown into prisons by the thousands, the Soviet Union did not break with that government. When Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana, the Soviet Government continued its relations, even though they used the words of Nkrumah as an excuse for not breaking off diplomatic and economic relations. Despite the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of communist sympathizers in Indonesia, the Soviet Government has not broken relations with the Indonesian Government though they did recently send a diplomatic protest objecting to the campaign of "anti-communism."

Khrushchev Removal Related  
to National Interest

When Khrushchev was removed from leadership of the Soviet Party and Government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at that time took into consideration the feeling of the Soviet people--their grievances.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

against the Soviet Government and particularly against Khrushchev. The Soviet people, whose standard of living was being slowed down, attributed their problems to the Khrushchev foreign aid "giveaway program." The man on the street was of the opinion that Khrushchev was giving away food, machinery, and other things that should be used or consumed by the Soviet people. In this way they believed he was neglecting their national interests. The opinion generally among the Soviet population was that Khrushchev was paying more attention to international adventures than to the solution of pressing domestic economic problems. If the people did not feel that their immediate interests or national interests were being neglected or sacrificed without receiving something more tangible in return, it is doubtful that the present leadership could have taken over.

Soviet Split with China Based  
Upon National Interest

When the Soviet Government reached the point where they were ready to engage in a political struggle with China, it was based upon national interests rather than ideology. Of course, in the polemics that ensued only ideology was stressed. But it is recalled that the sharp division actually took place first around the questions of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, and second, around the Soviet relationship with or effort to reach an agreement with the United States. This is not a mere abstract deduction. For years prior to the open announcement of differences, the Chinese demanded that the Soviets give them nuclear weapons, or give them the industry so that they could create their own nuclear establishment. The Soviet Government, for policy reasons related to the world situation, did not wish to create another nuclear power on its own borders. It did not matter to the Soviet Union that this power, the Chinese People's Republic, was in communist hands. In their appeal to the communist parties of the world, the Soviets used the argument that Chinese recklessness would lead to world nuclear conflict and that the Soviet concept of the possibility for "peace in our time" and the idea of "peaceful coexistence" are quite different than the Chinese theory that there can be no peace until imperialism is destroyed everywhere. It was in the defense of peace and the avoidance of global nuclear war that the Soviets tried to rally world opinion, and first of all the world communist movement, against China. The theory first raised at the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that "war is not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

fatally inevitable" was debated and accepted by the eighty-one parties meeting in Moscow. The Chinese were very bitter about the Soviet Union trying to reach an accommodation with the United States. They had really believed that the Soviet Union or Khrushchev at the Camp David meetings with Eisenhower had betrayed the interests of China and reached an accommodation with the United States. Subsequently, the debates and quarrels had once again indicated that the Soviet Union placed its national interests and influence first, and that the Chinese did likewise in response to the Soviets.

Soviet National Interest Takes  
Precedence Over "Internationalism"

The average communist is in a state of bewilderment and almost disbelief as a result of this basic quarrel and particularly the Chinese demands for boundary revision. Communist ideology has consistently stressed the international aspects of the movement. Communist dogma rejects "bourgeois nationalism," yet every communist state has some problem affecting its national interests in relation to some other communist state, not only in relation to capitalist states. The conclusion that must be drawn in the present world situation is that even for the socialist states, beginning with the Soviet Union, China, Romania, Yugoslavia and others, the question of nationalism, or national sovereignty as some call it, plays a most important role. It may be said that this nationalism or national self-interest supersedes their "proletarian internationalism," no matter how loud the denial.

Importance of "Internationalism"  
in World Communist Movement, and  
Soviet Use of This Policy to  
Advance Soviet National Interest

Nevertheless, in placing the problem of national interest first, the influence and power of communist international ideology cannot be dismissed. Internationalism is still an important part of Marxism-Leninism, and in conditions of struggle, especially where the communists do not have state power, it is expected that communists from the so-called "oppressor nations" will subordinate their national interests to those of the so-called "oppressed nations" in the struggle against imperialism. On the domestic scene, this means that communists in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the United States, no matter to which wing they belong--the pro-Moscow or the pro-Peking or the pro-Cuban--must struggle against their own government, their own people, to help the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, or Ghana, or for that matter any other country that is fighting against imperialist oppression. The expression of this concept can be observed in a more concrete way in connection with the struggles in the USA, Australia, etc., against the war in Vietnam.

The ideas of "internationalism" are probably more widespread in the Soviet Union than in any of the other communist countries. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union camouflages its drive for national advantages and its national interest under the banner of "proletarian internationalism." This is a traditional holdover from the days when the Soviet Union was the only communist state\* and all parties used the same slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union." (This slogan is no longer used--it is not dignified for such a big power to permit its use. Such a country not only defends itself but is capable of defending others. Therefore, "International Solidarity" is the substitute slogan.)

The Soviet Party leadership works hard at this internationalism with very deliberate goals and aims. This propaganda work is carried on not solely for the purpose of strengthening its leadership and one might say its hegemony over the international communist movement. "Internationalism" is also utilized in defense of its foreign policy. This is how national interests can be placed before the people of the Soviet Union and the people of other countries as "unselfish policies." The internationalism expresses itself nowadays chiefly around the question of peace. Were it not for this desire for peace on the part of the Soviet people, it would be very difficult for the Soviet Party to utilize the banner of internationalism almost as it did in the old days. Because the Soviet Union is the most powerful country in the so-called "socialist community," "the protector" of the other states against "aggressive imperialism," it gives them possibilities to use the phrase "international solidarity."

---

\* The term "communist state" is not being used here in the theoretical sense as the highest stage of society wherein the communist program states "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." It is used here only in the sense of designating that these are countries which are led by communist parties and are striving for this goal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the report to the last Party Congress, Brezhnev stated that in the previous year the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had met with the leadership of sixty communist and workers parties and with two hundred delegations. This is how they strengthen their international influence. But the Soviet communist leadership has another very practical purpose in strengthening its ties with the rest of the worldwide communist movement on every continent. First, they retain their ideological influence and loyalty by arriving at common conclusions or aims. Second, they strengthen the fifth column in every country even though the hold of the Soviet Party and Government is not as strong as in the past over the other parties. They nevertheless find ways and means and methods to retain the loyalty of these various parties. They are satisfied if they reach agreement on most of the political problems and do not push for one-hundred percent endorsement of Soviet policy. They emphasize the "equality" of parties and they generally get the leadership of other parties to speak for them as if the policies of the Soviet Party and Government were their own policies arrived at on the basis of their own national needs.

It is known that they also use very practical methods to retain their hold on the international communist movement besides political influence. These include ideological indoctrination; that is, the various parties send people to schools of all sorts in Moscow. The Eastern Europeans send people for training not only in the universities and scientific institutions and industry, but to the military academies as well. A good part of the work and studies of all these institutions deal with ideological problems and international indoctrination. Even the students from the less developed countries who come to the special schools like Lumumba University and other schools must take ("voluntary") courses in Marxism-Leninism. The other socialist countries do the same things on a smaller scale to influence foreign parties. In each of these communist controlled countries we can find hundreds, if not thousands, of people from all over the globe studying, working, or participating in some of their cultural and industrial institutions. These governments not only try to influence these people but try to utilize individuals to act in their behalf as a fifth column, as propagandists for the ideas of communism, and some individuals are utilized as espionage agents.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Domestic Factors Affecting  
Soviet National Interest

The Soviet people have gone through two World Wars in this century and years of civil war. At the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders admitted for the first time in actual figures the enormous casualties that they suffered in World War II. The Soviet people in this last half century have not known the real meaning of freedom and peace. They had a few years of "plenty" or "prosperity" in the middle thirties. They still refer to that period as the "golden years." At the end of World War II, most of the European part of the Soviet Union had been destroyed. Most of their cities were totally or partially leveled and they had to rebuild practically from scratch. In the rebuilding process they made enormous sacrifices in carrying out the ambitious postwar policies of Stalin. They made further sacrifices in holding on to the satellite states that border the USSR or at the time were the forward bases of Soviet power. Although it is true that for years they took tribute from these countries, it is doubtful that they received as much as they put into some of these countries who even built industries with Soviet help that they never had before.

The satellite countries, too, with a few exceptions, suffered immensely as a result of destruction in World War II and occupation by the Hitlerite Armies, and the task of reconstruction was accomplished largely with Soviet aid at the expense of sacrifices of the Soviet people. Even today the Soviet people, who are better off materially speaking than they ever were, resent the better-clothed and better-fed people in some of the other socialist states. Very often one can hear the remark of a Soviet citizen, "If we didn't send our meat to Hungary or if we didn't send our textiles to Bulgaria, we would be as well-fed and better-clothed than they are."

The Soviet leadership is therefore trying first of all to improve the living standards of its people. This is now visible in many ways--improved housing, more goods, better methods of public feeding, more attention to quality, etc. Yet, the Soviet people and of course the Soviet leadership feel that the USSR is still materially insecure.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Soviet Failure to Solve the  
Crisis in Agriculture

While the Soviets have solved numerous industrial problems and have been able to increase productivity, they have failed to reach the utopian goals (divorced from reality) set by Khrushchev in the seven-year plan that was to pave the road to communism surpassing the USA. The most plaguing problem of all, up to now, is the failure to solve the crisis in agriculture. It may mean nothing to an American if for one reason or another he went into a supermarket and could not buy a few pounds of flour, but Russian history and tradition see hunger in the background when they cannot obtain flour to do their own baking. The prohibition of Matzho baking for the Jewish Passover until recently was due to this strict rationing of flour rather than contempt for a religious ritual. It was only last year that the Soviet Government released flour in bulk form to be sold in the stores for some important holiday. This sale of flour was considered a good and happy omen by the Soviet people. Hunger was no longer stalking in the background symbolically speaking.

This is not meant to imply that the Soviet people are starving--this is not so. They have enough of the basic commodities. There is no rationing, although there may be many things in short supply and much of this is most often due to poor transportation and bad distribution. But the fact remains and the Soviet people know it and the wide world knows, that during the last number of years the Soviet Union has had to import grain. From time immemorial grain was considered equal to gold (if not more so) in both old and present-day Russia.

Last year the USSR produced a bumper harvest due to favorable weather conditions and improved organization. After discarding the erratic experiments of Khrushchev, the Soviets are just beginning to solve this enormous agricultural problem. There is no need to repeat or list the measures they have undertaken to solve this problem, noting only in passing that there is great stress on scientific agriculture, on daily material incentive, prices, pay, pensions, housing, conservation, etc. Of course, the building up of a giant fertilizer industry takes high priority. Americans who are used to surpluses and even payment for reduction of planted acreage cannot easily grasp the plaguing problems that the Soviet Union faces due to a backward agriculture.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Additional Strains on Soviet  
Economy: Foreign Aid, Arms  
Race

Soviet help to the developing states, Asia and Africa and other parts of the world, is also a big strain. But to retain its influence in the communist camp, as well as in world competition with the United States, the Soviet Union, even if it gives aid in measured amounts, cannot and will not let go. The strain would lessen if the Soviet Union would spend less on armaments but this they will not do. On the contrary, since Khrushchev, although their boasts about bigger megaton bombs have decreased; the building of armaments goes on. How to lessen these strains--how to satisfy the material needs of their own people--these questions are constantly being discussed by the Soviet leadership. Soviet national interests require a "breathing spell" from the fears of a big war. The people want this and that is why the USSR assumes a posture with emphasis on the removal of tensions. This posture is not always the same. From time to time the Soviet leadership takes a more belligerent stance even within the context of the policy of peaceful coexistence. This new posture is a "dialectical" combination of efforts for peace and threats against the imperialists.

Necessity of Communist "Example"  
of Abundance in Soviet Union

The present leadership, as the Khrushchev leadership before, believes that the influence of communism cannot spread unless they are able to prove by an abundance of material things that communism is superior to capitalism. In their argument with the Chinese, the Soviet leaders always use the necessity of building up at least one socialist country to serve as an example that would be convincing to the working people from Western countries, not only to people in the United States but even to people in more backward countries. This necessary example is to show that materially socialism can do just as well if not better than advanced capitalist countries. But the Soviets have not been able to do this up to now, although they have been making marked progress. Compared to a decade ago, it must be admitted that despite many difficulties and failures they have moved ahead.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Survival of Soviet Leadership  
Requires Solution of Economic  
Problems

Preceding the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there was a struggle for leadership in the Soviet Party, and in a one-party state this means the control of the Soviet Government. The Brezhnev forces won. When the question was posed as to how long this leadership could remain in power and retain the confidence of the Soviet people, knowledgeable Russian Party members would say that the test will come in the solution to the pressing economic problems. The leadership that solves these problems and continues to improve the standards of living of the Soviet people will remain on top. If this leadership does not solve these numerous international and domestic problems, they could be ousted as Khrushchev was.

The Soviet leadership is constantly straining to solve these numerous domestic problems in industry and agriculture. Now they are experimenting with new methods of planning, production and price schedules. These things are in the forefront in the Party organization, in the trade unions, in the press, radio, television, in education, etc.

These problems and their solution cannot be separated from the Soviet efforts to work out a cooperative relationship with the other socialist states. Just as the Soviet leadership cannot "command" its own people as in the days of Stalin, they cannot command the smaller Eastern socialist countries in the same old way. Instead, they try to convince and exhort.

Soviet Young Leadership  
and Youth

Up to this time, it can be said that the younger generation of leaders in the Soviet Union has followed the lead of the present leaders. Although it is known that there is a struggle going on in the Soviet Union between the generations, and available information and facts indicate that this struggle is going on constantly, it has been resolved temporarily by bringing some younger people into the leadership of the government and the party. How long this unity of the generations can go on, or how long this new leadership will follow in the footsteps of the old in retaining at least a surface unanimity after a policy is agreed upon, is hard to say. This depends on both economic and political factors.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As already stated, the present leadership of the Soviet Union will be measured by the degree of their success in solving economic problems. They will also be measured by their ability to stabilize the political situation internationally. This is not to suggest that their domestic situation is unstable. As long as they are able to place the danger of war in the background and strive for normalizing relations with other countries, the present leadership will not be challenged. But it is well to remember that prior to the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union some of this leadership favored more militant and aggressive action on the international front. Generally they favored more armaments and an armed direct military confrontation against the United States in Vietnam. There were even grumblings against any effort that would lead to negotiated disarmament. These younger leaders may have now concluded that they overestimated their strength, but they constantly show a greater belligerency than the older experienced present leadership. Some of these younger leaders favored a tightening of controls over the people, the limiting of dissent or freedom of speech. These young leaders favored for a time reverting to the control-like methods of the police.

It is necessary to make a distinction between the younger leaders and the youth in the Soviet Union. The masses of youth have grown up in the post-Stalin era. They are ashamed of what took place in their country during the Stalin period. They have developed a broader outlook regarding the rest of the world. They are more educated and better acquainted with what's happening outside the Soviet Union. It can be said that they have developed in a limited sense a democratic outlook. They are also the ones who understand the sacrifices that would have to be made in the event of a nuclear war. Among these youth are individuals, even groups, that fight for a more liberal cultural and literary outlook. The younger poets who are most often condemned by the leadership for running away with the reins are symptomatic of this present youth. To cite an example, there is the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko and others. It is no longer a secret that most of the literary circles were against the use of the courts to condemn the writers Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky. There were even protest meetings in Moscow. There were secret round-robin petitions circulated. The condemned writers' works were mimeographed and distributed. It is only the continued threat of force and reprisals that keeps the lid upon the literary and artistic world in the USSR. They

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

went through a complete reorganization in literary journalism in an effort to stem the progressive and liberal trend. They turned the Literary Gazette which was a daily into a biweekly.

At the time when it appeared there was going to be a struggle between the present older leadership and the younger leadership as represented by Aleksandr N. Shelepin, a member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet youth understood what would happen if the Shelepin forces in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union came out on top. There was even talk about possible resistance in demonstrations if that group would persist and once again use the old methods of Stalinist repression. This discontent of the youth reached the ears of the party and its leadership and this made it possible for them to hold back these younger, militant but nationalist leaders.

There is a youth problem in the Soviet Union. In many respects it is similar to the problems of youth we face in the United States. This younger generation does not exhibit the same discipline as the older generation. They know very little about revolutionary struggle. They are only interested in immediate problems--their education, their profession, and increased material things. However, by no means can it be said that the youth has abandoned Marxism-Leninism or Soviet nationalism. It would be naive to interpret this "youth rebellion" to mean that. The children in the Soviet Union take their Marxism-Leninism with their milk, in a manner of speaking. In the kindergartens and the very first grades, they are taught the meaning of the revolution and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Even the youth organizations are named after Lenin, like the "Leninist Pioneers" or the "Leninist Komsomol," etc. But these youngsters are not the fanatical revolutionaries of the Bolshevik type.

Patriotism and Peaceful Desires  
of Soviet People--Can United  
States Exploit by Appeal to  
Their National Interests?

There is, however, one thing that must be kept in mind in dealing with the Soviet people, that is,--that even if the people oppose some particular policy of their government, they do believe that their government is actually fighting for peaceful coexistence. It can even be said that they are the pressure that moves this leadership to try to reach accommodations with other countries and to live in peace, particularly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

with the United States. It is correct to state that the Russian leadership responds to the desires of their people on this question.

The Soviet people have gone through a lot of suffering during their fifty years since 1917, beginning with the long period of civil war and extending through the wars that followed. They have suffered invasion and the destruction of a good part of their country and its people. Even if the Soviet Government did not keep the past alive, especially the Nazi invasion, the majority of Soviet citizens would not forget this, for most have lost members of the family in the war or suffered greatly during the German rule. The people want peace and do not want to repeat the experience and sufferings of World War II.

The Russian people have a traditional sense of patriotism; they believe in their country and would fight for their country if they thought it was threatened. But the Soviet people will be moved by their self-interests, and if the United States should want to point to some wrongdoings of the Soviet Government, it must in the clearest terms show that that government is responsible for creating a certain atmosphere that leads to wars or to a situation that could lead to the abrogation of world peace. In this sense one appeals to the people to protect their national interests without violating their patriotic feelings.

SOVIET SUPPORT OF "WARS OF  
NATIONAL LIBERATION"

While Basic Policy is Peace,  
Soviet Union Endorses "Wars  
of National Liberation"

In fighting for its interests, the Soviet Union, in keeping with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, endorses revolutionary movements throughout the world and gives aid to these revolutionary movements and to governments that have established themselves either through obtaining independence from colonial rule or winning independence through armed struggle. All the resolutions of the Soviet Party, as resolutions of communist parties the world over, consider the "wars of national liberation"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

as a part of the general revolutionary struggle, and they are pledged to give aid to these movements as long as they are anti-imperialist. In carrying through this policy, the Soviet Union separates what they call wars of national liberation and wars for independence from the concept of general war. They attempt to show that there is no contradiction between the effort to avoid a world war and at the same time to help carry on wars of national liberation.

The Soviet leadership has concluded that nuclear wars can be devastating and may result in the annihilation of human civilization. They incessantly claim that they are the only state defending the people of the world from catastrophe by fighting for peace and against nuclear war. In their relations with other countries, socialist and capitalist, even where they have military alliances as in Eastern Europe, they always emphasize that world peace is paramount. Wars of liberation, though they have to be supported, are secondary, and while they do not accept the ideas of "limited wars" except insofar as they mean wars of liberation, in their inner discussions they establish a limit wherever there is a real danger that the local conflict could broaden into a conflict between big powers--especially between the Soviet Union and the United States. At such a point (actually a form of "brinkmanship") they would be prepared to reach some compromise. This was the case in the Cuban confrontation when the United States compelled the Soviets to remove their missiles. It was not only a question of being handicapped strategically but also the fear of a global conflict and its consequences. It can be said that the population of the Soviet Union was not prepared for such a conflict, and when Khrushchev agreed to the compromise over the protests of Fidel Castro, this served the Soviet national interests and took into consideration the feeling and understanding of the Soviet people and the people of the other Eastern European countries.

"Wars of National Liberation"--Roots  
and Countermeasures

Those who are willing to face reality can see that such class wars of "liberation" are destined to spread or occur in various parts of the world. This being so, the question of greatest importance to the United States is how to prevent the communists from taking over. Can an armed force from another country, even the United States, put down such insurrections at all times? The communists see these wars as "inevitable."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and therefore they are prepared for them. They prepare for them by using the native population to fight their own battles. These "rebels" have roots in the native soil and among the population, and thus they weaken the charge of "invasion" or "aggression." The big task that faces the United States, if it is to preserve its world influence and safeguard its own national interests, is to foresee these "inevitable" situations, to study the social and political problems more carefully in each given country, to try to find leadership that speaks for the people, for the most numerous sectors of the population.

A leadership must be found that speaks for those who have real grievances and who have been oppressed. It follows that such people lose nothing when they fight for issues and things that will be of benefit to themselves, their people and their country. This cannot be a mercenary army. Volumes have been written about guerrilla warfare; and fanatical maniacs like Ernesto "Che" Guevarra and Fidel Castro see in this type of warfare the answer to all problems. But the truth is that the guerrilla army is only as useful and powerful as its indigenous roots. If such bands or armies or groups have no support from the local population, no matter under what flag they fight, they will be confronted with the same problems faced by United States forces in many villages in Vietnam--they sometimes find it hard to distinguish between enemy and friend. Of course, this is a big question and there are many prior problems to be solved in each and every country.

If Latin America is to serve as an example, it must be evident at the outset that it is impossible to solve every problem. Yet, no problem will be solved if the United States does not take the lead in developing a cadre that understands its own country and the national interests of that particular country, that will not only make promises, but with American aid will bring about some genuine, deep, social changes in the structure of that society to uproot the remnants of feudalism or semi-slavery. In this way not only do people fight their own battles but viewing the matter from a national viewpoint the United States can husband its own national manpower and resources and increase its influence among allies fighting for the same aims. --Such phrases as "freedom," "democracy," "the free world," etc., will take on a new and fuller meaning. Some of these phrases have a very real meaning, but the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

population in the backward countries of the world will not be mobilized on this basis. When the peasant in Brazil cannot even lay claim to half an acre of land, to talk to him about "free enterprise" is like talking to the wind. Merely winning a landlord or paying off some general or colonel to fight on one's side will not increase one's influence. It may make it possible to hang on, momentarily, but eventually the problems facing the population will have to be solved. In one form or another they will try to solve these problems by forming guerrilla bands or using other terrorist means. They may call for help or receive voluntary help from a Castro, but this help comes from a system totally antagonistic to the democratic way of life.

Lessons of Wars of Liberation  
(Spain, Korea): Soviet Union  
Not Directly Involved

There are some lessons for United States political and military strategists to be drawn from these many wars beginning with the war in Korea. World society is so split up and constituted today that more wars of the type now being fought in Vietnam will erupt, perhaps on different continents simultaneously, and strategic lessons are imperative, not merely in the area of military aspects but also in the areas of political and social problems.

During the 1930's a civil war was fought in Spain in which the communists used an international brigade. Thousands of Americans traveled overseas as volunteers, as did British, Germans, Panamanians, Canadians, Yugoslavs, etc. The Russians who were there were only "advisers." The Soviets were merely suppliers of arms, and from time to time they contributed their military know-how. But Soviet manpower in great numbers did not become involved in this war. The Soviets did not have many more fighting men in Spain than there were Americans.

In the war in Korea, most of the arms were supplied by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not put any soldiers in the field to fight. They were in a better position strategically in Korea than they are now in Vietnam for they border on North Korea and have adjacent ports. But no Russians were actually fighting in North Korea. The Chinese stepped in with the so-called

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"volunteer" army only when their national interests were seemingly threatened. The Russians in deference to Chinese interests permitted their "volunteers" to go in. This did not hurt the USSR--by supplying arms and supplies they let the North Koreans and Chinese fight for their own interests and those of the USSR. At the same time the United States was involved in a bloody war while the Soviets turned their attention to efforts to gain advantages in the West. They were not involved directly; the Chinese and the North Koreans carried the ball for them.

Wherever civil war breaks out or there is some other conflagration, the Soviet Union sends advisers and aid, but they try not to get involved with their own manpower. An immediately apparent application of this observation in the contemporary situation is obviously United States involvement in Vietnam. The logical corollary is the important question of how fast the United States can build a government and an army in Vietnam so that the Vietnamese can do their own fighting. They will need aid and advice for perhaps a long time but that is different than fighting for them. Certainly, other lessons of equal consequence can be gleaned for current application from a study of these wars of liberation in the past.

#### VIETNAM

##### Soviet Union Wants Vietnam Peace But Must Give Aid to North Vietnam

Keeping in mind Western Europe, Germany first of all, the Soviet leaders are in favor of bringing an end to the war in Vietnam in order to remove the possibility of being dragged in either by the Chinese or by escalation on the part of the United States. The war in Vietnam is used as an excuse and as a reason for the failure to reach accommodation with the United States in other fields, whether diplomatic, trade, or the solutions to other troubles in the world.

However, in view of their conflict with China and in view of the demands of their allies in Eastern Europe for Soviet defense, particularly against Western Germany, the Soviet leadership cannot help but continue to give aid to Vietnam as proof of their loyalty and leadership of the socialist campaign against

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

imperialism. The leadership of the other socialist states has been quite critical of what they have termed "inadequate aid" given to Vietnam in this conflict. When the United States first sent large contingents of troops to Vietnam, some of the leadership in the Eastern bloc demanded a more militant resistance on the part of the USSR. It now appears that the Soviet Union has convinced their allies that whatever they are doing, as limited as it may seem, is in accordance with the wishes and desires of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese and for these reasons they could do no more. They also have convinced their partners in Eastern Europe that a confrontation with the United States in the Pacific or Southeast Asia would weaken the Western front and it is in this area of the world that the USSR and the East European socialist states are most interested at the present time.

Recent Increase in Soviet Militancy  
Noted on Vietnam But Fear of War's  
Spread Remains

A more militant attitude regarding Vietnam and a more vehement anti-United States campaign can be noted emanating from the USSR in the last few weeks. This may be due to many things happening in the world that can be interpreted by the communists as a spreading discontent or a "radicalization" of the masses--the election results in France, the anti-United States demonstrations during the Vice President's trip, the struggles in Greece, in Spain, the riots in Aden, the setback of the Government in Japan, the efforts of the West German Government to talk to the East German leadership, the racial strife in the United States, the continued strikes in the United States, the continued demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, etc.--all are taken into account and measured. The Chinese situation is also a contributing factor in this "flexible" posture of the USSR. Yet the changing tactical position of the Soviet leadership does not mean it is abandoning its main line.

Discussions with the main Soviet leadership reveal that they did not want this conflict in Vietnam to spread, and that after the spread they used their influence as much as they could to contain the war in Vietnam, to prevent it from spreading. If the Soviet Union was not involved in a serious conflict with the Chinese, they would probably consider the war in Vietnam as

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"a diversion" that keeps the United States occupied and "bleeding." But what the Soviet Union worries about, and this they discuss quite frankly with their friends, is that the Chinese are making an effort to involve the Soviet Union and the United States in a war, a direct confrontation. The Soviet leaders fear that once the United States and the Soviet Union would become involved in fighting each other, the Chinese would wait for both powers to weaken themselves and then move in to assert their will at a moment opportune to them.

Propaganda Advantage to  
Soviet Union as Result  
of United States' Involvement in Vietnam

The United States involvement in Vietnam has given communists the world over, to begin with in the Soviet Union, a big propaganda advantage. They have to a large extent succeeded in convincing people in many parts of the world that the United States is the "aggressor" in the world, that the United States has become a "neo-colonial" power, that the United States is using the most modern weapons to "suppress" peoples who are fighting for "independence," and that its methods are as "brutal" if not more so than those of the Nazis. It may not be pleasant to hear this, but a good part of world opinion believes this. No matter whom one talks with in different parts of the world, many believe that the United States is responsible for the war in Vietnam and that the United States does not hesitate to burn, bomb, and destroy people, especially people of another color. This belief has grown since the United States sent into Vietnam hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who carry the chief burden of the war. Some of these falsehoods are not only the result of communist propaganda. The lack of consensus in the United States about the war in Vietnam causes people in Europe, Latin America, and other countries to believe even the most exaggerated and violent propaganda of the communists.

When the United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaty against atmospheric nuclear testing, this took away a powerful propaganda weapon from the communists, who until that time were posing as the only ones who had concern for the human race and its survival. But with the spread of the war in Vietnam, communists once again were able to rally large sections of the people of the world, even those who do not believe in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

communism, even some anti-communists, pacifists, social democrats, and others, against the United States. The Soviets have succeeded in convincing their own people, who are greatly concerned about the war in Vietnam, that the responsibility of spreading the war falls upon the United States and that the United States is endangering the peace of the world.

Reaction of Soviet People  
to Vietnam War

The war in Vietnam has aroused the Soviet people. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government for the first time in many years were able to mobilize large masses of people to demonstrate. These demonstrations may be organized, but they are nonetheless genuine. The United States is really looked upon as the aggressor attacking a defenseless people. Soviet experience during World War II, the bombings they suffered, the scorched earth, etc., is the transferred image in Vietnam. The constant Soviet propaganda against the United States as "imperialist aggressors" keeps this feeling alive among the Soviet citizenry. But above all, the Soviet people fear that the war will spread and lead to a nuclear catastrophe.

Yet, the Soviet people are still able to separate one policy from another and retain their respect for the United States. This is also true among the intellectuals as well as among the educators and industrial executives.

Pressure on Soviet Union Regarding  
Vietnam--From East Europe; From  
China

It is not easy for the Soviet Union to play a pacific role in connection with the war in Vietnam. Just as the United States raises the problem of living up to its "commitments," so do some of the allies of the Soviet Union raise the same question from their point of view. "Will the Soviet Union allow a socialist state to be bombed out of existence or be destroyed by another powerful capitalist state? If this is permitted, we may be next." There is this kind of pressure on the USSR. This pressure was reflected in conversations with the leadership of Poland in late 1966. The Polish leadership would not even listen to American communist suggestions that this war in Vietnam can be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

settled around a peace table. They would not even agree to a tactical gesture whereby Ho Chi Minh or any of the other North Vietnamese leadership might say, "All right, we are going to talk," albeit placing some conditions, but at least answer and say that North Vietnam is interested in peace. The East German Party (the Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and Government were of the same frame of mind although not as belligerent as the Poles. Then there are the Chinese constantly shouting about Soviet "collusion" with the United States. This situation makes it tactically difficult for the Soviet Union to use initiative, to use pressure upon the Vietnamese, on the subject of peace in Vietnam, or even to maneuver. It is known that when members of the Communist Party, USA asked the Communist Party of the Soviet Union leadership to relay to the leadership of North Vietnam the suggestion that they might for "tactical reasons" suggest to President Johnson that they would agree to talk peace, the Soviet leaders would not even undertake to deliver this message although they agreed with it. The Czech communist leadership agreed to convey this message of the American communists, which of course was ignored by the Vietnamese. At the present time, the Soviet leadership uses Vietnam as the chief reason (but keep in mind the other major reason--West Germany) as the excuse for not being able to reach any worthwhile agreements with the United States.

Possibility of Soviet-Chinese  
Agreement to Aid Vietnam

Recent press dispatches indicate some agreement between the Soviet Union and China to expedite the movement of arms to Vietnam. There are also news items about new trade discussions. It is difficult to assess as yet whether these reports have substance or not. The Soviet press still continues to feature the struggle in China without reference to anything new. Only a few months ago the Soviet leaders complained that Soviet-Chinese trade is negligible, almost nil, although they signed new pacts months before (1966) which the Chinese merely ignored.

It is hard to say what the Chinese will finally do in the world communist movement regarding the war in Vietnam. Just as the Soviets are subject to pressure from their allies and communists in all countries about their insufficient involvement in the war in Vietnam, so the Chinese are subjected to pressure from the Soviet Union and from communists all over

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the world. This may compel the Chinese to make some bold moves to give more aid to Vietnam or even to make some more belligerent gestures that could be interpreted as anti-imperialist and anti-American, thus aggravating the situation in Southeast Asia. It would not be surprising, however, if the Chinese and Russians reached some accommodation on Vietnam. The March, 1965, "consultative" conference in Moscow, though not an overwhelming success, was nonetheless a victory for the Soviets in that they lined up the world communist movement on this one issue--unity and aid to Vietnam.

#### Possibility of International Brigade for Vietnam

There is still a big debate going on in world communist ranks about sending volunteers to Vietnam. The Vietnamese do not want a pure Chinese volunteer army in their country. In time such a volunteer army could mean occupation of Vietnam by China. There are historical reasons why the Vietnamese would not want a pure Chinese volunteer army, even if ostensibly for the defense of their country. The Chinese have vetoed Soviet volunteers and other international volunteers. Soviet advisers to Vietnam as of recent date are counted and allowed into Vietnam in very limited numbers. There could be a situation, however, when under the pressure of the war, the Vietnamese will request some smaller socialist states such as Cuba or Tanzania, etc., to send volunteers. In that case it is possible that an international volunteer army made up of communists and their sympathizers (like the International Brigades in Spain) may be organized. But this, too, in the last analysis would depend upon the attitude of China. A volunteer army in numbers could not come into Vietnam by any other route, except by land or air routes through China, unless the Soviet fleet is involved. Such a move by the Soviets is unlikely for they want to avoid a direct clash with the United States, especially if the Chinese remain neutral or continue close control of the land route.

#### Necessity of United States Presence in Vietnam

At this stage it would be most advantageous for the United States, if at all possible, to prevent a Chinese involvement in Vietnam. If it is possible to solve some military problems in connection with the war in Vietnam without taking on the Chinese, it would help avoid throwing the Russians and Chinese together. The United States cannot consider just pulling out of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Vietnam. Pulling out of Vietnam, as experience in the contemporary world amply demonstrates, would leave most of Southeast Asia in the hands of a powerful China. But the United States cannot to its advantage at this time get involved in other so-called wars of liberation while it is fighting in Vietnam.

#### EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS

##### Nationalism Rampant

The phenomenon of nationalism (which theoretically seems to be alien to Marxism) has become an overriding factor even in the ranks of communism. It is not limited to the communist countries. There are nationalist eruptions on every continent, including North America, if we but listen to the rumbles in Canada. Many of the struggles taking place in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, no matter what form they take, have some essence of nationalism. This is especially true in the countries that in the past had a colonial status. These countries are still attempting to assert their nationhood and this problem is even more aggravated if there are some racial questions apparent.

##### Effects of Nationalism on United States Image

There was a time in contemporary history when the United States was almost universally looked upon as an anti-colonial country. Whereas, almost every country in Africa, Asia, and Latin America could point to Great Britain, to France, at one time to Germany, Belgium, Holland, and others, and call them imperialist colonial powers, they could never say this about the United States. Even in old China the United States never claimed extraterritorial rights although every other big power at some time did have such rights.

During the period of World War II the United States was looked upon as a liberator. The United States sent its troops to free many of the occupied countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, etc. For a time, most countries rightfully recognized that the United States fought for their freedom and helped them to obtain the status of independence. The British may not have liked it, the French may have resented it, others may have wished that the United States took another position, but the fact remains that the United States had won for itself standing among these

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

people that were emerging as independent nations. In recent years, however, particularly in Asia and Latin America, the United States has been slandered with the canard of "neo-colonial power." In some of these underdeveloped countries the United States has formed alliances with the aristocracy and "oligarchs"; the communists call these "exploiting classes." This charge has hurt the United States image. Even though these charges are totally false, the fact must be recognized that the United States is seen as a different image among these people than Americans see themselves.

Soviet Efforts to Exploit  
Nationalism to Further  
Communism

The communists, to begin with the leadership of the Soviet Union, have had to take note of the development of nationalism in many parts of the world. They have decided that they can utilize this nationalism for their own ends. Theoretically they make a distinction between what they term "bourgeois nationalism" and "progressive nationalism." In countries that have only a small working class population, they assume that the middle classes and professionals will take control, not by themselves but with the aid of the middle or poorer strata of the peasantry and of course with an assist from the working class. The communists try to direct this national feeling and the desire for independence against "imperialism." Even if a former mother country offers aid, the communists interpret this as neo-colonialism. Communists pretend to offer aid "without strings attached" to retain their influence. But in every case they try to utilize nationalism to further the aims of communism.

When a big country such as the Soviet Union is involved in an aid program, they protect their national image first of all. The first lesson of this kind was driven home at the time of the negotiations with Egypt on the Aswan Dam. The Soviet Union utilized that situation to drive a wedge into the Arab world and this resulted in encouraging other revolutions, most of them aimed against the West. The Soviets did not get any apparent ideological concessions, but they did get the foot of communism, Soviet communism, in the door to the Arab world and the Middle East.

As stated before, in most of these countries, the communist parties have been suppressed, but they nevertheless spread their influence among certain sections of the population. The Soviet Union encourages industrial construction, giving aid that at least in the future may make it possible for some of the militant leaders such as Nasser to make concessions to the people,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and thus strengthen their nationalist consciousness and anti-Western tendencies, subsequently developing into militant anti-imperialism. The Soviet Union is also able to control the communists of these countries and make them follow a tactic in keeping with the policies of their own particular government (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) so that they do not "rock the boat." Here, again, the Soviets are thinking of their own interests and how this given situation will strengthen them. They are not interested in merely strengthening a local group or faction of communists.

#### Soviet Reverses Due to Nationalism

But all has not been clear sailing for the Soviet Union on the turbulent sea of emerging nationalism. Just as the United States has had to contend with certain rebuffs and misunderstandings of its motives on occasion, and a lessening of its influence in some parts of the world, so too communists are worried about the same problem. This emerging spirit of nationalism has corroded their influence. In some instances they had to suffer humiliation. There is nothing much they can do about this. This was the case in Guinea, in Tanganyika, and later in Ghana, where Soviet and other communist advisers were told to stop meddling and get out. The Soviets made concessions and remained, at least still retaining a diplomatic relationship, waiting for future opportunities. But this nationalist spirit has hurt the "socialist camp."

#### Breakup of East European Communist Monolith

If a few years ago it was correct, especially at the time of Stalin's rule, to call some of the countries of Eastern Europe "satellites," it would be incorrect to give this flat designation to most of these countries now. Nearly twenty years ago, Yugoslavia broke the iron bonds of Soviet rule and fought bloody battles to retain its independence. This was something new in the communist movement. It had never happened before. Communists who believed the dogmas of Marx and Lenin could never have dreamed that such a thing would happen. But not only did Tito's Yugoslavia strike the first blow against the monolithic rule of Moscow, it also set an example that shook the communist world at that time to its very foundation. It was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a blow from which Moscow has never recovered even to this day. Some time elapsed before other countries tried to do the same. This is the meaning of the rebellions of the fifties in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, although the communists retained control. But Moscow lost and dare not claim that it rules or even leads the socialist camp.

When the polemics between the Soviet communists and the Chinese began, the Soviets charged that the Chinese encouraged the Poles and Hungarians to take advantage of the situation by demanding more independence from the USSR. Although China is not a small power in the political sense and must be put into the category of a big power, the Chinese severance of "class ties" to the Soviet Union has the same roots as the other nationalist explosions in various parts of the world including those in Eastern Europe. The relationships between each socialist country are supposed to be different but they are not. These countries have no open borders though they call themselves "socialist" and "internationalist." It is more difficult to travel from one socialist country to another than from a capitalist country to any one of these countries. Their visa, passport, and currency restrictions in no way reflect "internationalism." Even communists visiting these countries are looked upon as "enemy aliens" unless they are of the same nationality or part of an official communist delegation.

There are sharp and constant rivalries between each of these states. In private discussions party leaders of one or another socialist country will talk contemptuously about another--Czech versus East German, East German versus Romanian, Hungarian versus Romanian, and on some occasions one or all give vent to anti-Soviet feelings purely from a national point of view. Romania's relations with the Soviet Union and the other East European socialist states is one of the clearest of recent nationalist feuds. Its relationship with China, despite the attitude of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, is an example of independence and its economic advantages for Romania. Despite the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, nationalist feeling and rivalry persist. The Romanian and Yugoslav positions are really "uprisings" for complete independence.

#### Soviet Recognition of Effects of Nationalism

At the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev spoke about the "world socialist system" and its influence on world events. He talked about it as a great

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

achievement of the working class and declared that the world socialist system has not only grown substantially stronger but has developed a good "fraternal relationship." He emphasized that this relationship is generally based upon Marxism-Leninism, mutual support for each other, the principles of "equality," non-interference and mutual respect for each other. But he underlined that the Soviet Government and Party's relations with the other communist and workers parties of the socialist community, as he called it, have become better, closer, and more cordial. Brezhnev went on to explain that the USSR has friendship and mutual assistance pacts with each of these socialist states. When talking about the theories of building of socialism, Brezhnev pointed out that there are "basic laws" of socialist construction that are "common" to all countries and that these laws are well known and have been tested in practice. (Here parenthetically it must be noted that when the first split between the Chinese and the rest of the socialist camp took place, the Chinese at the eighty-one party meeting vehemently denied that there are such "basic laws" of "socialist construction." But if Brezhnev or the Soviet communists were to deny the so-called basic law of socialist construction, they would also have to deny the theories of Marxism-Leninism.)

But the Soviet communists have learned something about this real world where the nationalist feeling is growing. Despite his assertion of the growth of "internationalism," Brezhnev pointed to the following important fact: "Nevertheless, as the socialist countries develop, they are constantly coming up against new problems engendered by the realities of life in all its complexity and variety. It stands to reason that there are no ready-made solutions to these problems, nor can there be any. The development of the world socialist system, therefore, requires a constant creative approach, on the tried and tested basis of Marxism-Leninism, to the problems that arise, it requires the pooling of experience and opinions." Then Brezhnev amplifies that the leaders of socialist states have businesslike contacts, political consultations, they negotiate, they have friendly meetings, sincere talks, they pool experiences and opinions, and in this way in good time they are able to profit from each other's practical experiences and activities and this is of help to the entire socialist system. Brezhnev emphasizes the "variety" of experiences and the need for cooperation to serve each other's national interests. But the thing that stands out in this relationship is that the national interests of this or that given country is paramount.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is true that in summarizing this problem Brezhnev puts some stress on "international solidarity" and the community of interests of all these parties and states, and he talks about the need for strengthening the cohesion of the "socialist community." But it should be emphasized that the Soviets have not lost sight of the conflicting national interests. In order to continue their hold and their present relationships with these countries they give concessions to the "variety of problems" and "different roads" to solutions of problems in the different countries. In fact, this is recognition that there is a split in the ranks of communism. It is true that some countries like the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, or Poland do not always agree with some aspects of Soviet policy, yet they do not always turn each one of these problems into a big issue because there is that paramount question of security against the arising nationalism of West Germany and the fear of a war of revenge. And it is this seeking of security "against the common enemy" that sometimes serves to minimize the differences that exist between each one of these countries and all of them in relation to that big power, the Soviet Union.

Eastern Europe Asserting  
Independence from Soviet  
Union

It would be wrong to imply that this community of socialist states is breaking up, but it is a fact that each country is now acting with some initiative and doing more things, more independently, than they did a few years ago. They no longer bow to the commands of the Soviet Union as they used to. On the contrary, very often they stand up and speak about their differences quite openly. Not only Romania and Yugoslavia, but others such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, at one time or another, have discussed with others their economic differences with the Soviet Union, their political differences, and differences about culture and art. Some emphasize differences in traditional attitudes toward democracy, forms of government, even different attitudes toward the church. Sometimes they even discuss different attitudes toward countries such as the United States, Great Britain, or any other Western country. Many and varied examples can be cited to show how this growing independence is asserting itself.

ISSUES AND METHODS FOR EXPLOITATION  
OF EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALISM

Not Open Anti-Soviet Campaign

What needs to be emphasized is how to utilize this situation in the national interests of the United States. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

effort of the present United States Administration to build "bridges" can best be advanced if it is not started as an open "anti-Soviet" project. These East European countries will not even step on to these bridges because of their military, economic, and other relationships with the Soviet Union if they think the United States approach is based chiefly on this premise. The objective has to be to win these countries and people to the side of the United States or to weaken the hold that the Soviet Union has upon them. But fundamentally this policy cannot be framed in an "anti-Soviet" context.

#### A Closed Society Opens Slowly

In some of these countries American art; theater, and movies are very popular and are shown freely. Sometimes a gesture on the part of some commercial body or social organization in the United States has more effect than months of general propaganda on the air waves.

It is important to keep in mind that the communists not only govern a closed society, but that their party organization is actually the most secret of organizations. This means that most of the decisions of their leadership except those shown in meager form never come out in the open. Their debates are rarely published openly unless in a polemic against a person or policy. Such guarded security is not pried open overnight. It is not realistic to expect that some of these organizations such as communist parties that run governments will make concessions overnight. (There are other parties in some of these ruling coalitions such as the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, but the fact remains that it is the communists that control the government and are the ruling parties, even though in some countries some other parties do exist.)

For example, a children's hospital was built in Krakow, Poland, with United States counterpart funds. When it was dedicated, in spite of the fact that United States funds built it, some of the United States representatives to the dedication were refused visas by the Polish Government and comparatively little publicity or credit was given to the United States among the masses of Polish people. How could United States influence be expressed since they keep such things from the public? Yet something of great use to the Polish people was done and they

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

undoubtedly appreciate this. One must be tactful, modest, and patient. Young United States diplomats must learn from the other side--they must eschew arrogance because they represent a big power. Ways can be found to let the Polish people know that the American people made such a contribution as in this case cited. The Russians built projects in Cambodia and Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and other countries; somehow or other they were invited to the dedications of these projects and the people of these countries know that the Russians built these projects. Their techniques must be studied in order to train people who stick to principles yet at the same time are flexible. The United States can get "credit" even when the communist party tries to shut them out. The communist states are still governed as a closed society, even though the democratic expressions of the people and the opportunities for democratic expression are growing and the people are beginning to talk back--and they do. The authorities cannot do anything about this.

#### Approach--Impression of Honoring Independence

In approaching each country, the United States must think of them, or at least convey to them the idea that the United States thinks of them, as "independent," and that it wants to deal with them as that particular country. No other government but the United States Government and theirs is involved. Czechoslovakia should not be looked upon in the same way as Hungary. Once these governments get the feeling that they are being dealt with as equals, then there can be raised other problems related to other countries, even the USSR. These countries do not want to be considered "satellites," yet at the same time they do not want the Soviet Union to look on them with hostility, as moving away to join another camp. Therefore, the question of independence as a separate state, even if within the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, is very important. This is no small matter.

#### Examples--Hungarian and Czech Attitudes

This jealousy of the air of national sovereignty can be detected in the following cases. When the Hungarians settled a few problems with the United States, they boasted about it. The Russians did not like this but it gave the Hungarians a feeling that they "solved" some problems on their own.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The last complaint of the Czechs was that they have no written agreements on trade with the United States at all. And when some agreements were worked out last summer, the United States Government negotiators said they were all ready to sign in a day or two, but the United States representatives never initialed these documents, and the negotiators never came back. The Czech Government wondered whether the United States was serious or wanted concessions to make the Czechs look bad in the eyes of the Russians. The Czechs talked the same way about the reciprocal air travel agreement. They said that they have reservations and were, therefore, initialing the agreement on a month-to-month basis. The United States never explained these problems and the Czechs held back because of suspicion and "fear" of the Soviets. The Czechs state that they are not being treated as equals by the United States and therefore will not rush to sign binding agreements.

Gradual Relaxation of  
Restraints in Eastern  
Europe

In Poland the government has been trying for years to curb the church, the only non-communist organized body and opposition to the communists. Yet, the church goes on and even carries through demonstrations that have an anti-government meaning. The only time the communists succeed in winning the people to their side is when the church touches an issue (Germany) that the people particularly resent as being anti-national. Furthermore, the intellectual community in Poland has really never surrendered to the communist party (the Polish United Workers Party). The youth in the universities have not been bridled and the peasantry in the main holds to its private land and the collectivization process has bogged down. Why mention these problems? Because these prove that Polish society is not monolithic and can be reached--provided the average Polish citizen is not expected to cheer for the United States against what they consider to be their national interests. This means keen analyses and a lot of tact to advance the interests of the United States.

There are similar situations in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. The communist regime in these countries too had to bend and allow the people to express themselves. It is no

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

small thing for the Czechs to allow Austrian (non-communist) newspapers into the country. The mass tours to border countries by Hungary and the reverse flow of tourists is not only because of the need for foreign exchange although that is important. But more important is the fact that they cannot keep their society locked in. There are possibilities to advance United States interests in these new situations.

The reorganization of industry on the profit and incentive basis makes it more possible for the people to express themselves. This is true in most of these countries, including the USSR. The party can no longer dictate as it once could. To meet the needs of modern industry the communists have to use more or less democratic forms of persuasion-- they have to work according to laws and rules. In the past the communist party would dictate to a bank, a factory, or any social or cultural organization, but they cannot do these things any more. Unless the communists are tactful, they meet resistance and sometimes are met with complete passive boycott or a "silent" revolt. The communists may close a magazine or fire an editor but they must keep in mind the result of this action on the people. Sometimes the action has the opposite effect from what the party leadership desired. They are using dictatorial methods less and less.

Even in the Soviet Union they are faced with the problem of activating the governing organization form known as the "Soviets." These Soviets are organized on a local, regional, city, and national basis. The Soviets do meet but up to now all they do is vote for motions, but there is rarely discussion, debate, or the use of any initiative in these bodies. At the XXIII Congress there was a big discussion on this subject. President Nikolai Podgorny and others of the Soviet leadership made reports on how to give life to these Soviets, how the Soviets can begin to function as parliamentary institutions, that would initiate proposals, carry on debates and reject proposals when they are not good. Since the XXIII Congress, many articles have appeared in the Soviet press on how to "democratize" these bodies. This change is true not only in the Soviet Union but more so in other countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, even in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, etc. This "evolution" is something to think about and analyze.

#### Exploiting the Opening Door to the West

How can the United States put forward ideas that can find reflection in this or that country's society? It can be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

said that the door has been pried open a little--let the United States continue to criticize and at the same time recognize the new. These are not simple things for governments to do. As a result of the disclosure about the Central Intelligence Agency, there may be some temporary setbacks. It may make things difficult for everybody involved in diplomacy and propaganda. The communists may become more suspicious of Americans coming to their countries for any reason. This is not in reference to tourists, but to exchange students, professors, lecturers and industrialists. There are some opinions that we should liberalize our exchange program, for we have more to gain and the communists have more to lose if the program is enlarged. The people they will send to the United States are students or professors and some undoubtedly are convinced communists. But they will bring back from the United States something about the American way of life that cannot be conveyed to them in any other way than by letting them see things with their own eyes. This is not to advocate that the United States let its guard down and let them all in--the United States must continue to be careful and vigilant.

The trade union delegations, most of whom are undoubtedly picked party members, do not always express their "inner thoughts" in their own societies. When these trade unionists come here they will be talked to by other trade unionists. They will be asked questions such as "What kind of trade unions do you have in Russia?", "Here is my paycheck, see what I earn, etc.", "These are our social benefits, etc.", "What protection do you have if something happens to you on the job?" How does their system really compare to that of the United States? Perhaps there are some published studies about wage standards, productivity, labor protection laws, etc., written by an authority on such matters. This author, if he is not known to be anti-Soviet, can really make an impression upon visitors from the Eastern European countries including the USSR.

Those who know life in these countries are convinced that the United States system would come out on top in such a comparison. There are numerous possibilities to take advantage of the loosening ties in the communist world and their movement. Labor conditions is only one avenue of approach.

There used to be talk of the Soviet empire. It is not a Soviet empire any more as it was under Stalin. But even if these countries are still tied to Moscow, the ties have become quite loose compared to 1946. But they have not yet opened up their society. When a foreigner has to fight for a newspaper as most do when they visit there, or tune in to BBC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

or the Voice of America in order to get the news, one can't call these communist countries open societies. But there are more and more opportunities, especially among the new generation, who have no ax to grind that is in the past, or any quarrels with the United States that touch upon their daily life.

### NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

There is a growing nationalism in Latin America. It would be foolish to deny this. This growing nationalism comes not from the big land owners or the wealthy of these countries, nor from the generals or colonels either, but arises chiefly from the middle classes and intellectuals who are looking for identity as a "class" representing all their people. Some of these elements, including the political leaders as well as tradesmen, will try to play off Soviet offers against the United States, "utilizing" both sides just as some countries in Europe and the Middle East utilized the "danger of communism" to wring concessions from the United States. The military dictatorships will want to add to their armaments also by utilizing the bogey of communism even if they have to exaggerate this danger. In this way also, honest nationalists may try to gain by setting the Soviet Union against the United States. But the United States should pay attention to some of these politicians or spokesmen of these middle classes. If the United States does not understand this problem of class relations and shifts in Latin America and set a realistic goal to protect United States national interests in alliance with the majority, it may just walk into a quagmire whose depth may not be fathomable.

Experience has shown that the gap between the rich and the poor in Latin America is very great, and that the people look upon the rich as selfish traitors who will not defend the interests of their country, neither from communism nor from foreign involvement (and this means the United States). There are sections of the population who are not taken in by the communists; these are not communist-minded, they have no special class interest, they do not have dealings with the communists, but are developing a new nationalism with pride in their country--they want to develop their own country. These groups will utilize the new "relation of forces" in the world to set one country against another or to wring concessions from the United States. These things have to be viewed very realistically and not from the narrow viewpoint of a military solution

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

only. The danger lies in momentary solutions without the backing of the people. Such solutions only postpone things while the revolutions take root and the antagonistic feelings toward the United States grow. A realistic approach that can stop communism and cement relations between these countries and the United States is dependent on the involvement of the people in their own problems.

### SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

#### Entire World Communist Movement Weakened

The split in the world communist movement is real and deep. This split began with the breakaway of the Yugoslav League of Communists and Yugoslavia from the communist camp in the late 1940's. The split was further deepened when the excesses of the Stalin terror were disclosed. Students of international communism cannot dismiss these prior events. The communist movement in almost every country began to decline at that time, and lost more influence after the XX Congress disclosures, and lost even more influence during and after the events in Hungary when the revolt of the people was put down by force with Soviet intervention.

Despite the number of organized communist parties in existence today in nearly one hundred countries, the communist movement was never so divided. Though here and there a communist party may show some strength and influence, as in the recent French elections, on the whole most of the communist parties have been weakened by this worldwide split. It can be said that the entire international communist movement, which includes the countries governed by communist parties, has been weakened as a result of the collision between the Soviet Union and China. However, these splits were minor compared to the split of the Chinese Party from the world communist movement which really began in 1958.

#### Sino-Soviet Differences: Charges and Countercharges

There is hardly any need to explain how the Sino-Soviet dispute has affected Soviet foreign policy. The struggle between China and the Soviet Union is not going to be solved in the very near future, if it is ever solved. They may reach temporary small

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

agreements on this or that question, but it is doubtful that any international meeting of communist parties or socialist states can resolve the clashing interests between China and the Soviet Union. Of course, it is difficult at this stage to interpret the meaning of Mao's words "A war may throw us together again." This he raised in discussion with Kosygin and Shelepin in Peking in 1965. The Chinese differences with the Soviet Union relate not only to state problems but also to problems concerning the communist parties. We do know that Mao aimed his chief blow in the "proletarian cultural revolution" against the cadre of the Communist Party of China because they did not follow him. If the Chinese pursue Mao's present tactic of splitting every party, turning this or that faction into a pro-Peking grouping or party, an international meeting of communist parties would not embrace China nor those parties and groups that follow the Chinese line.

This continued split is bound to aggravate relations between the two important parties--the Soviet and Chinese. Not only that, it will aggravate the situation with the allies of the Soviet Union, not only in Eastern Europe but also in Asia. The Chinese are determined to take over Mongolia either in the form of an alliance or through an aggressive invasion and occupation. The Mongolians, of course, are resisting this pressure from China and the Soviet Union is unreservedly committed to the defense of Mongolia. Thousands of Soviet military advisers and troops are in the Mongolian People's Republic. There are some other countries in Asia who though they may not completely be in the Soviet camp, nevertheless, are sympathetic to the USSR because they fear China and look to the Soviet Union for aid and protection. (North Korea and to a lesser degree North Vietnam).

Just as the Chinese cast doubt on the Soviet attitude toward the United States and charge the Soviet Union with "betrayal" of the cause of anti-imperialism, so in turn the Soviet Union casts doubt upon China and its attitude toward the United States. The Soviets charge the Chinese with "talking" a great deal about fighting imperialism but actually doing nothing to fight it. They point to the Chinese tolerance of the British and the Portuguese in Hong Kong and Macao. They accuse the Chinese of hindering and sabotaging aid to Vietnam. They say that China opened the gates for United States troops to invade and bomb Vietnam. They go back to the statements that Mao and Chen Yi made to Edgar Snow and to the foreign press in 1965 and 1966 that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

China would intervene only if China was invaded or Chinese sovereignty threatened. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union also uses the fact that China has up until now not permitted the establishment of Soviet air bases and depots for arms and fuel storage on Chinese soil near the North Vietnam border as further "proof" that the Chinese are not "sincerely" interested in the fate of Vietnam.

But more than that, the Soviets see dire "plots" being hatched, aimed at the Soviet Union by the United States and the present leadership of China. They refer to the hundreds of sessions that have been held between the Chinese and American representatives in Warsaw, and remark that not once did they issue an official communique. "Never do they say what they talk about," challenge the Russians. The Soviet Union also charges that a certain section of American capital is already examining the possibilities of the Chinese market and trying to determine a "price" that China would accept to reach some accommodation with United States at the expense of the Soviet Union. General discussions about China in American forums, conferences, magazines, or congressional committees are referred to by the Soviet press and its leadership as "United States plots" aimed at the USSR.

The Soviet leadership also says that the Chinese are in close cooperation with the Bonn Government against the USSR. They even charge that the intelligence agencies of China and West Germany work together to expose communists in other countries of Europe. And, finally, the Soviet Party points to the Mao Tse Tung leadership and charges them with abandoning the theories of Marxism-Leninism and substituting "Maoism" in its place. These charges are capped with the charge that China is splitting the socialist camp.

#### Advantages to United States From Split

Since the antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union are quite aggravated and will remain so for a long time, it would be best if this struggle between these two powers continues. Any tactic of discord to keep them preoccupied with their own problems and struggles would weaken both the USSR and China while the United States harbors its strength. The United States would then be in a better position if history and the situation require that it take a stand. There is no reason why the United States cannot "deal" with both of these powers if such advances United States national interests. This

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

position of the United States is not based upon favoring or fighting this or that ideology. Certainly the United States does not favor the Marxism-Leninism of the Moscow variety or the Sinofied Marxism of Mao. Both of these ideologies are antagonistic to the United States and to the democratic world. But a stand can be taken on questions that strengthen or weaken United States national interests. As these national interests are strengthened or weakened, the United States affects and influences the entire world. Safeguarding national interests is not in contradiction to the role the United States has to play on a global scale. Just as the communists do not admit peaceful coexistence of ideology, the United States does not compromise its ideology while guarding its national interests.

Can it be said then that the international conspiracy is therefore no longer a threat? It is wrong to draw such a conclusion. While the lack of an "International" and the continued split has weakened this conspiracy, grave portent lies in the existence of a number of "centers" that would like to lead this worldwide conspiracy or to lead it on a "continental" or "regional" basis.

#### Chinese Splitting Activities

The Chinese leadership is building a world center. The Chinese have created a split in every communist party. In some parties they may only have a small group or a faction, but no matter, the small group or faction gravitates around China and is supported by China ideologically and materially. These groups carry on their work against a particular government or institution in keeping with the demands and slogans of China. In some parties the pro-Chinese faction or group is very powerful. This is true not only in some of the Asian socialist countries, in Korea and Vietnam, but it is also true outside the socialist orbit. For example, the pro-Peking faction in India is said to be stronger and in the last elections came out even ahead of the official pro-Moscow Communist Party of India.

The Chinese use exactly the same methods as the Soviets in trying to influence or retain a hold on the communist parties all over the world. Even in the United States this is known to be a fact, for the Chinese influence not only the Progressive Labor Party which calls itself communist and does not hide its affiliation with Peking, but also some so-called "non-communist" organizations or associations. Such publications

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

as the National Guardian, the Monthly Review, Minority of One, the Far East Reporter, Spartacist, Hammer and Steel, etc., are under the influence and in the grip and pay of Peking. Some of the guerrilla bands that operate in a number of countries in Latin America received their first training in China and were sent back in a conspiratorial manner to split the various parties and to impose upon them a policy of armed struggle.

### Cuban Splitting Activities

In the Americas, Castro is now playing the same role as the Chinese played in the early 1960's. Castro has openly stated that he wants hegemony over all the parties in Latin America and that they must submit to the will and demands of Cuba. Since he did not have his way, he organized factions and groupings in a number of Latin American parties. Even the big parties in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Guatemala) are no longer united. When "Che" Guevarra left Cuba it was said that his mission was to organize these factions in guerrilla units and carry out the slogan of turning the Andes into the Sierra Maestras of the Americas. We know that Castro in a dictatorial manner has virtually liquidated the old Communist Party of Cuba, that some of the most powerful leaders of the old Communist Party in Cuba have been exiled, jailed, or demoted. The few that remain occupy posts that are of little significance in the governing of Cuba. Fidel Castro, since he has taken over that party, has placed his young followers into every position of importance.

Castro has challenged not only the communist parties of Latin America but also the international communist movement including the Soviet Party. He is using the same phraseology as the Maoists in China use, that is, that most communist parties are not revolutionary. He has recently served notice that he will work with and unite with every group, whether it is communist or not, that wants to "make revolution." He coined the phrase that "it is the business of revolutionaries to make revolutions." The majority of parties in Latin America have suffered splits but in the main, especially the bigger parties, they have not submitted to Castro's dictates. The conference of Latin American parties that is scheduled to be held in July, 1967, it is rumored, will not be held since most of these parties, as Pablo Neruda indicated during his last visit to the United States, want neither to endorse Castro at this time nor openly condemn the Cuban revolution, the first of its kind in the Western Hemisphere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Resistance of Communist Parties  
to Any New "International"

The split in the world communist movement is going to continue for a long time. There are some communist parties, like those in Scandinavia, for example, who have become totally "neutral" and unaffiliated. The Italian Communist Party has up to now resisted the formation of an international organization of communists. The Italian communists and some other communist parties of Europe do not even favor an international meeting of communists at this time. If it were not for the war in Vietnam, it would be almost impossible at this time to call together an international meeting of communist parties. The fight to support Vietnam against the United States and the fight for peace does to some degree bring these communist parties together and may at some time in the future, if not this year perhaps next year, lead to an international meeting. But the split in the world communist movement is real and will continue.

Most communist parties will now admit that it is no longer possible to bring the Chinese back and obtain unanimity in the world movement and that there are other reasons for continuing to operate without an international authority or center. The Soviet Party is even ready to admit that an international center cannot be organized and perhaps a world center like the old Communist International or the Cominform is not needed. But periodic international meetings that draw up resolutions and adopt a common line would be useful and necessary. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has already taken steps to organize its own international "center." It has organized the "Institute for World Labor Relations" employing a staff of three hundred fifty people. This Institute (the name of which has also been variously translated by Novosti Press Agency as "Institute of International Workers Movement" and "Institute of International Working Class Movement") has already held its first conference on April 12, 1967, which was attended by many important leaders of communist parties and at which papers were read from leading communists from throughout the world, including one by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA. This Institute is now making contacts and dispensing funds to build its authority internationally. Should a world united center come into being, this Institute can always be of use or an appendage.

Why is it that most parties resist the formation of another international or even an international meeting? A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

number of communist parties in capitalist countries, while giving allegiance to the idea of international solidarity and the need for a common front to fight for peace and against imperialism, do not want to submit to the hegemony or influence of a foreign power. The communists in the western world have been branded as foreign agents. In many cases they are called Soviet agents or Chinese agents, etc. Some of the bigger parties like the Italian or French, as well as some of the Scandinavian parties, feel that the reason for their inability to increase their influence and to gain the support of the masses is due to the feeling among the people that the communists are stooges of a foreign power, and in many cases closely linked with espionage activity or activities not in their own national interests. Some of the parties having been affiliated with the old International from its very beginning, feel that this is the opportunity to shake loose the chains of foreign control. These parties, although pledging loyalty to Marxism-Leninism in general, begin with a program that they believe advances their national interests. They hope in one way or another to win a bigger following and eventually even obtain power or participate in the government with other socialist groups. This is why some of the same parties do not want the organization of an International.

National Interests Produce  
"Many Roads to Communism"

The communist parties from the Western countries have for tactical reasons abandoned the old dogma of armed insurrection. Even the revised communist doctrine about the two ways to power, the peaceful and non-peaceful, is outmoded. The Western traditions dictate that they place the emphasis on the peaceful and parliamentary way to communism. Marxism-Leninism does not allow the complete exclusion of the armed or non-peaceful road. But practical politics dictate differently. Most parties want to formulate their own doctrine. It is now fashionable to speak of the "British road to socialism" or the "Italian road to socialism," etc. Many communist parties have given this name to their programs. For this reason, a number of parties do not want an International. Some of these parties also want to close the gap between themselves and the social democrats in order to realize their ambition of participation in government. They know that if somehow or other the label of foreign agent sticks, they cannot hope to participate in government even in unity with the social democrats.

This situation in the world communist movement is of importance to the United States. When communists speak of a struggle against "imperialism" they mean first of all the United

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

States. In the last international statement issued by the eighty-one party meeting of communist parties held in Moscow in December, 1959, the only power that they named was the United States and they branded the United States as the "gendarme of the world." It is evident that a disunited communist conspiracy is better for the United States and the entire world.

Methods of Exploiting Split  
for United States Advantage

The United States should learn to take advantage of this situation. First of all, the United States should help to deepen the ideological split and find forms to participate in communist debates in order to defend democracy. It should be shown that there cannot be a variety of roads to socialism and that a belief in the "theory" or dogma based on the so-called "scientific laws," which say that despite variations the general laws apply to all countries, means that one must follow others and go against one's own national interests--the interests of the people.

Next, there should be utilized broad propaganda appeals to the party membership of the various parties showing why they are rejected by the masses of people; that whether they were conscious of it or not they were pawns of the Soviets or the Chinese or some other foreign power all under the guise of a "noble aim," that is, the achievement of socialism. The technique of comparison can be utilized to good advantage for this purpose. When talking to European countries, this propaganda should show the inadequacies of the Soviet type of socialism or the Polish brand, or the Czech brand by comparisons to the standard of living of nearby countries in Europe. The comparison should be to the standard of living in Japan, if talking about the people in Asia, or comparison to the more advanced countries in Latin America if talking to the Cubans or other Latin American countries whose workers or peasants look to Cuba as an example. In some instances articles or stories should be very skillfully planted that praise this or that leader of a communist party; for example, the leader of the Swedish Communist Party is now the most ostracized and condemned person in the Soviet Union. But the Swedish communist leadership has succeeded in influencing the Norwegians and to a large extent the Danes have gone through a split in the communist party.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The split-off group in Denmark is more powerful than the official group that retained the title communist party. Exposure of foreign communist conspiracies should be intensified, even if they cannot now be called totally a Moscow conspiracy. The splinter groups (leftist) tend to become more hostile to free society and more pliant tools in the hands of the Chinese or the Cubans.

Three "Centers": Moscow,  
Peking, Havana

The world is now confronted with at least three communist centers. The Soviet Union still is the most powerful and influential of these centers and still retains the allegiance of more parties and people than the others. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that those who listen to or work in keeping with the lines of Peking or Havana or Moscow are working against their own countries, against the best interests of their people, and they can no more be a "free agent" working with Peking than they can be working with Moscow. Many communists of different countries will pay heed to such appeals. If these things are done directly in the name of the United States at this particular juncture in history, they are handicapped to start with, mainly because of the war in Vietnam and the successful propaganda of the communist powers, as well as the communist parties and their followers and pacifists all over the world. But this course must be pursued with persistence because the situation is bound to change and most ordinary people who belong to a communist party almost instinctively do not want to act against the best interests of their own country. If there is a split in the peace movement in the United States, it will be because of this.

Meeting the Cuban Threat  
in Venezuela

In meeting the Cuban threat, perhaps as it affects the struggles in Venezuela, a review might be given in cooperation with someone who knows the communist party of what happened to the Communist Party in Venezuela, of what happened after the dictatorship was overthrown, and how the communist party had obtained its legality and did utilize the democratic processes that were available to them. When they used it briefly, they were able to influence the working class and other sections of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the population. But when they embarked upon an adventurous road, influenced by a foreign power that supplied the weapons and ammunition which killed Venezuelans and harmed their country, the communist party lost its influence among the people and hurt the struggle of those who are fighting against dictatorships and for democracy in other countries of Latin America.

This may seem like an "appeal" to the communists, but it is well to remember that the Communist Party of Venezuela is split into two factions, that both groups are trying to win the allegiance of the youth, and that Fidel Castro is personally responsible for the split and the attacks against an imprisoned and "martyred" leadership. Many Venezuelan communists therefore resent Castro's and Cuba's "interference." Why not utilize this "resentment" to hit at Cuban communism?

The Communist Party of Venezuela has dissipated its influence; the working people did not follow it or join in the campaign of terror. The resistance of the government and the people broke the back of the armed struggle. The Communist Party of Venezuela wants to change tactics but Fidel Castro wants them to serve Cuban interests instead. He tries to take over their organizations through his own agents (Douglas Bravo). The university has been closed down as a terrorist headquarters--the youth is disillusioned and the majority of the Communist Party of Venezuela feels the sting of defeat. The Communist Party of Venezuela leadership is conducting a worldwide campaign against Fidel Castro's methods and is receiving support from most of the communist parties in Latin America.

Since the Cuban threat in Latin America is important to the United States, it would serve United States interests to encourage those who are fighting Castro and his terrorist bands. Many Venezuelan communists and sympathizers will listen. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union supports the official Communist Party of Venezuela and will not directly give arms to the Castro wing. The deepening of the split is to the advantage of the United States even if communists have to be utilized to disarm the fanatical Castroites in Venezuela. In the appeal to the Venezuelans, there is the theme of the worsening conditions in Cuba which can be emphasized--the continued terror under virtual slavery with no benefits coming to the working man or peasant. The standard of living in Venezuela, though not high, can be compared to the poorer conditions in Cuba since Fidel. The question is how to take advantage of the split in the ranks of communism.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET-CUBAN SPLIT IN LATIN  
AMERICAN COMMUNISM

Castro Fans the Flames  
of Revolt

The biggest problem next to the war in Vietnam is that in Latin America. In a number of countries in Central and South America there are symptoms of revolt and the beginnings of guerrilla warfare. The roots of this discontent are well known to the United States. For this reason the United States is trying hard economically, politically, and socially to get at the root cause of poverty and oppression in Latin America. Castro is working just as hard to fan the flames of discontent and revolt--to organize the poor against the United States, to inflame the youth and the middle classes against "Yankee imperialism." But while Castro has the economic support and still receives arms from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, there is a growing split between these countries and Cuban communism. The Soviet Union and other countries will not permit themselves to become instruments in Castro's hands. The USSR will continue to trade and establish relations with as many countries of Latin America as they can. Castro's shrill cries of condemnation will not stop the USSR from pursuing its own national interests. The Soviet press may demand the freedom from prison of Gilberto Vieira, the Colombian leader of the communist party, but at the same time they will sign agreements with the Colombian Government. They will not repudiate Cuban communism but the socialist bloc will not be led into armed adventures in Latin America.

Utilizing the Split for  
United States Advantage

For the United States this split between Castroism and the Soviets is most important and should be utilized in a way which lessens the danger of guerrilla wars in Latin America, and which at the same time holds the Soviet and Chinese communists back or reduces their influence. Because of the growing and widening split between the other Latin American parties and Castro, and the cooling off of the fraternal "partnerships" between the communist bloc and Cuba, the United States is in a position to expose the Castro failures. The United States is also in a better position to use political pressure on the USSR and its lesser allies to stop aiding Castro or fall victim to the charge that they, too, are spreading the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

armed conflict into Latin America. The United States can demand that the USSR show by deeds that they do not endorse the Cuban adventures. In using the word "demand" it is not placed in a belligerent manner--more as an exposé and pressure.

The USSR will not send arms directly to the various guerrilla bands. In keeping with their general policy of avoiding a hot war, they will not do this, especially after the failures in Cuba and Venezuela. They cannot at this stage control these guerrilla movements, and therefore they will not assume the responsibility of arming them. Of course, if the USSR is placed in a position where they have to publicly repudiate Cuba or some of the other guerrilla movements, they will not do this. Since Vietnam, they will avoid the charge that they have "betrayed" a socialist revolution or a war of liberation. If they can retreat while saving face and at the same time receive the support of some other communist parties in Latin America, they will do so. They will do this, not because the United States wants them to, but because they will not involve themselves in a situation that would endanger their main policies.

Communist Party of Brazil  
Under Pressure

At the present time it is important to watch the large communist parties in Latin America. They will influence the Soviet position in this area of the world. The Communist Party of Brazil (Moscow oriented) will hold a party congress soon. Although Luis Carlos Prestes, the leader of the Communist Party of Brazil, was the first to split with Castro regarding tactics in Latin America, he may under pressure of the Brazilian situation (the defeat of Joao Goulart and the outlawing of the communist party) revert to the line of guerrilla warfare. It is not unusual for communists to change tactics and resort to devious maneuvers. The Chinese and Castroites have split the Communist Party of Brazil and set up their own groups, bands, and parties. This pressure may cause Prestes to regroup his forces and once again utilize his old title as the "Knight of the Jungle" to organize a guerrilla war.

The Soviet Union in such a situation may offer aid, even if indirectly. They would then once again draw closer to Castro or give him the task to deliver the arms. They might do this also to avoid permitting the Chinese to step in and arm their own bands that would be anti-Soviet from the very beginning.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Issues in the Propaganda  
War: Cuban Dictatorship,  
Trade Unions Right to  
Strike, Cuban Interference

In the light of the foregoing, the propaganda war in Latin America takes on new importance. Consideration might well be given to developing the propaganda war around certain salient issues:

1. Emphasizing the differences between Castro and the other communists of Latin America and the world;
2. The deepening rift between Castro and the USSR;
3. Exposing the Soviet Union for its duplicity, hiding behind the cloak of Castro to help guerrilla bands, while at the same time preaching "non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries";
4. The Soviet Union by arming Castro ("The island of Cuba is sinking into the sea by the weight of armament," according to one leading Soviet) is starting an arms race in all Latin America.

Can such a campaign in Latin America lead to good results, favorable to the United States? It can, if recognition is given to the social and political evils that exist in these countries. The solution does not lie in war, even if such a war is led by Castro. Castro is held in contempt by the leadership of the USSR and by communist leaders in most communist parties. Exposure of Castro as an adventurer and dictator (he is still afraid of a democratic election) would receive a sympathetic ear among those who believe in peace and the democratic practices. The Communist Party of Chile had to face up to this question and gave Castro some sharp answers when he criticized their parliamentary efforts, their united front and Pablo Neruda's participation in literary discussion with United States writers. The Chileans were applauded by nearly all Latin American parties and Latin American intellectuals for this stand not so long ago.

In the Latin American propaganda battles, the technique of talking to the people must be mastered. Some countries, not all, can stand comparison with communist Cuba. Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, and perhaps others can be used as examples.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The liberty to strike is the most precious thing for a trade unionist. The Castro regime has outlawed strikes as have all communist dictatorships. Strikes and insurrections are synonymous for Fidel Castro. Venerated old trade union leaders (not of the Batista gang) have been ousted and persecuted. Opinion makers in the United States have knowledge of these facts. Without defending the terroristic dictatorships in some of these countries, comparisons can be made on this subject of the right to strike as it applies under the conditions in the above-named countries as opposed to present-day Cuba. The Latin American concept of "strike" is different than the North American concept and therefore for that very reason it is a subject for discussion and interest.

The Soviet Union, a country thousands of miles away from America, is responsible for maintaining communist Cuba and Fidel Castro's dictatorship. Castro should be called a dictator. The main fire when aimed at Castro will win approval from a lot of Cuban communists and from most leaders of communist parties in Latin America. As already pointed out, these communist leaders from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and other countries have been in a running fight with Castro since his emergence from the Sierra Maestras.

If factions exist in some of these parties, and they do, Castro helped to organize them. It is obvious therefore that these communist leaders have no use for Castro as a person (he is called the "bearded cult") nor for his policies and tactics. These communists fight as hard as anyone against the United States. But they refuse to knuckle under to Castro's dogmas handed down to them in dictatorial fashion. Their own national interests as well as their Marxist training caution that they must differ with Castroism. Most of the parties named no longer send people to Cuba for any kind of training. Previous "schools" in Cuba gave birth to pro-Castro groups upon return to their country. Guatemala is one such example-- Castro created a guerrilla force that until recently was independent of the communist party and often rejected party leadership and tactics. The same thing happened in Venezuela.

Exploiting the Split to  
Curb Influence of Both  
Cuba and Soviet Union

In the struggle between China and the Soviet Union, most Latin American parties overwhelmingly endorse Moscow. They would not want to submit themselves to another country in



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Latin America that they believe would dominate them. The question is how to utilize this situation. This is something to think about and study.

An interesting parallel can be drawn between the European Common Market and the proposed Latin American Common Market. Perhaps the United States can profit from the experiences of the former in implementing the latter. There is no common viewpoint among communist parties in Europe about the Common Market. The French originally were against the Common Market. They took the same point of view as the Russians that the Common Market is an instrument that will be used against the socialist bloc. The Italian communists did not agree with this. They said they were more concerned about the Italian people getting employment. They engaged in sharp polemics with the Russians and the French. The Italian communist leaders even suggested at one time that the Soviet Union make an effort to reach an understanding with the Common Market. On the other hand, the British communists were against joining the Common Market.

But Latin America is quite different than Europe. A number of countries are very backward, they produce very little industrial goods, and most of the production is raw materials or agricultural products. Capital investments, in the main, come from the United States. The communists and nationalists charge the United States with monopoly and imperialism. But there are some sections of the people in Latin America genuinely interested in the welfare of the people and in an expanding economy. Some honest nationalists and perhaps communists may take the same position on the Latin American Common Market as communists did in Europe and agree to work with the United States. This did happen in some European countries; so, this could happen in the more developed countries of Latin America--Argentina or Chile, and perhaps others. This approach is worth probing, providing the United States shows that this cooperation is not for the selfish benefit of investment houses or the oligarchies, but can serve the national interests of the countries involved and help guarantee their independence. This is more than Castro will do or can do. The Soviet-oriented bloc may offer such cooperation in competition.

The opportunity exists for taking advantage of splits, whether ideological or organizational, and influencing splits in a practical way. This will reduce the influence of communism of both domestic and foreign varieties, and particularly check Castroism and the dominance of the Soviet Union. The United

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

States can ask some challenging questions: What can the Soviet Union supply to these countries that would really be of economic help to them? The Soviets have not been able to supply even their own people. The USSR and other socialist countries had to buy grain--the Soviet Union, the biggest agricultural nation in Europe, could not supply them with bread or rice.

Placing the emphasis on the split in communist ranks and how to utilize it in Latin America is in keeping with the contemporary world situation. One might say such opportunities should not be lost because of political hesitancy. Economic and political situations develop or change, and the United States in the world struggle, particularly in Latin America, can "miss the boat," and thus allow the communists another advantage or even the start of another war of liberation. In each country there are power plays that go beyond classes. For example, the Goulart government was not a communist government; nevertheless, they were a threat. They represented a bigger danger than the communists because the communist party did not have the influence of the Goulartists. The communist party utilized the tactic of the united front with what they called "national elements." The United States will need to find allies in the very lowest strata of the population to check the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies, and the communist parties of Latin America who carry out the general Soviet line in a concrete way opportunistically, when necessary under flags of national independence. Unless the United States shifts the foundations of economic and political alliances to the lower classes including the middle classes and the intelligentsia, it will face more guerrilla wars under the leadership of Castro imitators.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/29/67

FROM : C. D. Brennan

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

## PURPOSE:

This memorandum recommends that a paper prepared by CG 5824-S\*, our top informant, regarding foreign policy of the Soviet Union, be disseminated to the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General.

## BACKGROUND:

At our request, CG 5824-S\* has prepared a 55-page paper entitled "Reflections on Soviet Foreign Policy" (copy attached for ready reference). In this paper the informant draws on his lengthy experience in the international communist movement (over 40 years), his personal discussions with leading figures in the international communist movement, and with top leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He points out that pursuit of national interests is and always has been the keystone of Soviet policy and how the Soviets have utilized the international communist movement to advance Soviet national interests.

In addition to providing a comprehensive summary of the numerous pressures on the Soviets, the informant sets forth ideas to exploit these pressures for the benefit of United States foreign policy.

Attached are letters enclosing copies of the informant's document along with a letterhead memorandum containing salient points for the White House, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That attached letters be approved and sent.

REC'D-101 OFFICE

Enclosures

100-428091

RCP:dmk

65 JUN

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. A. R. Jones  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

Date: June 6, 1967

To: Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The following has been supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

The Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has been contacted by officials of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) regarding possible means of providing support for the struggles of the Portuguese "patriots fighting oppression" both in Portugal and alongside the national liberation forces in the colonial wars of Africa.

It has been learned that the CPC sent copies of a pamphlet entitled "Report on a Mission to Portugal" to organizations in the United States such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the "Portuguese emigre group" in New York City, and the "Angolan students organization" in Rochester, New York.

The CPUSA has been requested to secure additional copies of the pamphlet for distribution to key members of the United States Congress. It is hoped that these pamphlets can be sent to the Congressmen along with accompanying letters from citizens' groups in the United States organized for the purpose of urging action against the Government of Portugal. It was further proposed that the pamphlet be furnished leaders of groups in the United States interested in civil liberties. The pamphlet is to be utilized as an instrument to initiate a conference in the United States on amnesty for political prisoners in Portugal.

RHH:dmk  
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

BY COURIER SVC.  
88 JUN 7  
COMM-FBI  
Mohr  
Wick  
Casper  
Callahan  
Conrad  
Felt  
Gale  
Rosen  
Sullivan  
Tavel  
Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Holmes  
Gandy

55 JUN 14 1967 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

The CPC suggested a citizens' committee to obtain amnesty for political prisoners in Portugal be formed in the United States to develop liaison with similar groups in Canada and South America. A major project of such a group would be to focus attention on the status of political prisoners in Portugal by bringing the matter up before the United Nations. Other activities would include drawing world-wide attention to special grievous cases, the growing presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in and around Portugal, and the role the United States plays in providing arms and support for the Government of Portugal.

1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
  
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (NY 694-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

This information was contained in a letter from William Kashtan, General Secretary, CPC, received at a mail drop for transmittal to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA. Data extracted from New York airtel 5/22/67, captioned  
"Solo, IS - C."

~~SECRET~~

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

LEGAT, Ottawa

6/8/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CANADA

*Solo*

There are enclosed three copies of a letterhead memorandum classified "~~Secret~~" and captioned "Communist Party of Canada."

Promptly furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to your sources in the [redacted] Your sources should be cautioned that it is essential that no distribution or use of our intelligence information be undertaken which would be likely to jeopardize the security of our sources.

b7D

Enclosures - 3

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through [redacted] for review)


RCP:dmk

(6)

## NOTE:

See LHM captioned "Communist Party of Canada," dated 6/8/67, prepared by RCP:dmk. This LHM is also being disseminated to State and CIA by routing slip.

ENCLOSURE



REC-16  
JUN 8 1967

JUN 8 1967

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUN 13 1967

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

June 8, 1967

### COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

Sources which have supplied reliable information in the past have advised as follows.

The Communist Party of Bulgaria has invited a representative of the Communist Party of Canada to visit Bulgaria during the Summer of 1967 for rest and vacation. Norman Freed, Educational Director, Communist Party of Canada, and his wife have been selected to accept this invitation. They expect to depart from Canada about the first week in July, 1967. They will spend about one month in Varna, Bulgaria, and visit Czechoslovakia and Great Britain on their journey home.


Freed will have to be back in Canada by the middle of August, 1967, for the Communist Party of Canada and the Communist Party, USA, plan to conduct a joint training school for youth during August 19 through September 1, 1967. The school will be held in Toronto, Canada. About ten Communist Party, USA, members are expected to attend this school. The Communist Party of Canada would like the Communist Party, USA, to send instructors to the school. Hyman Lumer, Educational Director, Communist Party, USA, has stated that, unless the Canadian Government grants official permission for Communist Party, USA, officials to enter Canada to become instructors at this school, he considers it most undesirable for the Communist Party, USA, to furnish any instructors for this school.

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)  
NOTE: Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation. CG 5824-S\* referred to as "sources" in order to further protect his identity. Dissemination being made to State and CIA by routing slip and [redacted] through letter to Legat, Ottawa. Data extracted from Chicago airtels 5/31/67 and 6/1/67, captioned "Solo, IS-C."

100-428091  
RCP:dmk  
(8) dmk

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐



## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/5/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS - C

Re New York airtel to Bureau dated 5/22/67 enclosing a copy of letter dated 5/16/67 to GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP), USA, from WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada. The enclosed letter stated that there was enclosed or under separate cover a number of documents concerning the struggles in Portugal, but these documents were not received through the New York drop address.

On 6/1/67 CG 5824-S\* advised that during his conversations with KASHTAN during the period 5/26-29/67 KASHTAN had informed him that these documents had in fact not been sent as of that date but would be forwarded immediately.

On 6/1/67 there was received at a Chicago Solo drop address an envelope postmarked 5/30/67 at Toronto, Canada, which contained the following documents, one copy each of which is enclosed herewith for the Bureau and New York. An additional copy of each is enclosed for the Bureau in the event the Bureau desires to disseminate copies thereof to the \_\_\_\_\_

- 1-904 9th 6 encls  
 ③ - Bureau (Encls. 12) (RM)  
 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encls. 6) (RM)  
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes  
 (5)

6 JUN 8 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

65 JUN 13 1967



CG 134-46 Sub B

- 1) Xerox copy of Pages 11-14 of an article entitled "MUNDO OBRERO Interviews ALVARO CUNHAL," which appeared in Issue Number 92 of the "Information Bulletin," issued by World Marxist Review Publishers, Prague, Czechoslovakia
- 2) Xerox copy of a pamphlet entitled "Report on a Mission to Portugal, by Two Members of the Canadian Parliament," issued by the Canadian Committee for Amnesty in Portugal, Toronto, Canada
- 3) Xerox copy of the letterhead of the Canadian Committee for Amnesty in Portugal, 765 Queen Street W., Toronto 3, Canada, with handwritten notes (apparently by KASHTAN) concerning individuals whose names appear thereon
- 4) Xerox copy of February/April, 1967, Volume 7, Number 1, issue of "Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin," issued by K. SHINGLER, 10 Fentiman Road, London, S.W. 8, England
- 5) Xerox copy of "Submission to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations," submitted by "A Delegation Mandated by the Canadian Conference for Amnesty in Portugal held in Toronto, Canada, October 28-30, 1966"
- 6) Xerox copy of "The Politics of Justice in Portugal," by MARK B. MAC GUIGAN, edited by the Patriotic Front of National Liberation (Portugal) 13, rue Auber, Alger

CG 134-46 Sub B

On 6/1/67 CG 5824-S\* sent a letter to KASHTAN care of the "J. KLEINSTEIN" drop thanking him for this material. The text of this letter is set forth below:

"Thanks a lot for your efforts & speedy dispatch of the material on Portugal. We will discuss this problem in the next few days.

"Did you see the editorial on the Mid-East crisis in the Worker of the 28th? It is somewhat similar to the editorial in the Tribune of the 29th. However, you should know there are problems here, especially in the peace movement and among the Jewish comrades who question the policy of the main fire being aimed at imperialism by the Arabs who want an all out attack against Israel. Some here are also equating Vietnam with the situation in the Mid-East.

"Once again thanks for your very warm reception & concern."

~~SECRET~~

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE


EX-103  
100-428091-6316  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam  
REC- Date: June 8, 1967

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Referral/Consult



BY COURIER SVC.

92 JUN 9

NOTE: Data in letters mentioned above were developed by CG 5824-S\* on Solo missions to the Soviet Union. To downgrade these letters in their entirety could jeopardize this valuable source and the future of our Solo Operation. Chicago being furnished list of leading functionaries of Institute to assist in interview of CG 5824-S\* for additional data. New York and WFO are being requested by separate covers to furnish photographs of these functionaries, if available.

Classified  
to CIA letter which

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~

~~"Secret"~~ since it refers  
was so-classified.

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

RCP:dmk

65 JUN 15 1967

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/5/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS - C

Re previous correspondence concerning investigation by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Office of the USA, Southern District of New York, into alleged manipulation of the stock market.

The Bureau was previously advised that records of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Illinois, pertaining to transactions of CG 5824-S\*, CG 6653-S and NY 694-S\* were subpoenaed by the USA's Office in New York City. CG 5824-S\* advised on 5/31/67 that although [redacted] General Counsel of the Lincolnwood Bank, had apparently not appeared in New York City, the records had been forwarded to the USA. CG 5824-S\* stated that he does not know what were the contents of the records sent by [redacted], but that as soon as he was able to get an appointment with [redacted] he would attempt to find out.

[redacted] informed CG 5824-S\* on 5/29/67 that in his opinion the USA and the SEC have no case at all against either CG 5824-S\* or any other members of IRVING PROJANSKY's group and that is why the government is trying the case in the newspapers. [redacted] does not see how the case can go

- ③ - Bureau (RM)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (RM)  
1 - Chicago  
1 - 904 94D - 1 - CO Brunner  
WAB:mes  
(5)

REC-103 EX-103

100-428091-6317

JUN 9 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by 7339  
Exempt from GDS, Category 73  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

80 JUN 14 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Document forwarded to  
per 60344 ac 6/10/67 and 6/13/67

b6  
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

CG 134-46 Sub B

to court on the basis of what they have at the present time... [ ] has protested to AUSA LAWRENCE NEWMAN against what he calls NEWMAN's illegal manner of leaking information to the newspapers, "blackmail stories" as [ ] calls them, in order to pressure people into making damaging statements.

b6  
b7C

CG 5824-S\* stated that members of the family have reported to him what they have heard "on the grapevine," the sources not being identified. He was told that "two petty hoodlums," BURT KOZAK and [ ] are still running the USA's Office in New York City and are boasting about it. They are trying to contact people to induce them to commit perjury. The informants of the PROJANSKY family who themselves were approached have stated that they would deny it if questioned officially regarding it. Additionally, it was reported that a "petty thief" named HARRIS NAGORSKI had been arrested in Illinois on some rather minor charge for which a very high bail was set. He was then transported by United States Marshals to New York City to be questioned on this case. In New York City, NAGORSKI has persisted in claiming the privilege of the Fifth Amendment. KOZAK, according to these informants, has been in and out of NAGORSKI's cell attempting to get NAGORSKI to talk, to such an extent that the United States Marshals have indicated that they are getting quite disgusted with the whole setup.

b6  
b7C

KOZAK has a gambling debt owed to the "syndicate." He does not have the money to pay it back and, therefore, the word is that the USA in New York City is hoping that KOZAK is not killed before the case is finished. KOZAK and [ ] have, since the outset of this investigation, been doing a lot of talking in bars and similar places about what witnesses have said to the Grand Jury and the AUSA. They obviously have the confidence of NAGORSKI and are boasting of how they are going to "get" those under investigation based on their allegations.

b6  
b7C

PROJANSKY has stated that there is a lot of talk in upper corporate circles about the "gestapo tactics" being used by the SEC and the AUSA in New York to discredit legitimate businesses. The General Counsel of Hercules-Gallion

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CG 134-46 Sub B

Products is coming into Chicago in the near future to talk to some of the individuals involved, including PROJANSKY, to determine what can be done about the situation. According to PROJANSKY, a lot of reputable people have continually expressed their readiness to go to New York City as witnesses to protest that the tactics being employed by the AUSA in New York City are wrong.

ARTHUR KELLER, former president of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood who was fired by PROJANSKY, left for Europe on vacation when this case was first under investigation. According to PROJANSKY, he has now returned.

In addition to the above information, CG 6653-S has explained to us their involvement in transactions in the stock of Mercury Chemical Corporation, another stock on the American Stock Exchange under investigation by SEC. According to this source, STUART PROJANSKY, who is the son of her brother, IRVING PROJANSKY, a vice president of the Lincolnwood Bank and a successful insurance broker in his own right, was in contact with BURTON "BUDDY" KOZAK and [redacted] who represented the [redacted] stock brokerage firm of Cleveland. KOZAK informed STUART PROJANSKY that [redacted] was opening a Chicago branch in the vicinity of the Lincolnwood Bank and implied they might place their bank account amounting to a million or more dollars in that bank. PROJANSKY continued to cultivate KOZAK in the hopes of getting this account.

b6  
b7C

KOZAK then introduced PROJANSKY to a stock broker (name not recalled) representing Douglas Securities, who subsequently made the following proposition to PROJANSKY. The broker asked PROJANSKY to get ten people to each purchase through Douglas Securities \$8,000.00 worth of stock in Mercury Chemical Corporation. He assured PROJANSKY that this stock was going to rapidly rise in price and a handsome profit would be made within 60 days. Furthermore, he would furnish a written guarantee that if this profit did not materialize or if the investors changed their minds, he would buy back the stock at the end of 60 days for the original price, plus six percent interest. When PROJANSKY offered this deal to

~~TOP SECRET~~

CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 6653-S, she declined on the grounds that this broker's guarantee was only as good as the man himself and she knew nothing about him. PROJANSKY persisted that according to KOZAK, whom he trusted, this man was reputable. Against her better judgment, CG 6653-S finally acceded to this pressure from PROJANSKY and purchased \$8,000.00 worth of Mercury Chemical.

A short while thereafter this group of investors decided they should pull out of this investment and PROJANSKY went to the broker to sell the stock back. The broker told PROJANSKY he had no intention of fulfilling his promise and furthermore that the written guarantee had no force of law. At this point PROJANSKY and CG 6653-S went to [redacted] and outlined their situation. [redacted] informed them that the broker had violated the law by offering the written guarantee in the first place. [redacted] made representations to the broker for the return of the investment and finally, after threatening a lawsuit for recovery, the investment was refunded with a small profit. Our informants' 1966 Income Tax Return shows a purchase of \$8,000.00 worth of Mercury Chemical in 2/66, which was sold on 4/14/66 for \$8,165.00, a profit of 2.06 percent. CG 6653-S noted that the broker in this case made his contact only with PROJANSKY, whom he persuaded to solicit ten people for a \$8,000.00 purchase each. Thus PROJANSKY is placed in the position of appearing to be the conspirator in this case rather than the victim.

The above is being provided for information. The Bureau and New York will be kept advised of further developments.

b6  
b7c

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Downing*

DATE: June 6, 1967

FROM : G. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Wick	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S\* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 6/6/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

## ACTION:

For information.

*C. D. Brennan*

*S. R. Putnam*

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo; Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

*11/2*

*HS:drv*  
*(7)*  
*Downing*

*EX-103*  
*EX-103*

*100-428091-6318*

JUN 9 1967

*PM*  
80 JUN 14 1967



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 6/7/67

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan  
1 - Mr. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R.C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

## PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises of information furnished by CG 5824-S\* concerning the receipt by James Jackson of an invitation to visit North Vietnam, and recommends attached summary incorporating this information be furnished the White House, Secretary of State, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Attorney General.

## BACKGROUND:

CG 5824-S\*, one of our top informants, has learned that James Jackson, Publisher of "The Worker," east coast communist newspaper, and Chairman of the Party's Commission on International Affairs, has for some time been seeking to obtain an invitation from the North Vietnamese to visit that country. In furtherance of this desire, Jackson enlisted the aid of Hyman Lumer, the Communist Party's Educational Director. Lumer in turn contacted William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada. Lumer was aware that Kashtan was already negotiating with the North Vietnamese for an invitation to be sent to the Canadian Party for a visit to North Vietnam. Kashtan agreed to intercede for Jackson with the result that both Jackson and the Canadian representative have been invited to visit North Vietnam. The only conditions to the invitation are that the North Vietnamese are not to finance the trips, that they must arrive in North Vietnam no later than the second week of June, and the visits must be restricted to a "few" weeks duration.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached summary incorporating the information furnished by CG 5824-S\* be sent to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, The White House; Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Honorable Richard Helms, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Attorney General.

By separate communication this information is being furnished Legal Attache, Ottawa, for transmittal to the

Enclosure  
100-428091  
RHH:jav (6)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

REC 33

6 JUN 12 1967

b7D

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 6/1/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for New York one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Possible Trip to North Vietnam by Reporter for Communist Party of Canada."

The information appearing in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished by CG 5824-S\* during the period 5/29-31/67 to SAs RICHARD W. HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

10 100 + ENCL 24940  
③-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago

REC 46

WAB:MDW  
(5)

6 JUN 12 1967

Approved: *mg/bs*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Dissemination to White House,  
Sec. St., CIA, AG. 6-8-67  
RA

*Blm*  
*R. [unclear]*  
*5-Mosberg*  
*P. [unclear]*  
*([unclear])*

*113*

80 JUN 14 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

The information set forth in the enclosed letter-head memorandum was obtained by CG 5824-S\* in conversation during the period 5/26-29/67 in Toronto, Canada, with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

June 1, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

POSSIBLE TRIP TO NORTH VIETNAM BY REPORTER  
FOR COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during May, 1967, advised as follows:

It was recently learned that the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) desires to send a reporter to North Vietnam. In furtherance of this objective, discussions were held with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by William Kashtan, General Secretary of the CPC, while he was in East Berlin where he was attending the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG), which was held April 17-22, 1967. The North Vietnamese indicated they would accept such a reporter from the CPC but would not pay anything toward the fare of this individual to Europe.

The SUPG has invited the CPC to send two representatives to the German Democratic Republic for a vacation, the cost to be assumed by the SUPG. The Canadians believe that once as far as the German Democratic Republic, their representative can probably be sent on to Moscow, USSR, at the expense of the SUPG. From Moscow, they believe either the USSR or the North Vietnamese will assume responsibility for his travel to Hanoi. At this point it is not known whether or not such travel would be via Peking, People's Republic of China. It is known that the CPC has taken the

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-6320

*Document downgraded to Secret  
per 60294 UC BAO/RS on 4/20/04*

POSSIBLE TRIP TO NORTH VIETNAM BY REPORTER  
FOR COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

~~TOP SECRET~~

position that if their representative cannot make the trip in the above-described fashion and would be forced to take the long way around to North Vietnam, then he would not go since the CPC could not afford such an expense.

Without stating the reason, the North Vietnamese representatives insisted that whoever travels to Hanoi for the CPC must be there in the first week of June, 1967, and absolutely no later than the second week of June. After arriving in Hanoi, the Canadian may stay in North Vietnam only for a few weeks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/1/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

ReCGlet to Bureau dated 5/18/67 and CGairtel to Bureau dated 3/28/67 both relating to efforts to travel to North Vietnam by JAMES JACKSON, member of the Secretariat and Chairman of the International Affairs Commission of the CP, USA.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies and for New York one copy of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Invitation From North Vietnam for James Jackson, Chairman of International Affairs Commission, Communist Party, USA, to Travel to North Vietnam."

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was orally furnished during the period of 5/29-31/67 by CG 5824-S\* to SAs RICHARD W. HANSEN and WALTER A. BOYLE.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels regarding the international communist movement, and thus adversely affect the national security.

3-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago  
WAB:MDW  
(5)

REC 46

100-428091-6321

6 JUN 12 1967

80 JUN 14 1967

Approved: *[Signature]*  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Dissemination withheld  
State, CIA, D.C. 6-4-67

*[Handwritten notes and signatures]*  
R. Putnam  
5. Putnam

CG 134-46 Sub B

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was obtained by CG 5824-S\* in conversation during the period 5/26-29/67 in Toronto, Canada, with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 8/11/01 BY 1043



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C.

June 1, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INVITATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM FOR JAMES JACKSON,  
CHAIRMAN OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION,  
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, TO TRAVEL TO NORTH VIETNAM

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, during May, 1967, advised as follows:

James Jackson, a member of the Secretariat and Chairman of the International Affairs Commission, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) and publisher of "The Worker," (an East Coast communist newspaper), has been exerting every effort to obtain an invitation to visit North Vietnam. During April, 1967, he requested assistance in this matter from Hyman Lumer, a member of the Secretariat and National Educational Director, CP, USA, who was traveling to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to attend the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG), which was held April 17-22, 1967, in East Berlin. While in the GDR, Lumer contacted William Kashtan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), who was already in contact with representatives of the Working People's Party of Vietnam relative to an invitation from the North Vietnamese for travel to Hanoi of a reporter for the CPC. Kashtan agreed to present Jackson's case to the North Vietnamese representatives. Kashtan subsequently reported that the North Vietnamese were most anxious for Jackson to go to North Vietnam and extended such an invitation to him through the CPC. The only conditions placed by the North Vietnamese were the following:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-6321

~~Document downgraded to Secret  
per 60324uc BAW/RS on 2/23/2011~~



INVITATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM FOR JAMES JACKSON, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION, CP, USA, TO TRAVEL TO NORTH VIETNAM.

---

~~TOP SECRET~~

North Vietnam would not pay any of Jackson's fare to Europe; and, Jackson must be in North Vietnam by the first week in June, 1967, or no later than the second week in June, and he can stay in North Vietnam only for a few weeks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/5/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

AIRTEL

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via \_\_\_\_\_

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "PLANNED ATTENDANCE OF CANADIANS AT INTERNATIONAL LENIN SCHOOL, MOSCOW, USSR, DURING 1968."

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was orally furnished by CG 5824-S\* to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN on 5/31/67.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

- 1-904 9th Street, Wash. D.C.  
 ③ - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)  
 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes  
 (5)

REC-59

6 JUN 12 1967

Approved: *WAB*

65 JUN 19 1967 Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

M

Per \_\_\_\_\_

LTV To CIA; LEGAT OTTAWA, 6-9-67

*R. P. [Signature] (lost)*  
*5-Mon [Signature]*

*Me*

CG 134-46 Sub B

The information contained in the enclosed LHM was obtained by CG 5824-S\* in conversations in Toronto, Canada, during the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada.



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.  
June 5, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

PLANNED ATTENDANCE OF CANADIANS  
AT INTERNATIONAL LENIN SCHOOL,  
MOSCOW, USSR, DURING 1968

During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

A leading member of the Communist Party (CP) of Canada recently stated that although it has been past practice for the CP of Canada to send new students every year to the International Lenin School in Moscow, USSR, during the current year for the first time in years no students were sent. However, during 1968, the CP of Canada plans to send nine students to the International Lenin School in Moscow. Six of these will spend one year studying there, while the remaining three will attend for only six months of study.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-428091-6322

Document downgraded to Secret  
per FOIA UC BAW/RS on 2/23/2011

*SW*

TELETYPE UNIT  
*4* JUN 7 1967  
ENCODED MESSAGE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Wick	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

-----33-----

FBI NEW YORK

1006 PM URGENT 6-7-67 AWS

TO DIRECTOR 100-428091

FROM NEW YORK 100-134637

*5-13.628091*

*C. B. Sullivan*

6

SOLO; INTERNAL SECURITY-C.

CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH S ASTERISK ADVISED ON JUNE SEVEN NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN THAT HELEN WINTER HAS REQUESTED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS BE TURNED OVER TO HER ON JUNE EIGHT NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN. THIS MONEY IS FOR EXPENSES FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL OFFICE. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL IN THIS REQUEST. UACB, THIS MONEY WILL BE GIVEN TO CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR DASH S ASTERISK AROUND ELEVEN THIRTY AM ON JUNE EIGHT NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN.

*1112*

END

HOLD

REC-34

*100-428091-6323*

EX-104

6 JUN 13 1967

80 JUN 14 1967

MR. DELOACH FOR THE DIRECTOR

CC: MR. SULLIVAN

*1/2*

**ROUTE IN ENVELOPE**

Date: 6/8/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: (6) SOLO  
IS-C

*5-R.C. [Signature]*

On 6/8/67, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a partially coded-ciphered message; the plain text of which is as follows:

"We plan to have a personal rendezvous with you at Elliott (Avenue J Subway Station, Brooklyn BMT Brighton Line) on June 15. Usual time (7:05 PM). Your confirmation of this message by phone will be considered also as your readiness for a personal rendezvous."

It is the opinion of NY 694-S\* that the Soviets wish to pass on to him personally a new cipher pad, a revision of the open code (see NY airtel 4/24/67) and possibly an adapter which is to be utilized in the tape recorder Uher 4000 L Reporter (see NY airtel 4/26/67).

*1-904 940*

*mo*

3 - Bureau (RM)

1 - Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)

1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)

1 - NY 105-14931-Sub C (TALANOV) (341)

1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

JFL:msb  
(8)

REC-34

6 JUN 13 1967

EX-104

80 JUN 14 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

M

Per \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Conrad

DATE: June 8, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

*CJ Putnam*

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S\* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 6/8/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 276 GR 45, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

*5- Putnam*

ACTION:

For information.

*me*

Enclosure

*me*  
ENCLOSURE

REC-34

100 - 428091 - 6325

EX-104

6 JUN 13 1967

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

*HS:drv*  
*(7)*  
*me*  
*fix*

80 JUN 14 1967

9/8/67

NR 0276 GR 045

06/08/67

27775 92694 69057 21808 63105 00720 16304 58926 71517 82974  
82979 30248 28927 44607 48094 18813 35101 35254 39630 17372  
89393 29360 02491 19068 25094 87998 89926 26952 24341 18514  
60992 23499 84462 03739 07561 79686 45921 89902 13519 01042  
10262 09825 73412 49441 88636

NR 0276 GR 045

06/08/67

WE WANT TO HAVE UNCLE WITH YOU AT ELLIOTT ELLIOTT ON #15 JUN  
E, USUAL TIME. YOUR CONFIRMATION OF THIS MESSAGE BY PHONE WI  
LL BE CONSIDERED ALSO AS YOUR READINESS FOR UNCLE.

100-428091-6325  
MICROFILM



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 6/9/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS - C

S. R. Patterson

Re Chicago airtel 4/10/67, Chicago teletype 5/15/67 and Chicago airtel 5/29/67, in which information is set forth concerning efforts to arrange a meeting in the vicinity of Montreal, Canada, during the period August 21 - September 11, 1967, between GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP), USA, and WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, CP of Canada.

CG 5824-S\*'s recent trip to Canada during the period May 26-29, 1967, was made at the express instruction of HALL to proceed to Canada to arrange contact with KASHTAN and also locate and rent housing for HALL and his family for a one to two week period in Montreal so they can visit Expo 67 at the same time.

CG 5824-S\* has advised that upon arrival in Toronto, he had been in contact with KASHTAN and also with NORMAN FREED, National Education Director and member of the National Executive Committee of the CP of Canada. The informant explained what was desired by HALL, and KASHTAN stated he would assign someone from the staff of the CP of Canada to locate such lodging for HALL's family subject to HALL's or CG 5824-S\*'s approval. It was KASHTAN's feeling that the best place to locate HALL would be in the area of the Laurentian Mountains. B6

CG 5824-S\* also purchased the local Montreal newspapers and stated that they are "full" of places to rent.

- 1-904 449  
② - Bureau (RM)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)  
1 - Chicago

REC-24

EX-103

WAB:mes  
(4)

6 JUN 14 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

65 JUN 16 1967

5010-106

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

However, to inspect any number of them to locate what HALL would consider suitable would assuredly be a very time-consuming task. Therefore, he has left this in the hands of KASHTAN although he is not convinced that the CP of Canada will really apply itself to this task for HALL. He will continue to follow this matter with KASHTAN to insure that HALL gets the accommodations he wants.

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 6/9/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS - C

5-R. [Signature]

Re previous recent correspondence to the Bureau and New York relating to the visit to Toronto, Canada, made by CG 5824-S\* from 5/26-29/67.

On 6/9/67 [redacted] advised SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN that there was received this date at the LYDIA WHITE drop address in Chicago, Illinois, a letter from WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP) of Canada. The letter was postmarked Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 9:30 PM, 6/6/67. The letter intended for CG 5824-S\*, currently in New York City, was dated 6/6/67 and the contents thereof are set forth below:

"Thanks for your note. Haven't had time yet to catch up with the press, but will make a point to read the editorial.

"Here too there is considerable interest and concern in the Middle East crisis with some good people temporarily disoriented. It requires patient explanatory work and avoidance of any appearance

③ - 904 920

3 - Bureau (RM)

1 - New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1 - Chicago

WAB:mes  
(5)

REC-24

100-428091-6327

X103

6 JUN 14 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Approved: [Signature]

65 JUN 16 Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

M

Per \_\_\_\_\_

CG 134-46 Sub B

of indifference to the existence of the State of Israel, while developing a clear and firm line. As you may have noticed we issued a statement following the editorial which focused on some questions and this was very well received in the course of the public meeting I addressed. Got good press and radio coverage.

"Will follow up on the item you spoke to me about. Should have something more definite by the end of the month and will advise you on it. In the meantime all the best.

"As ever

"B."

The Bureau and New York were previously advised of the note forwarded to KASHTAN by CG 5324-S\* making reference to the editorial appearing in "The Tribune," weekly newspaper of the CP of Canada, and directing KASHTAN's attention to the editorial in "The Worker." In the last paragraph of the letter from KASHTAN, "the item you spoke to me about" refers to efforts by the CP of Canada to obtain suitable lodging for GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, on his projected visit to Canada 8/21 - 9/11/67 for conferences with WILLIAM KASHTAN and for a visit to Expo 67.

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

6/13/67

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

*2* Airtel

To: SAC, New York (100-134637)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091)

**SOLO**  
**INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST**

Reurairtel 4/21/67 which enclosed a letterhead memorandum (LHM) captioned "Meeting of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, Between April 24-27, 1967."

Your attention is directed to paragraph three of this LHM, the last word in the fifth line starting with "Austria and Romania had indicated they would not sign any agreement opposing NATO." The Central Intelligence Agency inquired as to whether our source may not have meant Yugoslavia rather than Austria in this letter since Yugoslavia has been overtly opposed to the convocation of this conference.

Immediately recontact NY 694-S\* and determine which is correct. Advise by airtel.

RCP:dmk

(4)

## NOTE:

CIA inquired and has been answered that we are checking with our source. It is noted that NY 694-S\* received this information on 4/5/67, well in advance of the date of this conference, and CIA notes that the CP of Austria attended the conference and signed the resolution which indicates to CIA that they would not have made this statement. Since the information obtained by NY 694-S\* was received well in advance of the start of the conference, it is conceivable that the CP of Austria may have changed its mind.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

EX-103

MAILED 5

JUN 13 1967

COMM-FBI

6 JUN 13 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/8/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS - C

*S-R. Potnam*

Re Chicago airtels 3/28 and 5/4/67 and New York airtels 4/21 and 4/27/67 concerning efforts of GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP), USA, to obtain an invitation from European CPs for the CP, USA to send an observer to the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties which was held 4/24-25/67 at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "EFFORTS BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA TO SEND AN OBSERVER TO THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES, KARLOVY VARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-25, 1967."

The information in the enclosed LHM was furnished on 5/31/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN by CG 5824-S\*, who has furnished reliable information in the past.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" in order to protect the identity of this highly placed source who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement.

- 1-904 940 with LHM in REG-84/100-428091-6329
- 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)
  - 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
  - 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes  
(5)

EX-104

JUN 15 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

65 JUN 17 1967

CG 134-46Sub B

Unauthorized disclosure would jeopardize the security of this source, thus adversely affect the national security.

The enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C., in order to further protect the identity of this source.

The information in the enclosed LHM was obtained by CG 5824-S\* in conversations at Toronto, Canada, during the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the CP of Canada. KASHTAN stated that in view of his own experience set forth herein, he was not at all surprised that the CP, USA had not received an invitation to this meeting.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.

June 8, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EFFORTS BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF CANADA TO SEND AN OBSERVER TO  
THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST  
AND WORKERS PARTIES, KARLOVY VARY,  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-25, 1967

During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

It was learned that in late autumn or early winter, 1966, William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP) of Canada, had applied through the CP of the Soviet Union for an invitation for the CP of Canada to send an observer to the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties scheduled for April 24-25, 1967, at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. At that time the Soviet Party had informed him that they considered it a very good idea. Subsequently, he did not hear another word about it. When Kashtan attended the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany which was held April 17-22, 1966, in East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, he had been in contact with fraternal delegates of the CP of the Soviet Union, the CP of Czechoslovakia, and other Parties who were going to attend the Karlovy Vary conference. Kashtan felt sure that certainly the Soviet delegates at least would say something to him about the decision on Canadian attendance at the European Parties' meeting, but they did not.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-428091-6329

ENCLOSURE

~~Document downgraded to Secret  
per 60324 uc 640/RS or 643/DOJ~~



## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 6/8/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
           IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA."

The information in the enclosed LHM was furnished on 5/31/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN by CG 5824-S\*, who has furnished reliable information in the past.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "~~SECRET~~" in order to protect the identity of this highly placed source who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement. Unauthorized disclosure would jeopardize the security of this source, thus adversely affect the national security.

The enclosed LHM has been shown as having been prepared at Washington, D.C., in order to further protect the identity of this source.

The information in the enclosed LHM was obtained by CG 5824-S\* in conversations at Toronto, Canada, during

100 904 912 & ENCL.  
 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)  
 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes  
 (5)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

65 JUN 20 1967

ROUTING UNIT

ERROR LETTER SENT

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

M

Per \_\_\_\_\_

CG 134-46 Sub B

the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada, and NORMAN FREED, National Education Director and member of the National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.

June 8, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During May, 1967, leaders of the Communist Party (CP) of Canada engaged in conversations relating to current problems and activities of the CP of Canada. Some of the matters referred to are related herein.

In the recent past the CP of Canada had sent a delegation of Canadian-Ukrainians for a visit to the USSR. They were accompanied by Tim Buck, National Chairman of the CP of Canada. This delegation had returned quite dissatisfied with their trip. Their discussions with representatives of the CP of the Soviet Union concerning matters of interest to Ukrainians had not satisfied them at all. However, as of late May, 1967, Tim Buck had not returned and, therefore, the CP of Canada leadership was still waiting for a report on this trip. As a matter of fact, the CP of Canada leadership did not even know where Buck was at that time nor when he expected to return.

According to high officials of the CP of Canada, the Party is having problems in Vancouver, British Columbia. The British Columbia provincial leader of the CP of Canada, Nigel Morgan, has been sick and in his absence some groups

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-428091-6330  
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

## COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

composed of "leftists and pro-Chinese" communists have started forming and creating problems. These problems are far from solved.

In commenting on the youth meeting called by the CP of Canada on April 20-22, 1967, it was characterized as a very good meeting. This meeting was held about 125 miles from Montreal and was attended by about 85 young people. Included in this gathering were youth of all sorts, even including separatists, anarchists and communists. All in attendance agreed that they are going to set up a new youth organization which will be Marxist-oriented but not actually a communist organization. The meeting and this decision were marked by a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of the youth.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROUTE IN ENVELOPE  
Date: 6/12/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)  
SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

Re previous communications concerning possible indictments in the current SEC investigation of stock manipulations on the American Stock Exchange.

Through the NYO liaison with AUSA New York LAWRENCE NEWMAN, it has been ascertained that the Grand Jury in the current SEC investigation of stock frauds is presently in recess, subject to recall by the US Attorney whenever the latter sees fit to do so.

The said Grand Jury recessed immediately after indictments were handed down in the case involving Pentron stock, the reason being that the USA's office desired to devote some time to a review of information pertinent to the prosecution of cases involving other stocks, of which there are nine.

A further reason for recessing the Grand Jury, according to AUSA NEWMAN, is that the USA's office desires "to get the press off its back", because continued publicity of the SEC case could adversely affect the stock market.

3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
1-Chicago (134-46-Sub B) (AM RM)  
1-NY 134-91 (INV) (41)  
1-NY 100-134637 (41)

ACB:eac  
(7)

Classified by 2339  
Exempt from GDS Category 23  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Approved: 65 JUN 17 1967  
Special Agent in Charge

~~TOP SECRET~~

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

BY LIAISON

*4*  
*Document downgraded to Secret*  
*per letter to CIA BIA/RS on 1/2/80*

Date: June 13, 1967  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: INTERNATIONAL LENIN SCHOOL  
MOSCOW, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (U.S.S.R.)

*TO CIA 6/14/67*

b6  
b7C

A source which has furnished reliable information in the past has advised as follows.

A leading member of the Communist Party of Canada recently stated that it had been the past practice of the Communist Party of Canada to send students to the International Lenin School in Moscow, U.S.S.R., each year. No students are being sent during the current year; however, during 1968 the Canadian Party plans to send nine students to this school. Six of these will spend one year studying and the remaining three will attend for only six months.

*M*

### NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation.

Information obtained from source during period 5/26-29/67 during a trip to Toronto, Canada and in conversation with William Kashtan, General Secretary, CP of Canada. Data extracted from Chicago airtel 6/5/67, captioned "Solo, IS-C." This information is also being furnished Legat, Ottawa for referral to   by LHM.

b7D

*pan*

*h*

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Wick	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

RHH:dmk

(6) dmk

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification JUN 14 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Jwe*

DATE: June 13, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S\* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 6/13/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were transmitted.

## ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:drv

(7)

EX-108

REC-34

100-428091-6333

JUN 15 1967

65 JUN 17 1967

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/12/67

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

My memorandum of 5/8/67 set forth, in detail, disbursement of funds by the Communist Party, USA, during April, 1967, which funds had previously been received from the Soviet Union and Red China since 9/58. The following schedule shows the receipt and disbursement of such funds during May, 1967.

## TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 9/58 to 4/30/67

Total received from Soviet Union.....	\$4,187,745.19
Total received from Red China (all on 2/10/60).....	50,000.00
Total received 9/58 to 4/30/67.....	\$4,237,745.19
Total disbursed 9/58 to 4/30/67.....	3,267,905.17
Balance of Fund 4/30/67.....	\$ 969,840.02

RECEIVED FROM SOVIET UNION 5/20/67.....	\$ 530,000.00
TOTAL AVAILABLE.....	\$1,499,840.02

## DISBURSEMENTS DURING MAY, 1967

All disbursements made on specific instructions of Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA.

For Party expenses and activities.....\$ 60,000.00

Money spent on Hall or his family including:

Wearing apparel for Hall.....	\$ 608.10	
Expenses for Hall's [redacted].....		
[redacted].....	500.00	
To buy car for Hall's [redacted].....		
[redacted].....	935.34	
Travel expenses of Hall's family.....	368.00	
Miscellaneous expenses of Hall's family.....	206.00	
Total.....	\$2,617.44	2,617.44

CONTINUED - OVER

100-428091

65 JUN 17 1967  
(5) dms

EX-108  
REC-34 100-428091-6334

6 JUN 15 1967

b6  
b7c



Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

Gift for Henry Winston, Chairman of the Communist Party, USA.....\$	35.00
Salary of Max Weinstein for work in securing business opportunities for the Party.....	300.00
Illinois District expenses.....	200.00
Party expense for plane ticket for NY 694-S* to Soviet Union in April, 1967.....	526.30
Rent on safe deposit box, New York City.....	57.75
TOTAL DISBURSEMENT MAY, 1967.....\$	63,736.49
BALANCE OF FUND 5/31/67.....	\$1,436,103.53

This money is held in safe deposit boxes under our  
control as follows:

In New York.....	\$1,313,782.98
In Chicago.....	122,320.55

ACTION:

None. This memorandum is submitted for your  
information. An up-to-date accounting of Solo Funds will  
be brought to your attention each month. Details of the  
accounting of these funds are not to be disseminated.

*WCS*

*WCS*

*WCS*

*WCS*

## ROUTE IN ENVELOP

Date: 6/6/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and three copies, and for the New York Office one copy, of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) entitled "COMMUNIST PARTY OF SWEDEN."

The information in the enclosed LHM was furnished on 5/31/67 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN by CG 5824-S\*, who has furnished reliable information in the past.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~SECRET~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth therein could reasonably result in the identification of this source who is furnishing information on the highest levels concerning the international communist movement, and thus adversely affecting the national security.

In order to further protect the identity of this source, the enclosed LHM has been shown as being prepared at Washington, D.C.

- 1 CC 9049-20/CML.  
 3 - Bureau (Encls. 4) (RM)  
 1 - New York (100-134637) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - Chicago

WAB:mes  
 (5)

EX-108  
REC-34

6 JUN 15 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUN 17 1967 Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

CG 134-46 Sub B

The information in the enclosed LHM was obtained by CG 5824-S\* in conversations in Toronto, Canada, during the period 5/26-29/67 with WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Canada who attended as a fraternal delegate, Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C.  
June 6, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF SWEDEN

During May, 1967, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany which was held in East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, from April 17 to 22, 1967, there was some discussion among the fraternal delegations concerning recent developments in the Communist Party (CP) of Sweden. This Party has recently held its own congress and is now considering changing the name of the Party from CP to some other name, such as possibly the Communist Socialist Party, or the Communist Democratic Party, or the Communist Freedom Party, or a similar name. Eventually the Swedish Party plans to drop the word "communist" from its name and will try to stand apart from the burdens imposed by association with the actions of the communist countries.

In discussions about these developments in the CP of Sweden among various fraternal delegations to the congress, including the CP of the Soviet Union and the CP of Czechoslovakia, there was generally agreement that this may be the way for the Swedes to break through to the masses of the Swedish people. It was felt that many CPs in western countries are in a rut and are not leading the masses and thus they may have to break with the past in order to break through to the masses. No one considered the Swedish communists to be "revisionists" because of this attitude and no hostility was expressed against the Swedes and the CP of the Soviet Union delegates concurred in this position.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

100-428091

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

LEGAT, Ottawa

6/13/67

Director, FBI (100-428691)

1 - Mr. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Enclosed herewith are three copies of a letter-head memorandum classified "~~Top Secret~~" and captioned "Planned Attendance of Canadians at International Lenin School, Moscow, USSR, During 1968."

Promptly furnish a copy of this memorandum to your sources in the [redacted]. These sources should be cautioned that it is essential that no distribution or use of our intelligence information be undertaken which would be likely to jeopardize the security of our source.

Enclosures - 3

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

RHH:dmk

(6)


NOTE:

Enclosure classified "~~Top Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation.

By separate letter this information has also been furnished CIA.

EX-103

REC-19 100-428691-6336



Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JUN 14 1967

65 JUN 20 1967

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

6/12/67

PLAINTEXT

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (29-0)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (29-0)

SUBJECT: UNCLAS; Alleged Possible  
FRA Violations at the First  
National Bank of Lincolnwood  
Lincolnwood, Illinois  
FRA

ReCCairtels, 6/5, 6/67.

On 6/12/67, AUSA PAUL R. GRAND, SDNY, advised SA FRANCIS P. HENRY that AUSA LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN is on leave. GRAND is assisting NEWMAN in the SEC investigation and is familiar with captioned matter.

GRAND stated he concurs with the decision of USA EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, Chicago to hold captioned FRA investigation in abeyance pending completion of the SEC case. GRAND stated that an active FRA investigation of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood now might prematurely disclose information and witnesses needed in the SEC case.

GRAND stated he is sure AUSA NEWMAN also will agree with USA HANRAHAN's position. GRAND stated he will specifically bring this matter to NEWMAN's attention when NEWMAN returns to work.

4 - Bureau  
(1 - 100-428091)  
3 - Chicago  
(1 -  )  
1 - New York (100-134637)  
1 - New York

PPH:smv  
(10)

100-428091  
NOT RECORDED  
172 JUL 12 1967

59 JUL 1 9 1967

45961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b7D

6/6/67

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (23-0)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (23-0)

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; Alleged Possible  
FRA Violations At The First  
National Bank of Lincolnwood,  
Lincolnwood, Illinois  
FRA

Re Chicago airtel, 6/5/67.

On 6/6/67 AUSA [redacted] advised ASAC  
EYLE G. CLARK that inasmuch as the FRA allegations originated  
with AUSA NEWMAN in New York City, USA EDWARD V. HANRAHAN  
desired that AUSA NEWMAN be advised that any FRA investiga-  
tion would be held in abeyance pending completion of the  
SEC investigation.

New York, without disclosing any information about  
Chicago informants, advise AUSA NEWMAN as requested by  
USA HANRAHAN.

New York advise the Bureau and Chicago of the  
reaction of NEWMAN.

4 - Bureau (RM)  
(1 - 100-420091)  
2 - New York (RM)  
(1 - 100-134057)  
3 - Chicago  
(1 - 134-46 Sub B)  
(1 - [redacted])  
GTJ:BAQ  
(9)

100-420091  
NOT RECORDED  
172 JUL 12 1967

51  
59 JUL 1 9 1967

45961 - 1

ORIGINAL FILED IN 27

b7D

b7D

6/5/67

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (29-0)

UNSUBS;  
ALLEGED POSSIBLE FRA VIOLATIONS  
AT THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF  
LINCOLNWOOD, LINCOLNWOOD, ILLINOIS  
FRA

Enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) copies of  
memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AND MR. [REDACTED] CONDUCTED MAY 10, 1967,  
AT THE UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE IN FOLEYS SQUARE, NEW YORK."  
Enclosed for New York is one (1) copy of foregoing captioned  
memorandum.

By letter dated 5/25/67, from the USA, Chicago, it  
was requested that an Agent be assigned for the purpose of  
conducting an investigation into various alleged FRA  
violations at the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood,  
Illinois, and that the Agent assigned contact AUSA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] to discuss the matter further.

On 5/31/67, AUSA [REDACTED] furnished a copy of  
the enclosed memorandum which reflected his interview of  
[REDACTED] on 5/10/67, at the United States Courthouse

- (4) - Bureau (Enc. 2) (RM)  
(1) - 100-428091  
2 - New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (RM)  
3 - Chicago  
(1) - 134-46 Sub B)  
(1) - [REDACTED]

NOT RECORDED  
183 JUL 12 1967

EJN/rms/meb  
(9)

71 JUL 19 1967

b6  
b7C  
NAT. FILED IN  
C

b6  
b7C

b7D

29-459615

P4

100-428091-



CG 29-0

in Foley's Square, New York City. [ ] declared that there is a FGJ investigation being currently conducted at New York City into a nation-wide stock fraud deal, the investigation of which is being handled by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). [ ] currently employed as a [ ] of Installment Loans at the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, has been going to New York City on one-day trips to help out the SEC investigation. While there, he apparently talked about the information contained in enclosed memo. [ ] said, despite the fact that [ ] resides in the Chicago area, it was suggested by AUSA LAURENCE NEWMAN of the New York City USA's Office that it would be better to have one of the AUSAs from Chicago come to New York to meet [ ] and record any information he had to furnish as [ ] was reportedly nervous and fearful of possible hoodlum retaliation. [ ] said that, in his opinion, an investigation should be made into any alleged FRA violations in enclosed memorandum.

b6  
b7C

A review of enclosed memorandum reflects it to be a rather vague and self-serving document which mainly recounts the acquisition of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois, by a group headed by IRVING PROJANSKY and ARTHUR C. KELLER and the alleged over-the-legal-limit loan proclivities of the bank with various individuals and companies from which the bank will reportedly suffer losses of approximately \$200,000. Such over-the-legal-limit loans, as described, are not FRA violations but are covered by the regulatory powers of the National Bank Examiners. An investigation into the circumstances of these loans would be a "fishing expedition" as, according to enclosed memorandum, the National Bank Examiners were cognizant of these loans and would have referred them had they been FRA violations.

The memorandum does state that [ ] was told by one [ ] one of the three principals in Automatic Accounting Corporation, which company had obtained loans

b6  
b7C

CG 29-0

at the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, that, as to any payoffs, Automatic Accounting Corporation gave Air Travel Credit Cards to ARTHUR KELLER, IRVING PROJANSKY and his son, STUART PROJANSKY, all officers of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, but does not indicate extent of, or any, use of the cards by these individuals. [ ] also told [ ] that he had made some auto payments for STUART PROJANSKY on PROJANSKY's car. [ ] told [ ] that in consideration of the loan from Dr. [ ] to Automatic Accounting Corporation, that STUART PROJANSKY was given \$2,000 or \$5,000. This loan was a personal loan by [ ] to Automatic Accounting Corporation and [ ] did not know whether the bank had loaned [ ] the money to loan to Automatic Accounting Corporation.

b6  
b7C

Various individuals named in the memorandum are familiar to the Chicago Office as follows:

It is noted that on page 1 of the memorandum, the name of CG 5824-S\* is mentioned as a stockholder of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood. This is the only mention of this Chicago informant and no allegations are made by [ ] implicating him in any of the transactions described. As the Bureau is already aware, CG 5824-S\* is involved in the current investigation of alleged manipulation of stocks on the American Stock Exchange being conducted by SEC. This investigation reportedly now centers upon activities of individuals connected with the First National Bank of Lincolnwood. However, the disclosures of [ ] whose interview arose during the SEC investigation, appear to have no impact upon the SOLO operation at this time.

b6  
b7C

It is noted on page 13 of the memorandum the name of [ ] is mentioned as [ ] of the Gaylur Mercantile Company of Chicago. [ ] was reportedly brought into the bank by GEORGE BIEBER, a Chicago attorney and stockholder in the bank, to examine

b7D

CG 20-0

the books as to the newly discovered over-extension of loans. In connection with this situation, [redacted] purchased a quantity of cameras and agreed to pay off Time-Life and dispose of the books, which deals had originally been set up by the Automatic Accounting Corporation. The Gaylur Mercantile Company also obtained an \$30,000 loan from the bank in this connection. Informant has advised that these are legitimate transactions which would not be of concern to investigators of FRA matters. He advised that FELIX ALDERISIO and other top hoodlums have no interest in this bank's operations. b7D

GEORGE BIEDER is a Chicago attorney who, together with his partner MICHAEL BRODKIN, of the firm of Bieder and Brodtkin, has for a number of years represented numerous major Chicago hoodlums and thieves in local criminal courts. Chicago informants have advised that BIEDER and BRODKIN have often bragged that there is not a case in Cook County Felony Courts which they cannot fix.

An article appeared in the "Chicago Sun-Times" of 6/2/67, entitled "Four Chicago Men Indicted in Pentron Trading Probe," which article concerned the indictment at New York City of six individuals including OSEORN ANDREAS, SPERO FURLA, ROBERT NESS and MARK KOLLAND, all of Chicago, Illinois, and PAUL HEISCHUDER and MARIO TROMBONE, both of New York, for fraudulent activities in the sale of Pentron stock. The article stated that the Grand Jury investigation is also reportedly looking into suspicious trading activity in Rowland Products Inc., Lecco - Neville Company, Diversified Metals Corp., Hercules Galion Products Inc., Duraloy Company and Savoy Industries Inc. It will be noted that in enclosed memo, [redacted] advised that IRVING PROJANSKY is on the board of Hercules Galion. b6 b7C

On 6/2/67, in view of the foregoing information developed regarding Chicago informants CG 5324-S\* (Operation SOLO) and [redacted] USA EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, Chicago, was b7D

CG 29-0

contacted by ASAC KYLE G. CLARK and without disclosing the information developed relative to the two foregoing Chicago informants, the advisability of commencing the requested FRA investigation in the light of the current SEC investigation was discussed. HANRAHAN advised that he was in full agreement with Mr. CLARK that investigation of any possible FRA violations in enclosed memo be held in abeyance until the SEC has completed its FGJ investigation and returned any further indictments at which time they are reportedly to turn over all information of pertinence to FBI jurisdiction which is obtained in the course of SEC investigation.

In view of the foregoing, no investigation will be conducted by Chicago at this time.

New York is requested to follow SEC investigation through reliable officials and furnish the Bureau and Chicago any information obtained concerning the First National Bank of Lincolnwood or its board members and stockholders.

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE

Legat, Ottawa

6/14/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

*Solo*

There are enclosed three copies of a letterhead memorandum classified "~~Top Secret~~," captioned as above. Also enclosed are copies of literature received by the Communist Party, USA, from the Communist Party of Canada.

Promptly furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum with the attached literature to your source in the [redacted] [redacted] Your source should be cautioned that it is essential that no distribution or use of our intelligence information be undertaken which would be likely to jeopardize the security of our sources.


Enclosures - 7

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

RCP:cst  
(5)

NOTE:

See letterhead memorandum captioned "Communist Party, USA; International Relations," dated June 14, 1967, prepared by RCP:cst. Only one set of literature being sent Legat for dissemination to [redacted] since there is no need for Legat to retain a copy.



REC-19

EX-103

100-428091-6337

6 JUN 15 1967

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE

JUN 20 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE 11 ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

June 14, 1967

**COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The following was supplied by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past:

The Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has been contacted by officials of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) regarding possible means of providing support for the struggle of the Portuguese "Patriots Fighting Oppression," both in Portugal and alongside the national liberation forces in the colonial wars of Africa.

It has been learned that the CPC sent literature concerning this matter to the CPUSA. This literature consisted of the following:

A pamphlet entitled "Report on a Mission to Portugal"; a bulletin entitled "Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin," dated February/April, 1967; a leaflet entitled "Submission to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations"; and a letterhead of the Canadian Committee for Amnesty in Portugal. Copies of these documents are attached to this memorandum. Notations appearing thereon were affixed by officials of the CPC.

The CPUSA has been requested to secure additional copies of this literature for distribution to key members of the United States Congress. The CPC expressed hope that this literature could be sent to the congressmen along with accompanying letters from citizens' groups in the United States organized for the purpose of urging action against the Government of Portugal. It was further proposed that the literature be furnished leaders of groups in the United States interested in civil liberties. The literature is to be used to initiate a conference in the United States on amnesty for political prisoners in Portugal.

100-428091

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

RCP:cst

(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-6337

*Document downgraded to Secret per 60304 UC BAW/RS on 1/2/84*

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~**COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The CPC further suggested that a citizens' committee to obtain amnesty for political prisoners in Portugal be formed in the United States to develop liaison with similar groups in Canada and South America. A major project of such a group would be to focus attention on the status of political prisoners in Portugal by bringing the matter up before the United Nations. Other activities would include drawing world-wide attention to special grievous cases, the growing presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in and around Portugal, and the role the United States plays in providing arms and support for the Government of Portugal.

**Attachments****NOTE:**

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal identity of the sources (NY 694-S\* and CG 5824-S\*) who are of continuing value and such revelation could result in especially grave damage to the nation. Data extracted from NY airtel 5/22/67 and CG airtel 6/5/67, both captioned "Solo, IS - C." Data contained herein has been previously disseminated to State and CIA. Copies of enclosures being sent  as attachments to the LHM are already in our file.

b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~

6/15/67  
9:10 AM

June 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON *Solo*

Assistant to the Director Cartha D. DeLoach called. He stated that as I knew, when the Soviets give our Solo informant money, we keep a careful account and make him account for it to the penny. He continued that Gus Hall, Chairman of the Communist Party, has contacted Solo and indicated he wants this morning \$250,000 for expenses. Mr. DeLoach said this will be taken from the Soviet funds and not the FBI's and he sees no alternative except to give it to him. I told Mr. DeLoach this was all right as long as it comes from the money that came over from abroad. Mr. DeLoach said it will be taken care of.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

EX-103

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

REC-19

100-428091-6338  
6 JUN 16 1967

JEH:edm (4)

*edm*  
Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Wick*

SENT FROM D. O.	
TIME	9:40 AM
DATE	6-15-67
BY	1275

65 JUN 20 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐



UNITED STATES

MENT

ROUTE

ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 6/9/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS - C

5- R. [unclear] (lost)  
Stamps

Re Chicago airtel to the Director, cc to New York, dated 5/16/67, concerning contemplated travel to Canada by CARL LEICHTMAN of Prompt Press, New York City, to survey the printing establishment of the Communist Party (CP) of Canada.

During his recent trip to Canada May 26-29, 1967, CG 5824-S\* inquired from WILLIAM KASHTAN, General Secretary, CP of Canada, whether or not LEICHTMAN had arrived in Canada and visited their printing plant. KASHTAN advised that he did not know if LEICHTMAN had arrived and if he had arrived no one had called it to KASHTAN's attention. Since this would be unlikely, KASHTAN was of the opinion that as of that date CARL LEICHTMAN had not yet made the trip.

1-904 940

2 - Bureau (RM)

1 - New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1 - Chicago

WAB:mes

(4)

EX-103  
REC-19

100-428091-6339

6 JUN 16 1967

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

65



20 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Date: 6-1-67

To: Director, FBI

(Bufile : 100-428091 ✓)

Attention : \_\_\_\_\_

From: Legal Attache, Ottawa

( 105-684 )

Title  COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  (OO: Bureau)	Character IS - C  Reference BUlet 3-28-67, re "WILLIAM SYDNEY, IS- C."
------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

b7D

Enclosed are the following communications received from the [ ] Original and two copies of [ ] letter dated 5-26-67.

Remarks:

*S. R. Patterson*

38

REC-19

Dissemination

- ☐ May be made as received  
☐ May be made as indicated by stamp on enclosure  
☒ May not be made without further clearance with [ ]

60

b7D

Following offices would be interested in receiving copies of enclosures:

New York

Status with this office:

- ☐ RUC  
☒ Pending *summary copy*  
 3 - Bureau (1 New York)  
 (Enc. 3)

Ltr to NY, CG  
 6-13-67  
 RHH/dmk  
 1-OTT(3)  
 MLI:jhc

6-cc fpt - 6-15-67  
 6-cc fpt - 6-15-67  
 6-cc fpt - 6-15-67

Do not write in space below			
100-428091-6340	REC-19	EX-103	
JUN 5 1967		INT/SEC.	

ENCLOSURE  
 JUN 11 1967  
 REC-19

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *Jwe*

DATE: June 13, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On 6/13/67, the New York Office furnished the text of three messages which the informant desired to send and requested that they be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on the same day.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

ACTION:

For information.

*C. D. Sullivan*

*5- R. Putnam*

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

*CC*

HS:dry  
(7)

EX-103

REC-19

*100-425091-6341*

JUN 16 1967

ENCLOSURE

65 JUN 20 1967

6/13/67

05305 38541 03381 92303 44714 92191 16732 23305 31975 71237  
89699 48946 04521 95529 54953 86346 33152 16433 00087 73058

|CALLING|TO|YOUR|ATTENTION|AGAIN|IN|THE|GAP|OF|#|40|#GAMMA|GROUPS|  
|.SPRING|.

100-428091-6341  
ENCLOSURE

94073 67610 49727 76380 81872 92162 26999 35316 78889 59429  
83440 66762 39777 03335 72842 63588 71378 04944 09356 07172  
81708 56690 44031 10290 18267 05794 02062 07724 81069 45135  
52641 51835 02335 56915 92527 10199 57125 19941 26381 37853  
87362 48836 34806 91547 85344 68465 75817 54376 95414 79520  
86166

|YOUR|LAST|BAT|SIGNALS|TO|ME|WERE|WEAK|DUE|TO|LOCAL|DISTURBANC  
ES|.WERE|MY|BAT|SIGNALS|ALSO|WEAK\*|IF|THIS|CONTINUES|PERHAP  
S|YOU|SHOULD|MAKE|NEW|TESTS|FOR|BETTER|HOURS|WITH|FEWER|DIST  
URBANCES|.SPRING|..

41219 37075 81920 19313 89887 22449 77709 13659 33805 61020

38359 63607 92995 49541 96720 04255 96985

HAVE ALREADY PURCHASED UHER #4000 #1 REPORTER SPRING

SAC, New York (100-134637)  
Attention: SAC Dillard W. Howell

August 24, 1967

REC-134  
Director, FBI (100-428091) - 6342

SOLO  
IS - C

EX-101

TRAMUS

Reference is made to your letter of 6/13/67, captioned as above, in which you forwarded 3,116 pages of Xerox reproductions of money in the amount of \$240,000.

Serial numbers of the money on the 3,116 pages have been recorded in the Automatic Data Processing Unit. These numbers will be compared and added to the index.

There are being forwarded to your office under separate cover 3,116 pages of Xerox reproductions.

JP: lkt  
(6)

- 1 - SAC Dillard W. Howell (with Xerox reproductions)
- 1 - Mr. Row

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAILED 2  
AUG 24 1967  
COMM - FBI

62 AUG 25 1967

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

## Memorandum

TO: *[Signature]*  
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
(ATTN: VOUCHER STATISTICAL SECTION)

FROM: *[Signature]*  
SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: *[Signature]*  
SOLO  
IS - C

DATE: 6/13/67

### TRAMUS

Enclosed for the Bureau are 3,116 pages of xerox of money representing \$240,000.00 in \$20.00 denominations. This represents only part of the \$530,000.00 received by NY 694-S\* from the Soviets on 5/20/67.

Records of these bills should contain the reference, "NY 65-17696-A1391". It is also requested that the record contain the page number of the xerox which number may be found on the lower right hand corner of each sheet.

The enclosed material should be returned to the NYO after processing.

① *[Signature]*  
② C.G. *[Signature]*  
(*[Signature]*)  
C C

- 1-904900
- ③ - Bureau (Encls. 3,116) (RM)  
(1 - Voucher Statistical Section)  
1 - New York (65-17696) (343)  
1 - New York (41)

JFL:rmp  
(5)

REC-23

100-428091-6342

ACK 8-24-67  
JP:11K EX-104

JUN 15 1967



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

6/16/67

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

*EX*  
Airtel

To: SACs, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)  
New York (100-134637)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091)

**SOLO**  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

In order to insure that all information on the re-establishment of a daily newspaper is available at the earliest possible date, New York and Chicago should take the following steps.

1. NY 694-S\* and CG 5824-S\* are to be given specific assignments to determine everything possibly relating to this matter. Particular emphasis must be placed upon the financial commitments made by the Communist Party, USA, or Gus Hall toward purchase of equipment or supplies to re-establish a daily newspaper.
2. This matter is to be followed most closely and the Bureau immediately advised of pertinent information developed.
3. Insure that pertinent information from other sources, particularly that relating to financial transactions and Party commitments for supplies and equipment, are furnished the Bureau at the earliest possible date.

RCP:dmk

(6) *dmk*

NOTE: Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, has stated that it will cost one million dollars to re-establish a daily newspaper and \$600,000 a year to maintain it. The expenditure of such amounts of money should be of utmost interest to us.

REC-15

100-428091-6343

6 JUN 16 1967

MAILED 30  
JUN 16 1967  
COMM-FBI

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

5 JUN 20 1967

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

EX-109

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

6/19/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Reurlet 6/8/67 which requests the Bureau to furnish its observations relative to the conviction of the Chicago Office that the location of a replacement for CG 5824-S\* cannot be conceived of as the responsibility of the Chicago Office alone.

Your letter has been carefully reviewed. To clear up any misconceptions the following points are being set forth.

1. The Bureau has no intention of making the Chicago Office solely responsible for the location of a replacement for CG 5824-S\*. As the Bureau views the problem, the first logical step in a matter of such prime importance is to designate a coordinator. Chicago is in a unique position since it is the home of CG 5824-S\*. Therefore, it is logical that Chicago become the coordinator of this search.
2. Since CG 5824-S\* is the most active, politically, of our Solo informants, Chicago is in a position to critically analyze the work of other offices toward developing a suitable replacement for this informant. This is the task of a coordinator.
3. Bulet of 6/6/67 notes that there has been considerable correspondence under various captions over the years concerning this matter. The purpose of the Bureau letter was to centralize our efforts under one caption and institute a fresh start. As a first step Chicago should formulate a plan of action directed toward enlisting the cooperation of selected major offices in locating a replacement for CG 5824-S\*.

MAILED 30

JUN 19 1967

COMM-FBI

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RCP:dmk  
(4)

JUN 21 1967

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-23

EX-103

JUN 19 1967

Letter to Chicago  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

4. Your letter requested that you be advised of the results obtained and progress made under instructions set forth in Bureau letter 1/31/67, captioned "High Level Informant Development, CPUSA." There have been no favorable responses to this letter.
5. Your letter notes that the Illinois District has but a limited number of national leaders of the Communist Party, USA, while the preponderance of national leaders are in New York and it is from the ranks of national leaders that a replacement for CG 5824-S\* must be found. It could be that there is an alternative. The assignments of CG 5824-S\* are many, varied, and complicated. The informant himself is a most unusual individual. It may well be necessary to locate several individuals who have some of CG 5824-S\*'s attributes and utilize each in separate spheres of our informant's activities.
6. In any event, a dialogue on this problem has been started. By separate cover New York will be advised of the institution of this search and instructed to develop ideas for a fresh start. Copies of all communications will be directed to the Bureau and Chicago.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 6/8/67

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

Personal Attention:  
CHARLES O. BRENNAN  
Internal Security Section  
Domestic Intelligence Division

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS - C

CD Brennan  
S-R Brennan

Re Bureau letter to Chicago dated 6/6/67 captioned "SOLO; IS - C," setting forth observations and instructions for the Chicago Office relative to the development of a suitable replacement for CG 5824-S\* in the Solo operation. Referenced Bureau letter instructed that on a continuing basis Chicago should submit factual letters of results obtained in this regard at monthly intervals beginning 6/30/67.

As the Bureau is aware, I have given this program my close continuing personal attention over a period of years and I will continue to do so in the future. All responsible personnel in the Chicago Office are aware that the solution to this problem is among the most important responsibilities we have in the Internal Security field. This office has made initiatives to the Bureau on this subject on numerous occasions and will continue to exert every effort in this regard.

It is noted that referenced Bureau letter was directed to the Chicago Office with no copies thereof nor instructions therein set forth for other offices throughout the field. I would like to note that on many occasions in the past I have personally communicated to the Bureau the conviction of all concerned personnel in this office that the solution to this problem cannot be sought or obtained through recourse to the resources of this office alone nor the potential existing among communist subjects within the confines of the Illinois District, Communist Party (CP), USA.

- 2 - Bureau (RM)  
1 - Chicago

MWJ:mes  
(3)

REC-54 100-428091-6345

EX-108

6 JUN 20 1967

JUN 15 5 43 PM '67

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE



65

22 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

b7D

It is the firm position of this office that instead of being a problem unique to the Chicago Division, this problem must be viewed as a Bureau-wide problem. The continuation of Solo at such time as the current Solo informants are no longer able to function is of such overriding consequence that every resource of the FBI, both at the Seat of Government and in every field office, must be brought to bear in order to accomplish this end. This office has given and will continue to give this problem attention commensurate with the convictions set forth above.

b7D

As to current efforts being expended by this office toward this end, the Bureau has been kept fully informed of our continuing efforts to defect [redacted] with the ultimate objective of using him as an assistant or "legman" for CG 5824-S\*. It is apparent that even if successful in this endeavor, [redacted] does not constitute potential as a replacement for the Chicago Solo informant. Nevertheless, his defection, accompanied by an expanded role in his activities within the CP, USA funds operation, will be of material assistance to CG 5824-S\*. [redacted] has already been interviewed on several occasions, the results of which having been already furnished to the Bureau. We are continuing to maintain contact with [redacted] printed material is being placed in his hands on those matters wherein he has displayed a weakness, and at this time we are attempting to exploit the contradictions between his religious and ethnic feelings and the line of the CP, USA on the current crisis in the Middle East.

In accordance with planning initiated by Chicago, we have obtained Bureau authority to interview [redacted] Illinois District, CP, USA. However, at Bureau concurrence, this interview is now being held in abeyance in order that current developments in the Middle East may have their maximum effect upon [redacted] whose primary interest and perhaps weakness lie in the [redacted] question. Under separate caption Chicago is requesting the Bureau to authorize an Agent of [redacted] background to be sent to this office on special, to be briefed concerning [redacted] and to participate in the interview of [redacted] with a mature Agent of this office who is

CG 134-46 Sub B

familiar with [redacted] At the propitious time, when from information available to us and in our judgment the Middle East crisis has had its maximum effect upon [redacted] the interview of [redacted] will be aggressively pursued.

b7D

Following the results of the [redacted] interview, our next steps will be dependent upon the results thereof. As pointed out previously to the Bureau, it is our judgment that a "scatter gun" approach is not warranted in these high level defection attempts. We believe that there is greater opportunity for success by concentrating upon the most logical potentials first. My letter of January 10, 1967, set forth the identities of those individuals considered by this office and by CG 5824-S\* as having the best potential to perform as a replacement for CG 5824-S\*. It is noted that [redacted] is the only such potential who is in the Chicago Division. As the Bureau is aware, the Illinois District, CP, USA, has but a limited number of national leaders of the CP, USA. The vast preponderance of national leaders are located in New York, and it is from the ranks of national leadership that a replacement for CG 5824-S\* must be defected. My letter of January 10, 1967, set forth the identity of a number of individuals having the best potential in this regard, together with reasons therefor. These individuals are as follows: [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] It is our judgment that these individuals still constitute the best potential in this regard and the Bureau is respectfully requested to issue explicit instructions to the New York Office to exert every maximum, concentrated, imaginative and creative effort toward developing successful defection approaches toward the above CP, USA functionaries.

Although the Bureau directed a letter dated January 31, 1967, captioned "HIGH LEVEL INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, CP, USA" to a number of offices to conduct surveys in various categories for the purpose of developing potentials in those offices, no concrete results have been observed by this office. At that time the Bureau observed that upon receipt of the results of the surveys in these offices the Bureau would issue further instructions, Chicago is not aware of efforts made

CG 134-46 Sub B

in this direction. The Bureau is respectfully requested to advise the Chicago Office of the results obtained and progress thus far by these offices following the receipt of subsequent instructions from the Bureau.

This office intends to make continuing aggressive approaches and to develop creative techniques in an effort to defect [redacted] I must point out that should our efforts in this direction not meet with success, we must admit that at this time there does not appear to be any leader of the CP of Illinois who constitutes potential for replacement of CG 5824-S\*. Nevertheless, we will continue to bend every effort toward identifying any individual who can possibly be developed into potential as a suitable replacement for CG 5824-S\*.

b7D

The Bureau is requested to furnish to this office its observations relative to the conviction of this office that this program cannot be conceived of as the responsibility of the Chicago Office alone. Any observations of the Bureau which it may deem helpful in our continuing efforts to develop a replacement for CG 5824-S\* would be indeed appreciated.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)  
SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

DATE: 6/13/67

ReCGairtel to Bureau dated May 19, 1967, captioned "SOLO."

Reairtel advised the Bureau that as a consequence of his purchase from [redacted] of their stock in the First National Bank of Lincolnwood and in Hercules Galion, CG 5824-S\* would purchase U.S. Government bonds in the amount of approximately \$33,000 for the [redacted]

On June 6, 1967, CG 5824-S\* advised that he had sent CG 6653-S to a bank earlier that date to purchase U.S. Government bonds in that amount in order to be able to take such bonds to New York City on June 6, 1967, to turn them over to GUS HALL, General Secretary, CP, USA, [redacted]

On June 6, 1967, CG 6653-S advised that in discussing this matter with bank officials she learned that such government bonds in that amount were not readily available and therefore she was only able at that time to make the following purchases:

Type of Investment	Face Value	Purchase Price
U.S. Series E Bonds	\$ 7,000.00	\$ 5,250.00
Trailer Train Equipment Bonds	15,000.00	13,734.68
U.S. Treasury Bonds	5,000.00	4,909.12
Cashier's Check (cash)	6,000.00	6,000.00
Totals	\$33,000.00	\$29,893.80

For record purposes, set forth below are the serial numbers of the U.S. Treasury Bonds and the Trailer Train Equipment Bonds:

②-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW  
(4)

65 JUN 22 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



CG-134-46 Sub F

U.S. Treasury \$1000 Bonds

12181  
12182  
30849  
49302  
49303

Trailer Train Equipment \$1000 Bonds

M6601  
M6602  
M6603  
M6604  
M6605  
M6606  
M6607  
M6608  
M6609  
M6610  
M6611  
M6612  
M6613  
M6614  
M6615

The above amounts in check and investments were taken by CG 5824-S\* and CG 6653-S to New York City on June 6, 1967, to be turned over to HALL or the [redacted] during the week preceding the National Committee meeting, CP, USA, being held in New York City starting June 10, 1967. CG 6653-S advised that the following are the exact prices paid by CG 5824-S\* and CG 6653-S to the [redacted] for the investments in Hercules Galion and the First National Bank of Lincolnwood:

<u>Investment</u>	<u>Cost to [redacted] (Solo Funds)</u>	<u>Paid by Informants</u>
800 shares Lincolnwood	\$20,000.00	\$23,200.00 (current offered price)
1,000 shares Hercules Galion	\$ 8,820.40	\$ 8,820.40
Totals	\$28,820.40	\$32,020.40

CG 134-46 Sub F

In our discussions with these two informants concerning Solo funds which have been converted to the advantage of [redacted] it was recently learned that an expenditure of Solo funds, previously reported for December, 1966, as being turned over to GUS HALL for CP expenses and activities, had actually been used in part to mortgage the new home of the [redacted] in New Haven, Connecticut. During early December, 1966, on three occasions, \$20,000 was furnished to HALL ostensibly for CP expenses. Actually, on one such occasion HALL had converted \$16,500 to a mortgage of his [redacted] the mortgage being made out to the benefit of CG 5824-S\*. At this time, [redacted] is paying on this mortgage at the rate of \$123.20 per month which is mailed in the informant's name to the First National Bank of Lincolnwood where it is deposited to the informant's account. Since this is Party money, we might have expected that the informant would then withdraw such funds and return them to the Solo funds. However, upon HALL's instructions, such is not to be the case. Upon the accumulation of three months' payments amounting to \$369.60, the informant is to add \$5.40, bringing the total to \$375.00 and purchase a \$500 Series E Savings Bond in the [redacted] name and forward it to them. The [redacted] began such payments in March, 1967, and therefore CG 6653-S has purchased an additional \$500 Series E Savings Bond in [redacted] name and mailed it to the [redacted] during the first week of June.

b6  
b7C

CG 5824-S\* recognizes that this is a most dangerous practice which ties him even more closely into a financial web with the [redacted]. However, this transaction was carried out by HALL without consultation with the informant and therefore he was unable to control this. HALL was informed subsequently by the informant of the dangerousness of this continuing transaction but HALL was apparently impressed by the informant's previously demonstrated ability to provide for the financial welfare of his family and furthermore HALL apparently felt he had no one else to whom he could turn with such trust as he has in this informant. Therefore, HALL resolved to involve our informant ever deeper in the financial affairs of the [redacted]. At this time we can see no way in which CG 5824-S\* can extricate himself from this arrangement, but we will remain constantly alert to any opportunity whereby CG 5824-S\* can remove this tie between himself and the [redacted].

b6  
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/15/67

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CBH*

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

## PURPOSE:

This is to advise that CG 5824-S\*, who is in New York City, has received instructions from Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, to furnish Hall with \$250,000 by the evening of 6/15/67 (today). This memorandum recommends our New York Office be telephonically instructed to make this money available to the informant from funds obtained by our sources from the Soviets for the Communist Party, USA.

## BACKGROUND:

CG 5824-S\* advised our New York Office that Hall instructed him to furnish Hall with \$250,000 by the evening of 6/15/67. According to source, Hall stated this money was to be used to help in the re-establishment of a daily communist newspaper. We know that the Party is committed to the purchase of United States-made printing equipment at the cost of \$150,000 plus an additional \$50,000 to set up a new composing room for the paper's printing plant. It would appear that this is a legitimate request on the part of Hall, for in a summary teletype on this matter on 3/15/67, New York advised that CG 5824-S\* had been told by Hall that he estimated it would cost one million dollars to get the paper started plus an additional \$600,000 a year to keep it going.

SAC Roney of New York recommends we make this money available and we concur, for to do otherwise would mean the exposure of our informants and the end of our Solo

RCP:dmk

(5)

100-428091

EX-108

CONTINUED - OVER

6 JUN 20 1967

65 JUN 22 1967

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

Operation. SAC Roney pointed out an expeditious decision was necessary since the informant must have the money in the afternoon of 6/15/67. In addition, the serial numbers of these bills must be noted and the money packaged prior to passage to Hall.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that our New York Office be telephonically advised to make \$250,000 available to CG 5824-S\* for passage to Gus Hall.

20

*[Handwritten signature]* *WEL*

Pursuant to the Director's telephonic approval, this is being done.

*V* *RB* *per [unclear]* *J* *JS*  
*OK* *[initials]*

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. E. H. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

4/21  
(IS) 100-428091

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

BY LIAISON

Date: June 16, 1967

To: Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY OF SWEDEN

670-67  
delivered  
WHR

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised as follows:

During the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) (Communist Party of East Germany) held in East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, from April 17-22, 1967, there was some discussion among the delegations concerning recent developments within the Communist Party of Sweden (CPS).

The CPS recently held its own congress and is considering changing its name from the Communist Party of Sweden to some other, possibly such as the Communist Socialist Party, Communist Democratic Party, or the Communist Freedom Party. Eventually, the CPS plans to drop the word "communist" from its title and will try to stand apart from the burdens imposed by association with the actions of the communist countries.

Source further stated that in discussing these developments, the various delegations to the SUPG Congress, including those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, expressed general agreement that this might be the way for the Swedes to break

RHH:cst  
(7)

REC 54

100-428091-6348

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

~~SECRET~~  
EX-108

6 JUN 20 1967

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

File 100-428091

WHR  
WHR

65

JUN 22 1967

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

through to the masses of the Swedish people. It was felt that many of the communist parties in western countries were in a rut, were not leading the masses, and would, thus, have to break with the past in order to break through to the masses.

1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

TO [redacted] 6/16/67 [signature]

b6  
b7C

NOTE:

Classified ~~"Secret"~~ since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.

Information obtained from the source during a 5/26-29/67 trip to Toronto, Canada, and while in conversation with William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada. Data extracted from CG airtel dated 6/8/67 captioned "Solo."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. E. H. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

(IS) 100-428091

Date: June 16, 1967

To: Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

BY LIAISON

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past recently reported the following:

A delegation of Canadian-Ukrainians, accompanied by Tim Buck, National Chairman, Communist Party of Canada (CPC), was recently sent by the CPC on a visit to the Soviet Union. The delegation returned to Canada quite dissatisfied with their trip. Discussions held by the delegates with representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning matters of interest to the Canadian-Ukrainians did not satisfy them. Tim Buck, who as of the latter part of May, 1967, had not returned to Canada and whose whereabouts and date of return were unknown to the Canadian Party leadership, had made no report to the leadership on this trip.

Source further advised that the Canadian Party is having trouble in Vancouver, British Columbia. The British Columbia provincial leader of the CPC, Nigel Morgan, has been absent from his duties because of sickness. In his absence, groups composed of "leftists and pro-Chinese" communists have started creating problems which are far from solved.

6 JUN 20 1967

Source went on to state that the youth meeting called by the CPC was held from April 20-22, 1967, and was considered successful. It was held in a location

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RHH:cst  
(7)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.  
100-428091

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

65 JUN 23 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

approximately 125 miles from Montreal and was attended by about 55 young people. Among those attending were separatists, anarchists, and communists. It was agreed to set up a youth organization which would be Marxist-oriented but not actually a communist organization.

1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.

Information obtained from the source during a 5/26-29/67 trip to Toronto, Canada, and while in conversation with William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada, and Norman Freed, National Educational Director, Communist Party of Canada. Data extracted from CG airtel dated 6/8/67 captioned "Solo." This information is also being furnished Legat, Ottawa, for referral to [ ] by letterhead memorandum.

~~SECRET~~



# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 6/19/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via 4X AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
ATTENTION: FBI LABORATORY

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS - C

On 6/16/67, pursuant to previously made arrangements, NY 694-S\* met his Soviet contact NIKOLAI TALANOV, in the area of the Avenue Jay subway station of the Brooklyn BMT subway line. TALANOV gave to NY 694-S\* a cigarette box containing microfilmed messages, which will be reported later.

TALANOV advised the informant that, in accordance with instructions, from the CCCPSU, he was furnishing the latter with information to be transmitted to GUS HALL -- that the said information was being transmitted simultaneously to the heads of all Communist Parties throughout the world, the information concerning the Mideast crisis. TALANOV stated that his instructions were to furnish the information orally to NY 694-S\*, who would have to rely upon his memory in transmitting the information to GUS HALL. He stated that the information reflected the "line" of argument which Premier ALEXEI KOSYGIN would present to the United Nations upon his arrival in the USA.

- 1-904 940 with 1-904-110
- 4 - Bureau (RM) (Enc. 1)  
(1 - FBI LABORATORY)
- 1 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (RM) (Enc. 1)
- 1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (41)
- 1 - New York (105-14931 Sub C) (TALANOV) (341)
- 1 - New York

ACB:jaw  
(9)

JUN 20 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUL 5 1967 Special Agent in Charge

NY 100-134637

The information furnished by TALANOV to NY 694-S\* was transmitted telephonically to the Bureau on 6/16/67. Pursuant to Bureau instructions, a summary of the said information was prepared by the NYO and delivered by personal messenger to the American Delegation at the UN on 6/16/67.

The contents of the aforementioned summary are as follows:

"On 6/16/67, a confidential source advised that the following information is being furnished by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union simultaneously to all the leaders of the Communist Parties in the world, - including Gus Hall of the CP, USA. The information concerns the crisis in the Mideast.

"The war in the Mideast was instigated by the imperialist countries of the United States, Great Britain and West Germany in behalf of the 'oil imperialists' of those countries. The war has been directed not only against the Arab nations in particular, but also against the national liberation movements of these countries, which have been friendly toward the USSR. It had become essential for the 'imperialist' countries to destroy and root out national liberation movements which have been making great progress in the Arab nations.

"It is most urgent at this time that the leaders of all Communist Parties throughout the world realize that the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries have distorted the situation in the Mideast.

"The Soviets wish to explain their position before the outbreak of the war and after - to explain why they supported the cease fire resolution in the United Nations as they did. What follows will be the 'line' to be pursued by Kosygin when he addresses the United Nations.

NY 100-134637

"The imperialists, using Israel as a foil, were attempting to overthrow the regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria. In Syria the imperialists tried to utilize members of the old ruling circles to overthrow the Syrian regime. Failing in this, they utilized Israel to attack Syria. Members of the ruling circles in Syria - whose interests were related to those of the imperialists - engaged in provoking the Israelis along the border in order to give the imperialists and the Israelis an excuse to attack Syria. The imperialist countries had been losing influence both politically and commercially in the Mideast. Meanwhile, the anti-imperialists of the countries of the United Arab Republic, Algeria, and Syria were becoming stronger and were inclined toward socialist orientation. They are also improving their friendship with the USSR and the other socialist countries. The policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been to support the Arab nations against the imperialists, particularly United States imperialists in the Mideast. This policy also was to strengthen the entire anti-imperialist camp against Israel and its supporters among the imperialists.

"The USSR Delegation to the United Nations supported the cease fire resolution because, on the evening of June 6, 1967, the Soviets had received information from the United Arab Republic that a very critical situation existed at the front. The United Arab Republic requested that the USSR effect a cessation of military action until the morning of June 7th, and help to solve the entire problem in the Security Council of the United Nations. Therefore, the USSR Delegation in the United Nations and the United Arab Republic representatives thereto supported the resolution to cease fire.

"When Israel continued the war on June 6th, Nasser, in consultation with the Soviet Government, (4:00 p.m. GMT time June 7th) informed the Soviets that Israeli aggression was continuing. At that time the Soviet Government sent a message to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow stating

NY 100-134637

that if the Israelis should not cease the war immediately, the Soviet Union would sever diplomatic relations with Israel. On June 8th, the Soviet Government introduced in the United Nations a draft resolution condemning Israel as an aggressor and informed Israel that it must cease fire and withdraw behind truce lines - naming boundaries set as a result of the treaty following the war of 1948.

"It is significant that only three hours after the Soviet Union severed relations with Israel, the real cease fire took place.

"On June 7th, Nasser had requested the Soviet Government to press for a cease fire in the Security Council and emphasized that he did not wish the Soviet Union to become involved in this war. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union then called a meeting in Moscow of representatives of the socialist countries - including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Poland, and East Germany - at which the agenda concerned stopping the war in the Mideast.

"It was agreed at this meeting that a cease fire must take place immediately, and it was also agreed that the aim of the imperialist forces actually was to destroy progressive regimes in the Arab countries. It was also agreed that it was imperative that no further destruction as a result of the war occur, if possible. Following this meeting, the aforesaid countries - through their representatives - demanded that Israel withdraw behind the truce lines of the 1948 war and to establish a permanent peace in the Mideast.

"Also at this meeting it was agreed that it was essential that these countries support - more than they ever had before - the anti-imperialist and progressive forces in the Mideast.

NY 100-134637

"That there has been a strengthening of the anti-imperialist forces in the Mideast is evidenced by the fact that the people in this area have refused to accept the resignation of Nasser, or of Syrian Government officials.

"The Soviets are strengthening the anti-imperialist forces in the Mideast economically and militarily (that is, with equipment), the reason being that the Soviets wish to advance the aims of the anti-imperialist and the national liberation movement in these countries against the imperialists.

"In the beginning of June, the Ambassador of the United Arab Republic and the President of Syria were in Moscow discussing the situation as regards the Gulf of Aquaba. The Soviets urged the United Arab Republic Ambassador and the President of Syria not to close the aforesaid Gulf. The Soviets emphasized that they were opposed to closing the Gulf of Aquaba, which they said would constitute a very grave mistake. They were warned that such action would lead to more serious problems. When the invasion began, the Soviet Government charged Israel with being an aggressor and demanded that it withdraw its troops behind the truce lines set up following the war of 1948. It was at this time that Kosygin sent a message to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow charging Israel with being the aggressor. At this time the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations was instructed to prevent the acceptance of the United States Delegation's resolution supporting Israeli action.

"All the Communist Parties in the world must be aware of the fact that now, more than ever before, it is essential to stress the fact that Israel has been the aggressor in this war and that it must withdraw behind the truce lines established following the war of 1948, and there must be a move toward permanent peace in the Mideast.

NY 100-134637

"A further objective must be the support of anti-imperialist forces in these Mideast countries, both politically and morally, and to refute the thesis of the bourgeois propagandists against the Arabs and the other socialist countries of the world.

"A further objective is to re-emphasize the necessity for the restoration, on all fronts, of the border positions which have been lost by the Arab countries, and to maintain them so that they may not be lost again."

The messages on microfilm delivered by TALANOV to NY 694-S\* are as follows:

"To Jack Brooks,

"I would like to transfer to you the following:

- "1) 1967 radio timetable (see NYairtel, 4/21/67, page 2)
- 2) agreed CPSU - CPUSA code (see NYairtel, 4/24/67)
- 3) Gamma cypher pad (see NYairtel, 4/24/67)
- 4) Telephone numbers for acknowledgement:

473-8751	}	July - August	
473-8707			
695-8858			September - October
563-8183			November - December
Time		5:05 p.m.	

*acknowledge* "I'd like to have your opinion of the possibility to ~~secure~~ your radio reception through walkie talkie. It is for the sake of security. If you agree, please let me know from what date this order would be in effect (maybe we decided during our meeting).

NY 100-134637

"In this case, when Moscow asks you to acknowledge the radio reception, you inform me on the same day through walkie talkie with two signals at 7:50 - 8:00 p.m. Your walkie talkie timetable and signals are unchanged.

"The above mentioned telephone numbers would be used only for drop acknowledgement when you pick up.

"Late evening, May 3, I put signal on Wall Street station calling you to drop. But I failed to receive your acknowledgement May 4. Did you check it?

"I was informed that you decided to change this place. How about a new one?

"I was also informed that you expressed your readiness to explore the possibility to use the television signal (see NYteletype, 4/20/67, referring to a proposed signal via television). If it is convenient for you, let's test it June 20 and 26, at 9:00 - 9:30 p.m. But we can discuss the dates and time during our meeting and fix it to our mutual convenience.

"After each test, please acknowledge if you got signals (4 channel) the same day at 10:30 sharp by calling 744-9200. You do not give this call if you got no Wax signals. If the tests are successful, I'll inform you about the order of using Wax later.

"Our drops, which you handed in Moscow, are in effect after this meeting. (See NYairtel, 4/3/67.)"

The next message was the 1967 Radio schedule. There is, set forth hereafter, the schedule for the months of July through December, 1967, of which the FBI Laboratory has not been previously informed:

NY 100-134637

Day of the week	1st transm.		2nd transm.		3d transm.		CALL
	GMT	KGC	GMT	KGC	GMT	KGC	
Monday	1132	12882	1152	13908	1212	15024	1 2 L
7) Thursday	1146	13071	1206	14416	1226	15569	8 3 Q
Wednesday	1139	12253	1159	13548	1219	14912	P P 7
8) Friday	1154	13108	1214	14433	1234	15657	B 6 W
Tuesday	1128	13099	1148	14562	1208	15974	N 5 N
9) Thursday	1136	13128	1156	14496	1216	16021	3 8 M
Monday	1145	12874	1205	13917	1225	15633	2 J 8
10) Friday	1121	12651	1141	13849	1201	15611	G 9 6
Monday	1228	12723	1247	13536	1307	15714	3 D 1
11) Wednesday	1213	12466	1233	13625	1253	15982	6 6 L
Tuesday	1234	12932	1254	14468	1314	16104	4 R 2
12) Thursday	1222	12761	1242	13854	1302	15593	2 7 Z

The next message was a new open code to be used in transmittal of messages between the CPSU and the CP, USA. Prints from the Russian film are very poor and it will require sometime to accurately report the code to the Bureau. This will be done as soon as possible.

NY 694-S\* has advised that he had discussion with TALANOV regarding apparatus problems, which he will report as soon as it is convenient for him to do so.



NY 100-134637

NY 694-S\* gave to TALANOV a cigarette box - chemically treated - which contained a number of messages on microfilm, some of which were in ciphered code and some in plain code. The messages were as follows:

1. Calling to your attention again the gap of 40 gamma groups.

JACK BROOKS

Regarding above, see New York airtel, 5/17/67.

2. Your last walkie talkie signals to me were weak due to local disturbances. Were my walkie talkie signals also weak? If this continues, perhaps you should make new tests for better hours, with fewer disturbances.

JACK BROOKS

3. Have already purchased UHER 4000L Reporter.

JACK BROOKS

Re above, see New York airtel, 4/2/67, page 2, and 4/26/67, page 2.

5/20/67

Receipt

\$500,000.00  
\$ 30,000.00  
(For JESSICA SMITH)

JACK BROOKS

Regarding above, this is the acknowledgement of the receipt by NY 694-S\*, in behalf of the CP, USA, of \$500,000.00 for the Party, and \$30,000.00 for JESSICA SMITH and the "New World Review."

NY 100-134637

CCCPSU

Many weeks ago "The Worker" contacted WILFRED BURCHETT who resigned from the "National Guardian" (NY), requesting him to become our correspondent in Asia. We afford him same payment that he had received from "Guardian." We should appreciate your cooperation in inducing BURCHETT to accept our offer. His acceptance would help build daily paper in days ahead.

GUS HALL

CCCPSU

When they arrived in Moscow, WILLIAM WEINSTONE, DISKIN (LOU DISKIN) will have for the CCCPSU copies of some reports of our recent National Committee plenum, which ended 6/13/67. We know that these will be of interest to you.

CG 5824-S\*

CCCPSU

Our comrade MIKE DAVIDOW of "The Worker" is going to Moscow from New York to attend film festival in Moscow in July. He will be joined later by his wife - Mrs. comrade DAVIDOW, who will pay her own fare to Moscow. Please instruct your Washington, D.C. embassy to issue visas for these two comrades as soon as possible.

GUS HALL

CCCPSU

I should appreciate it if you would issue visa for two months to [redacted] so that she may be able personally to talk things over with the [redacted] LEV ALEXEIVICH DANILENKO, a Soviet citizen. The following are details in connection with the matter.

b6  
b7C

Sincere Fraternal Greetings,

GUS HALL

NY 100-134637

The following are communications sent by [redacted]  
[redacted] San Francisco, California,  
on 2/14/67, to A. KOSIKOV, Chief, Consular Division,  
Embassy of the USSR, 1609 Decatur Street N.W., Washington,  
D.C.:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
San Francisco, California  
February 14, 1967

b6  
b7C

A. Kosikov  
Chief, Consular Division  
Embassy of the U.S.S.R.  
1609 Decatur Street N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The enclosed is an application for a visa for both myself and [redacted] who will be [redacted]. I am requesting a visa other than a tourist visa which will be valid for the duration of the time required to carry out marriage procedures.

b6  
b7C

The child's father is a Soviet citizen, Lev Alexeivich Danilenko, a student at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages. He has asked me to join him in Moscow, where we will make our home.

In addition, will you please send me information regarding the procedures to be followed in buying a co-operative apartment through your Consulate.

Enclosed please find three copies of my autobiography, and a money order for \$8.00 for visa and translation fees.

Please send me instructions as to what type of information will be needed from my fiancé.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
San Francisco, California  
February 14, 1967

A. Kosikov  
Chief, Consular Division  
Embassy of the U.S.S.R.  
1609 Decatur Street NW  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

On [redacted] I was born in Denver, Colorado to [redacted] and [redacted]. My mother was born in Lincoln, Nebraska in 1916. She works as a Medical Secretary. My father was born in Zager, Lithuania in 1908, and lived most of his childhood in Kozlov, Russia, and was taken to America by relatives when he was twelve years old. My father works as a janitor. My [redacted] works as a computer operator.

When I was [redacted] my family moved to Santa Clara, California, where we lived until 1964 when we moved to San Francisco. At that time, I was [redacted]. I joined the W.E.B. DuBois Club and became an active participant in the Peace and Civil Rights Movement. As well as being a DuBois Club member, I helped organize a progressive high school organization, SOEAL, (Students' Organized Education and Action League.) We published a newspaper called The Activist Opinion for distribution on the San Francisco high school campuses. The paper was banned by the School Board as "Communist propaganda." We spent a year fighting the ban but were unsuccessful. I was President of this organization for a year, during which time we held the first high school demonstration against the war in Viet Nam.

In the summer of 1965, I was chosen to be a delegate from the DuBois Club to the Helsinki World Congress for Peace. After the Congress, I was a member of the Youth Delegation invited by the Soviet Peace Committee to visit the U.S.S.R. During this trip, I met Lev Danilenko, who was a guide for the delegates and is now my fiance.

After the tour of the Soviet Union, [redacted] DuBois Club and [redacted] the Hiroshima Memorial in Japan August 6 through August 9. This trip was made possible by the Soviet Peace Committee.

After returning in September, 1965, I was appointed International Secretary of the DuBois Club and a member of the Executive Committee. I held this position until May, 1966, when the National DuBois Club Office moved from San Francisco to Chicago.

It was this summer of 1966 that I went back to the Soviet Union through Intourist. During my visit, I wrote a series of articles in the August issues of Komsomolskaya Pravda in conjunction with Vladimir Bolshakov. The articles were based on my life in the Progressive Movement, written under the name of Ann Carter. My visa was extended and changed to a guest visa for that purpose.

Since returning, I have continued my activities in the Peace Movement and am now working as a DuBois Club member in the Spring Mobilization which will culminate in two mass anti-war demonstrations in San Francisco and New York on April 15.

I was graduated from Lowell High School in San Francisco with [redacted]  
in May, 1966. [redacted] at San Francisco State  
College in the [redacted]  
This semester, I have interrupted my studies, due to the impending  
[redacted] However, I am working on my job full time  
and am continuing political activity with the DuBois Club.

b6  
b7C

I sincerely hope you will be able to make possible the reunion in  
Moscow with my fiance and our child by the end of this summer.  
Thank you for your kind assistance in this matter,

Sincerely,

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
San Francisco, California  
March 6, 1967

b6  
b7C

Since November, 1965, I have been a member of the San Francisco Youth Chapter of the Communist Party. When I joined, I was [redacted] I had been a [redacted] of the San Francisco high school movement for a year previous to joining the Party, and therefore continued in the same work as my first Party assignment.

b6  
b7C

During the year 1965-1966, I was [redacted] of the high school group in the area SOEAL (Students' Organized Education and Action League). As well, I was appointed by the National Executive of the DuBois Club to replace Mike Myerson as International Secretary of the DuBois Club. I held this position until May, 1966, when the National Office moved to Chicago.

b6  
b7C

My current Party assignment is to work in the Spring Mobilization Committee in San Francisco and specifically to mobilize the Neighborhood Vietnam Committees around this demonstration.

In the summer of 1965, I attended the Helsinki World Peace Congress as a DuBois Club [redacted] Afterwards, I visited the Soviet Union as a [redacted] and later the Hiroshima Memorial in Japan. While I was in the Soviet Union, [redacted] Soviet student, Lev Alexeivich Danilenko, a guide for the Latin American Delegation from the Peace Congress. We found that we shared many viewpoints and aspirations and became very fond of each other.

b6  
b7C

Lev is 23 years old, was born and spent his childhood in a village in the Caucasus. Later, he moved to Leningrad, where he attended the Suvorovite High School. He is now a Spanish and English student at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages, and he will be graduated next year. He also attends lectures at the Marxist Institute. He is doing his graduation thesis on the topic of Argentine fascism. He intends to do his graduate work at the Latin American Institute in Moscow. Lev is also a member of the Komsomol organization in his Institute and hopes to become a Party member.

After returning from my trip, in September, 1965, Lev and I continued to write each other. We wanted very much to be together again, so I decided, since I wanted to continue my education and as well continue my relationship with Lev, I would apply to go to Moscow as a student. I then made my request to Mickey Lima who took it to a member of the National Board. Around April, Mickey brought back to me a response, in the form of a note, from the National Office. I felt, at this time,

XERO  
COPY

XERO  
COPY

XERO  
COPY

that it would perhaps be at least another year before arrangements to study could be made. Since Lev and I were so anxious to see each other again, I decided to go to Moscow through Intourist and hoped to be able to arrange something there. I realized very soon the mistake I had made in acting outside of the collective and that I had not acted in a manner expected of a Party member.

Since I was not able to arrange for schooling, the only thing I would have been able to arrange was to marry. However, marriage at that time was impractical because we had no place to live and no means of financial support. So we decided I should return home for a year and come back to Moscow through proper channels.

I returned to San Francisco in September and soon afterwards discovered that I was going to [redacted]. I then found a job so I could save money in order to return to Moscow after the [redacted] and be able to buy a co-operative apartment.

b6  
b7C

Now I am requesting the Party organization to help me make arrangements for my return, Since at least four weeks are required to complete marriage procedures, I will need a visa for approximately four to six weeks for myself and [redacted]. However, before I can return, I will need help in pre-arranging for the purchase of a co-operative apartment. To this date, I have saved \$1000.00 and plan to have \$3000.00 by this September. I need definite information on how much a 1 or 2 bedroom flat will cost in foreign currency. It will also be necessary that I work, so I would appreciate any help from the Party in arranging this matter. I thought perhaps while I am gaining fluency in Russian, I could do some kind of work in the Foreign Language Publishing House.

b6  
b7C

I sincerely thank the Comrades for any help they can give me.



NY 100-134637

CCCPSU

Received your request about writing introduction to the book being published by International with introduction by FONER (PHIL FONER) "Attitudes of Americans Toward the Soviet Revolution." Would appreciate it if you were more specific as to the kind of introduction you want me to write and how it would differ from that of FONER. Am waiting to hear from you.

GUS HALL

The NYO has no further information regarding the above. This message was sent to the Soviets at the request of CG 5824-S\*.

CCCPSU

Trying our best on Montreal Trade Union Delegation. Information arrived only yesterday. Very difficult to mobilize delegation on only two weeks notice. However, we will continue to try.

GUS HALL

Regarding above, details are known to CG 5824-S\* who requested above message sent to the Soviets.

CCCPSU

Greeting and salutations,

Many thanks for your fraternal concern for the treatment of our delegations.

With warm fraternal regards,

GUS HALL

NY 100-134637

CCCPSU

Concerning [redacted] if you agree that he may go for purposes indicated we would send him with a delegation going to the USSR, someone in delegation being assigned to take care of his physical needs. Please reply by radio at once on this.

b6  
b7C

GUS. HALL

Regarding above, see New York airtel, 5/17/67, reflecting that the CP, USA requested that [redacted] be permitted to visit the Soviet Union. See also New York airtel, 5/31/67, reflecting that the Soviets requested that there be forwarded to them a medical history of [redacted]

b6  
b7C

The following message contains the medical history of [redacted] and physicians' comments with respect thereto.

b6  
b7C

Medical History of [REDACTED]

9-1950

Hospitalized with [REDACTED]

Confined to [REDACTED] for three weeks; received hot pack treatments for two months; daily physical therapy while in hospital; first able to sit up with aid 12-1950.

2-1951

Released from hospital; [REDACTED] Able to use wheelchair regularly after 5-1951.

Received therapy regularly through 5-1953; concentrating on

attempts to [REDACTED]

attached to torso corset (single unit bracing) and full-length crutches.

6-1952

Minor surgery to release tension in leg muscles to allow patient to fully extend legs at knees and hips.

5-1953

Entered Warm Springs Foundation at Warm Springs, Georgia; For two months placed in [REDACTED] with pressure placed against spine in effort to straighten it; then instructed to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] given extensive functional training;

Also therapy concentrating on attempts to [REDACTED]

9-1953

Released from Warm Springs

8-1954

Returned to Warm Springs Foundation for examination; physicians concluded patient should expect to continue [REDACTED]

1957

Discarded [REDACTED]

1-1966

Spent three days in hospital as treatment for upset stomach

PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN EXERCISES TO STRENGTHEN ~~XXXXXX~~ BREATHING  
AND IN WEIGHT CONTROL

b6  
b7C

24 February 1967

[redacted]  
Charles R. Oldham  
705 Chestnut, Room 326  
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

Dear Mr. Oldham:

b6  
b7C

Mr. [redacted] was referred to me in order to evaluate his ability to cope physically with his environment in light of the fact that as a victim of polio he would have considerable difficulty with jail life. Mr. [redacted] when he was struck down with polio in 1950. He spent three weeks in an [redacted] from which he was under rehabilitation including Warm Springs on two occasions in 1950 and 1954.

At the present time, the residuals of polio include complete loss of motor function in both lower limbs; moderately severe trunk weakness, with a rotary lateral scoliosis (spinal deformity) with the apex in the lower thoracic region, severe involvement of the muscles of respiration, and about 75% of normal strength in the upper limbs. He is entirely confined to wheelchair, but he is able to transfer himself into and out of bed.

An inventory of his residual abilities raises certain questions in regard to jail life, which will be either inimical to good health, or to coping readily with his environment.

1. This man does not breathe with a normal pattern but uses accessory muscles of respiration. Vital capacity measurements made during my examination give a reading of 1.7 liters which is 1/3 of normal predicted for his age and height. In addition, he has an obviously weak cough due to weakness of respiratory muscles and a history of frequent and sometimes continuous colds.

To a person with respiratory involvement as described above, a poor environment conducive to colds may easily lead to pneumonia. Respiratory impairment is a definite risk-to-life factor.

2. This man uses his wheelchair in situations where normally one walks. Modern wheelchairs have a span of 28-1/2". I understand that the usual ingress to a cell is about 20". Therefore, Mr. [redacted] will have a problem in this respect and will probably have to be carried.

b6  
b7C

3. In spite of his handicap, Mr. [redacted] needs assistance only in bathing. In order to sit on a stool placed within the bathtub where he takes a seated shower using a flexible shower head. Obviously with flail limbs he cannot stand. I, therefore, can visualize some difficulty in hygiene in the future.

4. Mr. [redacted] has developed a technique aided by hypertrophy of certain arm muscles to slide himself from wheelchair into bed. The leverage for this movement is obtained with the

NY 100-134637

The following is a description of exact location where I plan to place tape as signal that I wish to contact you. Request you inspect and advise whether you approve.

Directions: Drive east on Roosevelt Avenue when coming from area of 74th and Broadway. On approaching 76th Street, note steel upright girder number 352 on south side of Roosevelt, in front of 76-18 Roosevelt Avenue. You will see, inside the girder where black paint ends, two strips of plastic tape - one yellow and one red. These have been so placed that when approaching girder by car, the driver can see the strips of tape.

Yellow will signal drop contact and red personal contact for the following day. Test this signaling method, making any additional recommendations you wish. You may begin tests as of 6/19/67. Test tapes will remain in place until you tell me to remove them. Schedules will be arranged if you approve this signaling method.

JACK BROOKS

Regarding above, see New York airtel, 42/4/67, page 2.

There followed on the microfilm five photographs of the area in which the above described signaling operation is to take place.

Let it be understood from now on if drop place is either closed or demolished go on same day to next listed drop. Hereafter, I will designate two drops each time to take care of such an emergency. The following drops next to be used, in order, are:

1. Millie;
2. Ella

JACK BROOKS

NY 100-134637

Next personal contact - Armstrong.

Micro-transceiver number 2 next.

NY 694-S\* also furnished to TALANOV, on microfilm, a copy of the report GUS HALL made at the CP, USA National Committee meeting beginning 6/10/67.

Accompanying the said report is an outline of the opening remarks of HALL made at the said meeting. Also accompanying the report is a message from CG 5824-S\* to the CCCPSU describing the agenda of the said meeting.

A copy of the GUS HALL report, above described, is being furnished as an enclosure to the Bureau and Chicago.

A meeting of the National Committee of the CPUSA was held June 10-14, 1967. The last day was devoted to Commission and Subcommittee meetings to concretize the resolutions and memoranda that were adopted to act as guide lines for the Party. These documents are to be further concretized state by state. With few exceptions, these documents were adopted unanimously. In a couple of cases, such as the question of Youth Work and the publication of a daily paper, there were two or three abstentions. There were no votes opposed.

The following agenda was taken up at this meeting:

1. A report by Gus Hall (the war situation, the struggles for peace, and the political outlook for 1968). The subject matter presented in the report was discussed in the following manner, each point separately, such as:
  - a. The situation in the Mideast.
  - b. The war in Vietnam and the peace movement
  - c. The election struggles for 1968
  - d. The revitalization of the American labor movement and the role of the Communists
  - e. The struggle for Negro rights and freedom
2. Remarks by Winston on the carrying out of the above tasks.
3. Proposals on Youth Policy.
4. The discussion and the adoption of the draft resolution on the calling of "a new world conference of Marxist-Leninist Communist and Workers parties."
5. More on the publication of a daily newspaper.
6. Some motions on the Albertson case.

Before the National Committee meeting adjourned, there were proposals adopted on the calling of special conferences within the next few months to check on the carrying out of the resolutions.

There were also proposals adopted instructing the National Executive Board to consider the convening of a special convention in early 1968 to carry out the mandate of the 18th Convention to adopt the Party program. That this special convention is also to consider the nomination of National Party candidates for President and Vice-President of the USA as part of independent electoral struggles. This is a tactical question related to the Party's emphasis at this moment on the mobilization of the masses for an alternative to the Democratic and Republican reactionary foreign and domestic policies--this to take the form of an independent peace and freedom ticket.

The report of Gus Hall contains the entire essence of all these policies and tactics. The resolutions and memoranda are the summarization of these.

The discussion was on a very high level, and rich in concrete proposals. The report on the legal status of the Party and recent victories for democratic liberties indicated big opportunities for the Communist Party. It is significant that for the first time in 20 years the CPUSA is circulating a Party application card.

The report of Gus Hall is most important, and is attached.

With warmest fraternal greetings,



NOTES OUTLINE OF THE

NOT A TEXT

Gus Hall Report 6/19/67

Opening REMARKS

How many have not read the section on the Middle East crisis in The Worker?

This was written over a week ago. Obviously this was before the act of aggression was committed. The two lines on the aggression were inserted the morning of Israel's attack.

I have not changed it because it is sound. Events have fully confirmed its soundness.

Now of course events have fully exposed the criminal behavior of Israel.

(Continuation of aggression - diplomatic break)

That it has acted as the tool of U.S. oil monopolies, life has documented fully. The aim is also clear. It is to destroy the politically independent Arab states.

The oil monopolies want governments like those in Saudi Arabia and Iran -- subservient. The actions against Syria also proves our point--that it was the Syrian government that above all U.S. imperialism wanted to overthrow. and dependent.

They want to destroy the 30-50 oil deals in the Arab world. They want to return to the 30-20 split arrangements.

It is in the service of these despicable cutthroat thieves that the leaders of Israel sold out the Jewish masses, the State of Israel, the anti-imperialist forces of the world and progressive humanity. They have brought disgrace and dishonor to the cause of Israel that will take a long time to live down. They have added grist to the mill of anti-Semites throughout the world.

Opening

- 2 -

That they have done this in the name of generations of suffering and persecution and torture suffered by the Jewish people only adds to the enormity of the crime.

That they have misled millions of Jews throughout the world who put their faith and hope on a homeland still further compounds the crime.

The accusing finger of shame must be pointed on the small ring of reactionary business circles who have taken over Israel and tied it to the chariot of the oil vultures.

The day will come when the masses will wrest Israel from their grip and return it to the people of Israel. When that time comes Israel will take its place in the world camp of progress.

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

LEGAT, Ottawa

6/21/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

There are enclosed three copies of a letterhead memorandum classified "~~Secret~~," captioned as above.

Promptly furnish a copy of the enclosed memorandum to your source in the [redacted] Your source should be cautioned that it is essential that no distribution or use of our intelligence information be undertaken which would be likely to jeopardize the security of our informant.

Enclosures - 3

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

RHH:dmk

(6) dmk

NOTE:

Enclosures classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the Nation.

Information in LHM obtained from source during trip 5/26-29/67 to Toronto, Canada, and while in conversation with William Kashtan, General Secretary, CP of Canada, and Norman Freed, National Educational Director, CP of Canada. Data extracted from Chicago airtel 6/8/67, captioned "Solo, IS-C."

This information has also been furnished Department of State and CIA by separate letter.

MAILED 2  
JUN 21 1967  
COMM-FBI

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE

REC-21

100-428091-6351

JUN 22 1967

6 JUN 21 1967

EX-104

JUN 22 1967

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Mossburg  
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

June 21, 1967

## COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past recently reported the following.

A delegation of Canadian-Ukrainians, accompanied by Tim Buck, National Chairman, Communist Party of Canada (CPC), was recently sent by the CPC on a visit to the Soviet Union. The delegation returned to Canada quite dissatisfied with their trip. Discussions held by the delegates with representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning matters of interest to the Canadian-Ukrainians did not satisfy them. Tim Buck, who as of the latter part of May, 1967, had not returned to Canada and whose whereabouts and date of return were unknown to the Canadian Party leadership, had made no report to the leadership on this trip.

Source further advised that the Canadian Party is having trouble in Vancouver, British Columbia. The British Columbia provincial leader of the CPC, Nigel Morgan, has been absent from his duties because of sickness. In his absence, groups composed of "leftists and pro-Chinese" communists have started creating problems which are far from solved.

Source went on to state that the youth meeting called by the CPC was held from April 20-22, 1967, and was considered successful. It was held in a location approximately 125 miles from Montreal and was attended by about 85 young people. Among those attending were separatists, anarchists, and communists. It was agreed to set up a youth organization which would be Marxist-oriented but not actually a communist organization.

100-428091

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL AND TWO TO LEGAT, OTTAWA BY LETTER DATED 6/21/67.  
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

RHH:dmk (7)

~~SECRET~~  
100-428091-635 MB/116  
GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/14/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)(41)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS-C



ReBuairtel 6/13/67, inquiring whether ~~NY~~  
 NY 694-S\* may have meant Yugoslavia rather than Austria  
 with regard to opposition to the convocation of European  
 Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, between  
 April 24-27, 1967.

On 6/14/67, NY 694-S\* advised that his source  
 had specified Austria - not Yugoslavia - in this connection;  
 that no reference had been made to Yugoslavia, which in  
 a matter of this kind is considered by his source more as  
 an "outside party," not one to be invited to a meeting such  
 as was held at Karlovy Vary.

1-964940  
 1 - Bureau (RM)  
 1 - NY 134-91 (INV)(41)  
 1 - New York

REC 3

100-428091-6352


6 JUN 21 1967

ACB:msb  
(6)

Let to CIA  
 6/19/67  
 RCP: dmh



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Approved:   
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUN 26 1967

~~SECRET~~

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

*4*  
*2*  
Date: June 19, 1967  
BY LIAISON *Solo*  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam  
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT  
KARLOVY VARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-27, 1967

Reference is made to my letter dated June 14, 1967, captioned as above (your file CSCI-316/02485-67), which stated our source was being recontacted in response to your inquiry as to whether our source may not have meant Yugoslavia rather than Austria in line four, paragraph four of my letter of April 27, 1967.

Upon recontact our source advised that the information given clearly specified Austria was in opposition to signing a resolution against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It should be noted that our source obtained this information in early April, 1967, well in advance of the meeting in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. *Mr*

*REC 3 100-428091-6353*  
NOTE: By letter dated 6/2/67, CIA furnished details of what transpired in the meeting at Karlovy Vary and questioned information set forth in our letter of 4/27/67. Bureau letter 6/14/67 advised we were recontacting our source (NY 694-S\*) who obtained his information from Nikolai Mostovets, head of the North and South American Section, International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 4/5/67. Of course, CIA was not told where our source obtained his information. *6 JUN 21 1967*

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal identity of the source (NY 694-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the ~~SECRET~~ nation. Data extracted from New York airtel of ~~GROUP 1~~ 6/14/67, captioned "Solo, IS-C."

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RCP:dmk  
(5)

100-428091

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI ( 100-428091 ) DATE: 6-15-67

FROM : Legal Attache, Ottawa ( 105-684 ) ( P )

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  
IS - CANADA  
(OO: Bureau)

*Solo*

Reference: LHM dated 6-8-67, at Washington, D. C.

Dissemination, as outlined below, was made on dates indicated to foreign agencies listed.

☒ One copies of re LHM

☐ Pertinent information from

Name and Location of Agency

[Redacted Box]

Date Furnished

6-15-67

b7D

*1D*

3 - Bureau

(1 - Liaison Section)

1 - OTT

MLI:jhc

129 (4)

54 JUN 21 1967

*100-428091-*

NOT RECORDED

3 JUN 19 1967

NAT. INT. SEC.

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

**SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub F)**

6/21/67

Director, FBI (100-428091) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Reurlet 6/13/67 which sets forth information that Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, used Solo Funds to make out a mortgage in the amount of \$16,500 on [redacted] to the benefit of CG 5824-S\*. It further states that Hall has instructed that the monthly payments made on the mortgage to be made to CG 5824-S\*'s personal account at the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Lincolnwood, Illinois. Hall further instructed that, upon accumulation of each three months' payments amounting to \$369.60, CG 5824-S\* is to add \$5.40 bringing the total to \$375. Then the informant is to purchase a \$500 Series E savings bond in the name of Hall's [redacted] and forward it to her.

Your letter notes that CG 5824-S\* recognizes this is a most dangerous practice but that since it is Hall's instruction made without prior consultation, there is no apparent way for the informant to extricate himself at this time.

EX-103

**REC 3**

100-428091-6354

However, no indication is given in your letter as to how this apparent interest income for CG 5824-S\* will be handled with respect to the source's income tax or how he contemplates obtaining funds to pay the additional tax necessary. This is a matter of extreme importance and should be thoroughly discussed with the informant. The Bureau should be promptly advised of the steps that will be taken to insure that this activity does not result in CG 5824-S\* becoming involved with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.

1 - New York (100-134637)

6 JUN 21 1967

**NOTE:** This is another instance where Hall has used our informants to feather the financial nest of his [redacted] who is the "apple of his eye." In order to fully protect our sources, we must insure that the matter of income tax is handled in such a way as to preclude an unnecessary investi-

RCP:dmk (5)

~~Classified by~~

NOTE CONTINUED - PAGE TWO

Exempt from GDS, Category

UNIT ☐ ~~Classification Indefinite~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM 07

TELETYPE UNIT

~~Document downgraded to Secret~~  
~~per 60324 in GAO/RS on 3/26/04~~



Letter to Chicago  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTE CONTINUED:

gation of the informant's financial activity by IRS.  
If the taxes are properly paid the sum paid by Hall's  
daughter could be concealed in the informant's investment  
income which is substantial.

~~TOP SECRET~~

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

BY LIAISON

*4/5X*

Date: June 14, 1967

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT  
KARLOVY VARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-27, 1967

*6/15/67  
DHP*

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to your letter dated June 2, 1967.

[REDACTED]

Our source is being recontacted regarding this matter. The following additional information has been developed concerning the meeting at Karlovy Vary by another source who has furnished reliable information in the past.

*Don*

In late autumn or early winter 1966, William Kashtan, General Secretary, Communist Party (CP) of Canada, applied through the CP of the Soviet Union for an invitation for the CP of Canada to send an observer to the Meeting of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. At that time, Kashtan was informed by the Soviets that this was a very good idea.

*Don*

When Kashtan attended the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (CP of East Germany), held April 17-22, 1967, in East Berlin, he was in contact with fraternal delegates of the CP of the Soviet Union, the CP of Czechoslovakia, and others who were going to attend the Karlovy Vary meeting. However, not one of these individuals said anything to him regarding the attendance of an observer from the CP of Canada at the meeting in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.

RCP:dmk/cst  
(5)

100-428091-6355

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

EX-102

REC-24

65 JUN 28 1967

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

As of this time no information is available to indicate that there will be a follow-up meeting to the Karlovy Vary conference.

Referral/Consult

NOTE:



Classified ~~"Secret"~~ since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal identity of the source CG 5824-S\* who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation. Data extracted from CG airtel 6/8/67 captioned "Solo, IS - C."

~~SECRET~~

9

9

FBI ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/20/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

On 6/20/67, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a partially coded-ciphered message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To Gus Hall:

"Editorial Board of magazine Problems of Peace and Socialism want to know whether CPUSA representative will attend conference opening in Prague on June 22, or will you send a report. Editorial Board discussed this matter with HY LUMER."

1-904 94P  
3 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM) EX-102  
1 - Chicago (134-46-SUB B) (AM RM)  
1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (41)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)

ACB:gmd  
(7)

REC-24

100-428091 6356  
6 JUN 23 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUN 27 1967

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mjt* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: *SOLO*  
IS-C

DATE: 6/13/67

Enclosed herewith is one Xerox copy each for the Bureau and New York of an article entitled, "The 'Missile Baron': The Real Man Behind the Halo of Publicity," which in English translation appeared in the Supplement dated May 23, 1967, of "Daily Review, Translations From The Soviet Press," published by Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, USSR. The article originally appeared in the issue of April 6, 1967, of "Krasnaya Zvezda," organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This article concerns Dr. WERNHER VON BRAUN, rocket expert who is now Director of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration at Huntsville, Alabama. This article is a condemnation of the activities of Dr. VON BRAUN during the time he was Director of the Rocket Research and Development in Hitler Germany.

CG 5824-S\* suggested that this article be called to the attention of the Bureau because the prominence given to this article and the fact that this lengthy article was printed in full in translation led him to the opinion that this is but the opening salvo of what may become a full-scale assault to discredit Dr. VON BRAUN.

This office has not observed any other such articles concerning Dr. VON BRAUN in the socialist press nor were comments of the type set forth in this article observed in the U.S. press in connection with the announcement in early June, 1967, that Dr. VON BRAUN was to receive the Langley Medal from the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

1-904 940  
②-Bureau (Enc. 1) (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW  
(4)

REC-24



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ENCLOSURE TO BUREAU FROM CHICAGO

1 Xerox copy of article entitled, "The  
'Missile Baron': The Real Man Behind the  
Halo of Publicity."

RE: SOLO  
IS-C

Bufile 100-428091  
CGfile 134-46 Sub B

Transmitted via CGlet to Bureau 6/13/67



100 - 428091 6357

ENCLOSURE

THE "MISSILE BARON:"THE REAL MAN BEHIND THE HALO OF PUBLICITY

The History of the "Transfiguration" of Wernher

von Braun

M. Rebrov, Engineer Major

"As Head of the Marshall Space Flight Centre of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration at Huntsville, Ala., Dr. Wernher von Braun is the key man behind the Saturn V rocket that is to send Americans to the Moon."

(United States News and World Report, December 1966.)

X X X

"While Wernher von Braun is receiving the Galabert Prize in Astronautics, the former prisoners of Buchenwald-Dora concentration camp express their protest against such honours."

(From the Statement of the French Organisation of the Former Prisoners of the Buchenwald-Dora Concentration Camp, March 15, 1967)

### Why the Praise?

The account below is not a collection of detective stories, military episodes or other chance events not connected with each other. All this is more serious than might seem at first sight. History does not tolerate falsification and especially the history of the past war, for it was written in letters of blood, and nothing has been forgotten.

It is nobody's secret today that rockets paved the way into outer space, and that in the past years the development of world astronautics has been induced by two different motives: a daring quest and a desire for the advancement of science, a yearning to unravel the mysteries of the Universe in the interests of all mankind and its progress. The other motive was that of profit, selfish interests and the policy of military gambles.

Some may ask: How can one deflect problems of a scientific-technical nature into the channel of morality? In reply to this we can say that, first, this is justified by virtue of an objective assessment of facts, and, second, we are for morality not for the sake of morality, but because we are convinced that astronautics should engage in creative endeavour and discovery not for evil but for the good and prosperity of mankind. And this means that the people behind astronautics should have clean hands.

In April 1946 a mysterious clause appeared in the US Air Force Research Programme. It dealt with the "flights above the atmosphere, including space bases and various appliances for the use of space." The Jupiter-C rocket was selected for launching America's first artificial Earth satellite. The first stage of this rocket was an improved variant of the ballistic missile V-2 which in times past was dubbed as Vergeltungswaffe (the weapon of retribution) by the Nazis.

There are many talented people in America. And among these one can name famous men of letters and actors, diplomats, politicians, architects, scientists and engineers... However, there are also some others who have acquired American citizenship, yet it is doubtful that they could be an adornment to America, even though some of these are now said to be in the category of "space genuises," and hopes are being expressed that they will help to raise the prestige of the nation.

One of these is Wernher von Braun, a scion of Prussian barons, Himmler's close friend, member of the Nazi Party, SS Sturmbahnfuhrer and cavalier of the Knight's Cross for Merits with Swords -- one of the highest Orders of the Third Reich (an account about all this will follow). Wernher von Braun was the man who dreamed in 1944 about firing missiles of his design at New York, Moscow and Leningrad. In the '50s he described to the Americans his plans of waging a war in outer space and developed the strategy of space espionage.



-3-

He was the one who offered the Pentagon his "toys" which became the predecessors of Polaris and Redstone missiles for which the SS criminal was decorated with the highest Order of the American Army.

One of the issues<sup>of</sup> the magazine Missile Design and Development said that von Braun was "probably the only man, not counting the President, who could get a billion dollars from the Congress and even more..."

"Astronautics is my only interest." Von Braun uttered these words in a very much advertised film called "Wernher von Braun: I Yearn For the Stars." Apparently the missile baron has learned to juggle phrases. And the thing which formerly sounded like "world domination" is now being camouflaged with the words "world space," as though there was no such thing as the Nazi medieval period, the grief of lacerated Europe, the hopeless gloom of Buchenwald and the horrors of Dora.

The film itself, the numerous statements at press conferences and the effective posing before TV cameras and many other things done by Braun and his bosses are aimed at bringing to naught Braun's past and showing that America's space genius is irreproachable morally and politically.

#### "Weapon of Retribution"

We shall not delve into the meaning of these words invented by Goebbels. They are clear enough. What is not clear is against whom this retribution was and for what... However, there is another point to be raised. Does von Braun remember the meeting in the "Wolf's Lair" (that was how Hitler's HQ in Rastenburg area was called) and the words which the Führer said to him: "Thank you! Why didn't I believe in the success of your work until now? I was simply badly informed..." On that same day Hitler personally granted Braun the title of professor.

Later in one of his friendly talks with Hitler (these talks had become quite customary) Braun described his plan of developing a missile for shooting at America. The bloody maniac was fired by the idea and promised the baron all the gold of the world. He also demanded "to reduce the testing period and immediately start industrial production."

Having lost the capacity for offensive operations at the Eastern front, after its inglorious defeat at Stalingrad, Kursk, and Oryol, the Wehrmacht nurtured the vindictive dream of achieving a turning point in the military operations with the help of a "wonder weapon." On November 8, 1943, Hitler proclaimed that the hour of retribution was near. "If we cannot reach America yet, we have in immediate proximity to us one state, thank God, and we shall not let it go!"

Having returned from Hitler's headquarters on January 5, 1944, Doctor Josef Goebbels hastened to raise the morale of the army with the following statement: "The Führer and I, looking at a large-scale map of London, marked the most important targets. On the narrow area occupied by London there are twice as much people living as in Berlin. I know what this means... There have been no air alarms in London for more than three and a half years. You can imagine what a terrible awakening this will be!"

What was it that the missile fanatics, including von Braun wanted to achieve. There can be only one answer: the mass-scale destruction of the civil population of other countries. They were in a great hurry. On June 15, 1944, Colonel Wachtel waited with impatience for an order with the code name "White Bear." Immediately on receiving the order urgent instructions were issued: "Open fire at target No. 42, use a warhead." Two hundred and forty four launchings had been made before the afternoon of June 16, and 73 flying bombs had hit Greater London area before midnight of the next day.

On June 18, Wachtel's regiment launched its 500th flying bomb. The skies over South East Britain turned into an arena of unprecedented military operations. Hundreds of V-1 flying bombs flew from Northern France in the direction of the British coast. The number of launchings kept increasing, and in the first half of July the British Isles were hit by 820 flying bombs. The number of casualties also increased with every day.

The sons of Albion were really alarmed. Military Intelligence made attempts to misinform the Germans about where the flying bombs scored their hits. The MI agents were supposed to point out the places hit by the bombs which went beyond the central part of London and give the time of the explosion of those flying bombs, which fell short of the target. This was done in the hope that the Germans would possibly reduce the range of the flying bombs.

However, the operation, carried out by Britain's secret service, was crowned with only what might be described as relative "military" success. There appeared some domestic complications instead, as some heated debates started in British Parliament concerning the tactics of Military Intelligence. Herbert Morrison said that "nobody has the right to doom a person to death just because he lives slightly south of London." He insisted on cancelling the M.I. plan, and got the support of the Cabinet.

However, in reality everything remained the same.

### The Failure of Operation "Anvil"

This mysterious name was invariably connected with notion of top secret and thorough preparations. The operation began on August 12, 1944.

...At 17hrs 52 mins a Liberator heavy bomber carrying the number 32271 and American identification marks took off from the Winfarthing-Fairsfield airfield in Norfolk. The equipment and the crew of the plane were just as unusual as the assignment set to the British pilots. Instead of the maximum bombload of four tons the Liberator carried 380 boxes of explosives with the total weight of more than 10 tons. Instead of a crew of 10-12 people the machine had only two lieutenants: first pilot Joseph Kennedy, 29, the elder brother of the future President of the United States, and second pilot Wilford Willey.

Taking off after the bomber and following the same course were two Ventura type guidance planes, one aerial photography Mosquito plane, one B-17 bomber and a flight of air cover fighters. Their destination was the secret "weapon of retribution," the launching racks of the missiles which the Germans had been using for several weeks for firing at London.

The plan of the operation had been worked out thoroughly: Kennedy and Willey had to leave their "infernal machine" over Kent, before the armada reached Dover, and the rest of the job would have to be carried out by the Ventura guidance planes. In that way it was planned to do away at a single blow with the secret weapon of the Germans.

At 18rs 20 mins the groundstations received the code message saying that everything was all right; and that the Buckles control point was in sight. At the same moment the Liberator went ablaze like a lightning. Two explosions shook the skies with an interval of one second, leaving nothing of the machine.

What had actually happened? Had this been sabotage or an accident, or an ordinary human mistake or a case of technical miscalculation? The reason of what had happened has remained a mystery forever... The "weapon of retribution" also remained a mystery.

The air squadrons of the Allies continued to bomb the launching pads in Northern France and incurred great losses, though they did not achieve any substantial success. There were 450 planes downed and 2,900 pilots lost. Such was the result of these operations after which the Germans continued to fire at the British capital.

The offensive which began in France seemed to have made things easier for the British Isles.

The last flying bomb launched from the French territory reached Britain on September 1. The same day the British civil defence agencies stopped planning precaution measures.

On the evening of September 7, Duncan Sandys, British Cabinet Member and Churchill's son-in-law, announced at a press conference that the war against flying bombs was over. He was too hasty. Next day the German troops deployed in Western Holland launched the first one of the thousand V-2 missiles which were destined to fall on Britain. A panic began in London: hundreds of houses were damaged or ruined every day, hundreds of people perished and a sixth part of the capital's production capacities were idle though they were of a decisive importance for the war effort.

Even before that the battery stationed in Oiskirchen got orders to start firing at Paris at which 19 missiles were aimed. However, the unsuccessful launching of the first missiles (they exploded right on the launching pad) made it imperative to postpone the operation. Later General Eisenhower said: "Had the Germans managed to complete the development of this new weapon and use it six months earlier, the landing of the Allies on the European continent would have been exceptionally difficult and perhaps impossible..."

#### Not Forgotten with Time

The allied bombers did not solve the problem of fighting against "the weapon of retribution." Hitler as formerly staked on von Braun's missiles considering that missile terror would make the British and the Americans conclude a separate peace treaty with Germany. He kept nurturing the dream that he would be able to collect his forces again and crush the Soviet Army.

The manufacture of missiles was organised at a new place, in an underground plant not far from Nordhausen. Two tunnels each two kilometres long were built under a 70-metre layer of ground of Mount Konstein. These were connected with each other by 46 transversal passages. It was there that thousands of people brought from different concentration camps had to take part in the production of flying bombs.

There is no describing the extremely difficult conditions in which the prisoners of Dora had to work. The horrors of Buchenwald pale when compared to what these people had to go through. In only six months between September 1943 and March 1944, 50,000 people perished in the suffocating and wet pits. Underground transport trains with "manpower" arrived every week and on some occasions several times a week. Each such train carried 700-800 people, and these could barely make up for the human losses of the week.

-7-

The same carriages took back to Buchenwald corpses of people maimed by tortures, men hanged or shot by the firing squad, emaciated by starvation, by inhuman work and infectious diseases.

Did Wernher von Braun know about all this? Yes, he did. He was the "master" of this underground inferno. Here is the testimony of only a few of Dora's prisoners.

Prisoner No. 138708 (yes, the people who were in Braun's underground dungeon had only a number, and no name. However, we know the man: He is Communist Mikhail Stepanovich Zabochev who got to Dora as a boy and carried out various assignments of the local underground organisation. He is now a Major of the Soviet Army):

"I have been in Auschwitz and Buchenwald. However, even these seemed like paradise when compared to the underground shops of Dora. People died in tens and hundreds every day... In Dora, Braun arranged feasts for the Nazi generals in honour of the launching of the first V-2 missiles. He was a cruel man. Perpetrating atrocities together with him was Oberschahrführer Sanger. On November 19, 1944, the SS men announced that a Bolshevik underground organisation had been discovered. After that they hanged and shot many people....

"On April 13, 1945, when the end of the Nazi Reich was near, there began a heinous extermination of people to conceal the crimes and keep the mystery of the "secret weapon." Dora prisoners were poisoned, shot and burned..."

Vasily Vasilyevich Ivanov (former assistant commander, reconnaissance platoon, 376 Howitzer Regiment, Secretary of underground Party group, now engineer of Lengiprotyazhmash):

"Braun often appeared in Dora. He was a tall, neat and lean man. He wore a felt mufti hat and an oil cloth raincoat reaching almost to his ankles and concealing an SS uniform with the skull and cross bones emblem. All the subordinates used to stand at attention before him..."

"He used to pass the stacks of corpses with an indifferent smile pretending that this did not concern him. I recall how one of the SS sadists from the security group was beating up Dmitry Bidenko (he now lives in Odessa and works at one of the local colleges) at the entrance to the tunnel. The hobnailed boots trampled ruthlessly the man lying on the ground. At that moment Wernher von Braun appeared. He could have stopped this outrage with a single gesture. He could, but he didn't. Braun calmly stepped over the blood-stained man and walked on."

"In one of the shops some executed Dora prisoners hanged for a long time on a travelling crane (they used to hang sixty people at a time). Von Braun would pass under the crane with complete indifference noticing only the things which were connected with the production process. What he wanted was speed of production at any cost."

Adam Gabala (Polish anti-fascist, former political prisoner No. 13573):

"The German scientists under Professor Wernher von Braun saw all this. They saw how the prisoners were working and sweating it out and how they were being humiliated. Wernher von Braun did not protest a single time against this cruelty and inhuman behaviour... On a small platform next to the ambulatorium building there were piles of corpses of the prisoners tortured to death by unbearable labour and the outrages of the vindictive overseers. From afar the corpses looked like an unending grey mass. Braun would go by very close, almost touching the corpses. It's hard to believe that this sight did not affect him in any way... I do not think that he was engaged at that moment with only his thoughts on inter-planetary space without seeing the people dying in dirt and excrements. He certainly saw them! But why did he keep quiet?"

Why did he keep quiet?

"Many people, including soldiers, scientists and others realised that they were serving a regime whose legality was more than dubious. However, what can a single man do in such a situation? Should he flee or firmly hold his post? I decided to stay..."

These words of yours, Wernher von Braun, are false through and through. Another thing that has not been forgotten with time is one more of your admissions: "It is September 7, 1944; the long-awaited moment has come and our 'toy' has turned into a weapon of destruction."

Perhaps there might be some pangs in the conscience of the "missile baron" should he recall the mysterious death, in an automobile accident of engineer Klaus Riedel, who declined to don the SS uniform, which Wernher von Braun had put on.

It is worth recalling that still alive are many people among those who remember Braun's servile attitude to Hitler, who will never forget the death which he brought to London, Antwerp, Liege, Remagen, Billie, and Paris, the ones who remember the piles of corpses in Dora, the hanged and lacerated people who refused to perform the "deadly jobs."

-9-

A. Struggle of Valour

Dora, separated from the rest of the world with concrete and barbed wire, SS troopers with machine guns, search lights and dogs, became a domain of sadism. There were about 5,000 Soviet prisoners in the camp, and not a single one of them believed in the chance of salvation. However, nobody wanted to forget the meaning of the word "life." At first this word meant that it was necessary to escape, and then it became a symbol of struggle. Stubborn efforts were made to weld the Resistance forces. The Soviet group of underground workers/under Semyon Yalovoi, a military flier downed in one of the dog fights in the area of Lodz. The comrades who joined the war at the airfield in Pruzhany, where the 30th Fighter Wing and the 74th Assault Plane Wing were stationed, should remember him.

The first organised manifestation was an act of sabotage; the refusal to work and mass-scale boycotts. However this did not bring success. The people who ventured to do this were tortured and killed on the spot. Dora was under the personal surveillance of Himmler, and reports came to him every day on the state of affairs there. Carrying out the Führer's order, Braun was supposed to ensure the "maximum build up of fire power with the utilisation of an unlimited number of ammunition."

The camp's Resistance Committee insistently sought for new forms of struggle. Taking place one day in February 1944 was a secret meeting which discussed the question of skilled technical sabotage, the distribution of people and propaganda on a wide scale. Then it all began.

...During the hydraulic testings some mysterious force crushed the aluminium tanks for liquid missile fuel. There was a large percentage of spoilage appearing suddenly in the section where parts of the missiles were welded.

...Thoroughly concealed defects appeared in the section which engaged in the assembly of the remote control instrumentation and radio equipment. These defects were so inconspicuous that even the SS men and the specialists with their strict check-ups failed to discover them.

Alien metal objects "forgotten" during assembly constantly appeared in the vulnerable places of the missiles under the fuselage. Parts and materials of which there was an acute deficit kept disappearing without trace from the plant's shops.

...The "clumsy" Russians damaged the missiles when they loaded them on flat carts and when they took them out of the main tunnel. They put out of commission machinery, mechanisms, machine tools and used every convenient opportunity to do this.

-10-

The underground group had its own radio receiver assembled out of parts of missile radio equipment. Despite the continuous surveillance of the security agents, the prisoners managed to listen in to Moscow. The reports of the Soviet Information Bureau were written down on paper tape. Used instead of ink was a solution of manganese dioxide. Leaflets with the slogan "workers of the world, unite!" were disseminated in the camp.

After each report about the successes of the Soviet Army the spoilage in the underground shops increased. The military kept making complaints about Braun's missiles. One of the documents of that period said: "...coming from the command of the Wehrmacht are ferocious protests addressed to the general administration of the plant, for a substantial number of V-missiles prove to be useless." Later it became known that every other missile could not be fired at the launching or departed from its course of flight. This was the result of concealed spoilage.

Such is the answer to the question why V-missiles did not take off, a question for which those on the West are trying to find a different explanation.

The Soviet underground group was the biggest, and it inflicted the main damage to the enemy. Among those who fell in the struggle the number of our compatriots was prevalent. Braun should remember the foul provocateur from his secret service. If he does not remember him, we can tell him the man's name -- it was Grozzo. He was the one who tore the thread connecting the bold and daring prisoners; he betrayed many of the members of the national committee and the leaders of the general uprising which was being prepared by Semyon Yalovoi. The uprising was to start on the night of December 24, 1944. But it was not destined to take place.

Before he was executed Yalovoi organized the escape of 17 prisoners from the death bunker. The executioners seized the courageous Communists. The Soviet people met their death with the words: "Long Live the Red Army! Convey our greetings to our country!"

The struggle continued.

#### Not to Be Bombed

was hidden

It was February 10, 1945, and Dora in sinister gloom. Bombs exploded somewhere nearby. The searchlights on the corner towers of the barbed wire entanglements were switched off. There were only the signal lights at the high tension wires shining like opaque reddish-violet eyes and giving warning of death.



-11-

On assignment of the Resistance Committee six Soviet prisoners were supposed to escape from the camp. In twos they climbed over a board laid across the humming wires. At first the first pair, then the second and then the third disappeared in the night. Everything was quiet at the camp. The guard was hiding in bunkers, and the prisoners were driven into remote pits.

The underground issued the order to meet the troops in the offensive and tell them the bearings of Dora. This was a tremendous risk: previous escapes did not bring any success. "And still we have to test fate, realising that the measure of risk is one's own life," says Vasily Vasilyevich Ivanov. "All the six of us had hazarded to risk something more. The International Committee had assigned us to reach the front and give the information about Mount Konstein in the bowels of which thousands of people perished and weapons were made for the destruction of tens of thousands of other human beings. The names of the killers and the killed should be known."

The Committee decided to put itself under fire so as to save thousands upon thousands of inhabitants of the European towns from the Nazi flying bombs. Quite a lot could be said about how the six courageous men acted carrying out the assignment of the underground -- how they singed their hands with lunar caustic to remove the concentration camp number; how almost losing the last of their strength and half naked they went through deep snow covering up their tracks with red pepper, how they stayed in hiding in woods, avoided large roads and ate bark so as not to starve to death...

The only one to reach the point of destination was Goluzov. He reached without too much trouble one of the US Air Force units and saw its Chief of Staff. He told him about the request of the International Committee and gave him the bearings of Dora. The Soviet patriot insisted on the bombing of the underground death camp.

However, the officer, having heard what Goluzov had to say, did not hasten to carry out his request. The American had before him the map of Southern Harz, and the place where the underground plant was situated was ringed with a red pencil. This meant that this area was not to be bombed. Already then, at the beginning of 1945, somebody had apparently decided to provide protection for Braun's "enterprise."

"Who gave this order?"

The US officer spread his hand as if to show that he did not know...

-12-

Nazi Germany lost the war. On May 2, 1945, SS Sturm-bahnführer Wernher von Braun surrendered to the Americans, and his new bosses certainly liked their "trophy." This is the only thing that can explain the fact that in November of the same year, when the Nuremberg trial began, Braun was not in the dock.

"Had we got him in 1945," said Lee Thompson, the well-known British public figure, "we would have certainly put him before a military tribunal and he would have probably been hanged."

It may be assumed that in the days so alarming for London, the British did not suspect that an unparalleled combat between men and rockets was taking place in the drifts of the Harz mines. But why should this be kept from the public today? The memory of the heroes of the Dora underground is not to be wiped away. To the present day millions of people cherish in their hearts a warm feeling to those who at the price of their lives strove to interfere with the shelling of the British Isles with the Braun missiles. This is the memory of the hearts. And what about the memory incarnated in a monument. There is no such monument in Britain. Yet, there is something else: the British Interplanetary Society has awarded a gold medal to Wernher von Braun.

Quite recently the "blue blooded" baron was awarded the Galabert Prize. This act evoked resolute protests in France. General Gustave Leroy, of the French Air Force, Chairman of the Society of the Prisoners of Buchenwald-Dora and Cavalier of the Legion of Honour, sent Braun the following telegram:

"On my own behalf and on behalf of the prisoners which have survived as well as in memory of the thousands of people who died in that camp I would like to remind Wernher von Braun of the time when he was in charge of the work... and took part in the atrocities. Perhaps today he should show greater modesty remembering that only yesterday he was the 'adornment' of this death tunnel."

"Astronautics is my only interest..." (?)

And what about more than 50,000 people who died in the dungeons of Dora? What about the 13,000 killed and 40,000 heavily wounded inhabitants of South Britain and Belgium?

May the fear of retribution always harass you, Wernher von Braun. You are a criminal!

(Krasnaya Zvezda, April 6 and 8, 1967. In full.)

TELECOPIER ORIGINAL

(17394-54)

Not for Telanov, 6/16/67

member of the Soviet  
only within the United  
States.

Last night I met with - when we first met he told me he had a very important oral message to give to me for my general secy Gus Hall. Took out a small piece of paper with an outline to tell me the following. That this oral statement from the CC of the CPSU is the position of the Soviet government and that on the situation in the Mideast, on the crisis in the Mideast, and is to be given in this manner only, orally, to the heads of all CPs of the world.:

(1) That the war in the Mideast was started under the instigation of the imperialist countries of the United States, Great Britain and West Germany for the oil imperialists of these countries against the Arab nations in particular and the national liberation progressive movements of these countries in general who have been successful with very progressive movements and friendship towards the USSR and in themselves towards socialistic aims. That it was important for the imperialist countries to destroy and root out the national liberation movements which have been making great progress in these countries headed by Messrs. 22 1967

(2) That it is most urgent at this moment to point out to Gus Hall and to the heads of all CPs throughout the world the distortion which the bourgeoisie of these imperialist countries are giving in the near East situation today. That they are distorting now and have distorted the situation before the war and before the peace line.

65 JUN 27 1967

REC-24

100-42807-16358

100-42807

Received by Bureau & Sullivan 6/16/67  
"Independent Information" prepared by R. C. Smith  
Ref. to W. H. G. (C. 100-42807-16358)  
cc to R. C. Smith

(2) That it is most urgent at this moment to point out to Gus Hall and to the heads of all CPs throughout the world the distortion which the bourgeois of these imperialist countries are giving in the near East situation today. That they are distorting now and have distorted the situation before the war and before the cease fire.

(3) That they wish to emphasize and state their policy and Soviet position before the outbreak of the war, how and why

they supported the cease fire resolution in the United Nations during this period at the time when they did, together with the Arab Nations, and their policy from the time of the cease fire to the present period.

It is the position of the Soviet Government given by the CC of the CPSU to all heads of the CP throughout the world explaining their position during and after.

Kosygin will pursue this line at the UN.

That this position is stated to the heads of the CPs throughout because the bourgeoisie of these countries is distorting the real situation.

This distortion began immediately after the military activities of Israel began. Therefore the reason why they must tell the heads of the CPs. Attempt of imperialists to leash a war to stop advancement being made by Arab nations, such as United Arab Republic, Syria and Algeria, because at that time the imperialist countries were losing their influence both politically and commercially in this area and in these countries. They tried at that time to use the ruling circles of Syria to stop the loss of this influence. Therefore that explains why the Israel was being attacked along the border of Syria by Syria prior to outbreak of hostilities. Imperialist countries were using the ruling circles of Syria to harass Israel. This the imperialists did not succeed. Meanwhile during this period, the anti-imperialist sources of the countries of the United Arab Republic, of Algeria and Syria were becoming stronger and

stronger and they were inclined towards socialist orientation. While they were harassing and provoking incidents against the Israel countries, the anti-imperialist movement was strengthening in these countries, the national liberation movements were strengthening and in these countries they were inclined towards socialist orientation within their countries and they were strengthening their friendship towards the USSR and the socialist camp. When they saw they could not succeed, meaning the imperialist countries, it was then that they started strengthening their support of these countries against Israel and provoking them in the war against these countries.

He said, further, our Central Committee policy was based upon the following: That the Arab Nations was given our support in both economic and other aid as a bulwark against these imperialists, particularly U.S. imperialism, in this sphere (the Mideast). Strengthening the whole camp of anti-imperialists and their socialist aims against Israel and the military clique which responds for the imperialists in their war against the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Syria.

The military circles of Israel invaded and became the aggressors against these countries. In the UN Security Council, why did the USSR Delegation support the cease fire resolution in the United Nations. He said, because on the evening of June 6 we received information from the UAR that there is a very critical situation on the front and the UAR

asked the USSR government to stop military action until the morning of June 7 and to help solve the problem in the United Nations in the Security Council. He said, the USSR delegation in the United Nations and the UAR representative supported this resolution to cease fire. When Israel continued with the war (this was June 6) Nasser in consultation with the Soviet government (date was 4 PM GMT time, June 7) informed them that the aggression was still going on, and at that moment the Soviet government sent a note to the Israel Ambassador in Moscow that if you don't stop this war immediately we will break relations with you. On June 8 the Soviet government introduced a draft resolution to condemn Israel as an aggressor. and told Israel that they must cease fire and must withdraw behind the truce lines, meaning the boundaries as proclaimed in the treaty after the 48 war. At that moment (June 7) Nasser asked the Soviet government to solve the matter in the Security Council and Nasser emphasized that he did not want the Soviet Union to be involved in this war. Then, the Central Committee of the CPSU called a meeting of the socialist countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, East Germany, in Moscow in which the agenda was to stop the war in the Mideast (heads of ~~USSR~~ CP's).

We are strengthening this camp then and now both economically and militarily and the reason we are doing this is because of the anti-imperialists, national liberation and

TELECOPIER ORIGINAL

We are strengthening this camp then and now both economically and militarily and the reason we are doing this is because of the anti-imperialists, national liberation and socialist aims of these countries against these imperialists.



## TELECOPIER ORIGINAL

countries (US Imperialists, Great Britain and West Germany).

We consider this to be the correct policy in this situation particularly because of the national liberation movement.

Before this crisis our government (USSR) rendered moral support to these countries, strengthening our position there in order to create effective measures to preserve peace and prevent a crisis of the beginning of a war in that area. After the situation became aggravated in this sphere (meaning the Arab nations) it is the result of the actions of the Israel imperialist forces which are supported by U. S. imperialism, Great Britain and West Germany. Therefore, we saw the following in this area. The clash of two policies (1) the part of the socialist national liberation movement and the imperialists (2) concretely, the Soviet government made this statement, of these two clashes, in the United Nations and outside of the Soviet Union accusing the Israelist militarists and western powers that they are unleashing a war in the Mideast (statement made May 23 in the UN).

At the very beginning of June, the Soviet government tried their very best to lessen the pressure of these western powers against the UAR in the Gulf of Ag. and simultaneously when the minister of the UAR, arrived, at that moment when they made this statement, simultaneously the Ambassador of the UAR and the President of Syria were meeting in Moscow discuss this serious situation. / The Soviet government said we told them to o their best to keep off actions (told them not to close the Gulf of Ag) and / said we were against, to a certain extent, some of the mistakes which were made by some Arab leaders

within the Arabian countries. It was a mistake to have sealed off and closed the Gulf of Ag. Told this to Ambassador of Egypt and to Syria. We warned them that this action would lead to a more serious problem. We told them not to do it. At the beginning of the invasion on the part of Israel who unleashed the war (this dated June 1) the Soviet government qualified or accused Israel as an aggressor and demanded that they stop the military aggression against the Arab nations and to withdraw their troops behind the truce lines of the 48 war. It was then that Kosygin sent a letter to Israel Embassy in Moscow, pointing out their aggression and it was then that this point was stressed, the point that Israel is an aggressor in the United Nations Security Council and the delegation was so instructed to prevent accepting the US delegation resolution which supported the Israel action.

Why did the Soviet delegation support the cease fire resolution? Because on the evening of June 6 we received information from the UAR, meaning Egypt, that there was a very critical situation on the war front and asked the Soviet Union government to stop the military action until the morning of June 7, To solve the problem in the United Nations. This is the reason that the USSR and the UAR representative supported the resolution to cease fire. When Israel continued to fight, in consultation with Nassar, he told them to stop the war (this was at 4 PM etc) At that time Israel was told by the Soviet Union

that if you don't stop the war immediately we will break relations with you. Then the Soviet government introduced draft resolution to condemn Israel as an aggressor.

On June 7 Nasser asked us to solve this matter in the Security Council because he did not want the Soviet Union to become involved in this war. Then a meeting was called of the Communist countries in Moscow with the agenda that this war be stopped. They met on that (1) cease fire must take place immediately and (2) that the <sup>aims</sup> ~~aims~~ of the imperialist forces (U.S. etc) was to stop progressive regimes in the Arab countries, for example, UAR and Syria. They were out to destroy them completely. and therefore they did not want any more destruction to take place. At this meeting, Israel was instructed by these countries to withdraw behind the truce lines of the 48 war and to establish a permanent peace in this sphere. Also at the same time they agreed that they would render all necessary aid, both economically and military (equipment) to liquidate the damage that was done and to restoring a normal situation in this area. Also at this meeting, it was most essential for these countries to support them more than ever before to strengthen the anti-imperialist forces and the progressive forces, which, the war did not succeed in destroying. These imperialist forces could not fulfill their aim in destroying also the progressive regimes of Nasser and Syria. In fact, the progressive forces were strengthened and that was shown by the example where the people refused to accept the resignation of Nasser or the Syrian government resignations.

What is the objective in informing all of the CP's throughout the world, that now more than ever before to stress Israel as the aggressor and that they must withdraw behind the truce lines as established in 1948, and towards a permanent peace in this sphere. That in the case of the socialist countries, European countries, that it is necessary to liquidate the bad and to restore a normal situation.

Again, to support the anti-imperialist forces of these countries both politically and ~~morally~~ morally.

To paralyze the thesis of the bourgeois propagandists against the Arabs and the socialist countries of the world.

To re-emphasize on all fronts for the restoration of the border positions which were lost by the Arab countries, to ~~keep~~ retain them so that they should not be lost.

In conclusion, that we consider that the crisis shows the necessity of all our CP movements throughout the world, to show openly and predominantly proletarian internationalism against this situation.

~~TELETYPE~~

6/16/67

Last night I met with - when we first met he told me he had a very important oral message to give to me for my general secy Gus Hall. Took out a small piece of paper with an outline to tell me the following. That this oral statement from the CC of the CPSU in the position of the Soviet government and that on the situation in the Mideast, on the crisis in the Mideast, and is to be given in this manner only, orally, to the heads of all CPs of the world.:

(1) That the war in the Mideast was started under the instigation of the imperialist countries of the United States, Great Britain and West Germany for the oil imperialists of these countries against the Arab nations in particular and the national liberation progressive movements of these countries in general who have been successful with very progressive movements and friendship towards the USSR and in themselves towards socialistic aims. That it was important for the imperialist countries to destroy and root out the national liberation movements which have been making great progress in these countries headed by Nasser.

(2) That it is most urgent at this moment to point out to Gus Hall and to the heads of all CPs throughout the world the distortion which the bourgeoisie of these imperialist countries are giving in the near East situation today. That they are distorting now and have distorted the situation before the war and before the cease fire.

TELECOPIER

(2) That it is most urgent at this moment to point out to Gus Hall and to the heads of all CPs throughout the world the distortion which the bourgeoisie of these imperialist countries are giving in the near East situation today. That they are distorting now and have distorted the situation before the war and before the cease fire.

(3) That they wish to emphasize and state their policy and Soviet position before the outbreak of the war, how and why

TELECOPIER

they supported the cease fire resolution in the United Nations during this period at the time when they did, together with the Arab Nations, and their policy from the time of the cease fire to the present period.

It is the position of the Soviet Government given by the CC of the CPSU to all heads of the CP throughout the world explaining their position during and after.

Kosygin will pursue this line at the UN.

That this position is stated to the heads of the CPs throughout because the bourgeoisie of these countries is distorting the real situation.

This distortion began immediately after the military activities of Israel began. Therefore the reason why they must tell the heads of the CPs. Attempt of imperialists to leash a war to stop advancement being made by Arab nations, such as United Arab Republic, Syria and Algeria, because at that time the imperialist countries were losing their influence both politically and commercially in this area and in these countries. They tried at that time to use the ruling circles of Syria to stop the loss of this influence. Therefore that explains why ~~the~~ Israel was being attacked along the border of Syria by Syria prior to outbreak of hostilities. Imperialist countries were using the ruling circles of Syria to harass Israel. This the imperialists did not succeed. Meanwhile during this period, the anti-imperialist sources of the countries of the United Arab Republic, of Algeria and Syria were becoming stronger and

TELECOPIER

stronger and they were inclined towards socialist orientation.

~~stronger and they were inclined towards socialist orientation.~~

While they were harassing and provoking incidents against the Israel countries, the anti-imperialist movement was strengthening in these countries, the national liberation movements were strengthening and in these countries they were inclined towards socialist orientation within their their countries and they were strengthening their friendship towards the USSR and the socialist camp. When they saw they could not succeed, meaning the imperialist countries, it was then that they started strengthening ~~for~~ their support of these countries against Israel and provoking them in the war against these countries.

He said, further, our Central Committee policy was based upon the following: That the Arab Nations was given our support in both economic and other aid as a bulwark against these imperialists, particularly U.S. imperialism, in the sphere (the Mideast). Strengthening the whole camp of anti-imperialists and their socialist aims against Israel and the military clique which responds for the imperialists in their war against the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Syria.

The military circles of Israel invaded and became the aggressors against these countries. In the UN Security Council, why did the USSR Delegation support the cease fire resolution in the United Nations. He said, because on the evening of June 6 we received information from the UAR that ~~that there is a very critical situation on the front and the war~~



# TELECOPIER

asked the USSR government to stop military action until the morning of June 7 and to help solve the problem in the United Nations in the Security Council. He said, the USSR delegation in the United Nations and the UAR representative supported this resolution to cease fire. When Israel continued with the war (this was June 6) Nasser in consultation with the Soviet government (date was 4 PM GMT time, June 7) informed them that the aggression was still going on, and at that moment the Soviet government sent a note to the Israel Ambassador in Moscow that if you don't stop this war immediately we will break relations with you. On June 8 the Soviet government introduced a draft resolution to condemn Israel as an aggressor. and told Israel that they must cease fire and must withdraw behind the truce lines, meaning the boundaries as proclaimed in the treaty after the 48 war. At that moment (June 7) Nasser asked the Soviet government to solve the matter in the Security Council and Nasser emphasized that he did not want the Soviet Union to be involved in this war. Then, the Central Committee of the CPSU called a meeting of the socialist countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, East Germany, in Moscow in which the agenda was to stop the war in the Mideast (heads of CP's).

We are strengthening this camp then and now both economically and militarily and the reason we are doing this is

national liberation and

# TELECOPIER

We are strengthening this camp then and now both economically and militarily and the reason we are doing this is because of the anti-imperialists, national liberation and socialist aims of these countries against these imperialists.

TELECOPIER

countries (US Imperialists, Great Britain and West Germany).

We consider this to be the correct policy in this situation particularly because of the national liberation movement.

Before this crisis our government (USSR) rendered moral support to these countries, strengthening our position there in order to create effective measures to preserve peace and prevent a crisis of the beginning of a war in that area. After the situation became aggravated in this sphere (meaning the Arab nations) it is the result of the actions of the Israel imperialist forces which are supported by U. S. imperialism, Great Britain and West Germany. Therefore, we saw the following in this area. The clash of two policies (1) the part of the socialist national liberation movement and the imperialists (2) concretely, the Soviet government made this statement, of these two clashes, in the United Nations and outside of the Soviet Union accusing the Israelist militarists and western powers that they are unleashing a war in the Mideast (statement made May 23 in the UN).

At the very beginning of June, the Soviet government tried their very best to lessen the pressure of these western powers against the UAR in the Gulf of Ag. and simultaneously when the minister of the UAR, arrived, at that moment when they made this statement, simultaneously the Ambassador of the UAR and the President of Syria were meeting in Moscow discuss in this serious situation. The Soviet government said we told them to do their best to keep off actions (told them not to close the Gulf of Ag) and we said we were against, to a certain extent, some of the measures which were made by some Arab leaders

RECOPIER

within the Arabian countries. It was a mistake to have sealed off and closed the Gulf of Ag. Told this to Ambassador of Egypt and to Syria. We warned them that this action would lead to a more serious problem. We told them not to do it. At the beginning of the invasion on the part of Israel who unleashed the war (this dated June 1) the Soviet government qualified or accused Israel as an aggressor and demanded that they stop the military aggression against the Arab nations and to withdraw their troops behind the truce lines of the 48 war. It was then that Kosygin sent a letter to Israel Embassy in Moscow, pointing out their aggression and it was then that this point was stressed, the point that Israel is an aggressor in the United Nations Security Council and the delegation was so instructed to prevent accepting the US delegation resolution which supported the Israel action.

Why did the Soviet delegation support the cease fire resolution? Because on the evening of June 6 we received information from the UAR, meaning Egypt, that there was a very critical situation on the war front and asked the Soviet Union government to stop the military action until the morning of June 7, To solve the problem in the United Nations. This is the reason that the USSR and the UAR representative supported the resolution to cease fire. When Israel continued to fight, in consultation with Nassar, he told them to stop the war (this was at 4 PM etc) At that time Israel was told by the Soviet Union

COPY

-7-

that if you don't stop the war immediately we will break relations with you. Then the Soviet government introduced draft resolution to condemn Israel as an aggressor.

On June 7 Nasser asked us to solve this matter in the Security Council because he did not want the Soviet Union to become involved in this war. Then a meeting was called of the Communist countries in Moscow with the agenda that this war be stopped. They met on that (1) cease fire must take place immediately and (2) that the <sup>aim</sup> of the imperialist forces (U.S. etc) was to stop progressive regimes in the Arab countries, for example, UAR and Syria. They were out to destroy them completely. and therefore they did not want any more destruction to take place. At this meeting,

Israel was instructed by these countries to withdraw behind the truce lines of the 48 war and to establish a permanent peace in this sphere. Also at the same time they agreed that they would render all necessary aid, both economically and military (equipment to liquidate the damage that was done and to restoring a normal situation in this area. Also at this meeting, it was most essential for these countries to support them more than ever before to strengthen the anti-imperialist forces and the progressive forces, which, the war did not succeed in destroying. These imperialist forces could not fulfil their aim in destroying also the progressive regimes of Nasser and Syria. In fact, the progressive forces were strengthened and that is shown by the example where the people refused to accept the resignation of Nasser or the Syrian government resignations.

TELECOPIER

-8-

What is the objective in informing all of the CP's throughout the world, that now more than ever before to stress Israel as the aggressor and that they must withdraw behind the truce lines as established in 1948, and towards a permanent peace in this sphere. That in the case of the socialist countries, European countries, that it is necessary to liquidate the bad and to restore a normal situation.

Again, to support the anti-imperialist forces of these countries both politically and ~~morally~~ morally.

To paralyze the thesis of the bourgeois propagandists against the Arabs and the socialist countries of the world.

> To re-emphasize on all fronts for the restoration of the border positions which were lost by the Arab countries, to ~~retain~~ retain them so that they should not be lost.

In conclusion, that we consider that the crisis shows the necessity of all our CP movements throughout the world, to show openly and predominantly proletarian internationalism against this situation.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*42*  
**Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE**

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*  
FROM : C. F. Downing *CD*  
SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: June 20, 1967

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*WJG*  
*CD*  
*5-Program*

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S\* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 6/20/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 217 GR 65, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

**ACTION:**

For information.

*E*  
Enclosure  
**ENCLOSURE**

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

*HS*  
HS:drv

(7)

ST-115

REC-40  
*100-428091 6359*  
6 JUL 25 1967

65 JUN 27 1967

6/20/67

NR 0217 GR 065

06/20/67

56158 03797 97692 40882 51404 91014 38256 70146 07205 09471  
67347 51605 41171 71459 42325 59769 56645 03404 77652 42712  
35095 98421 13427 63736 37933 13729 03250 54487 93826 72773  
04993 18385 03996 35959 02737 63153 41214 11373 97656 62328  
54955 48482 49556 42772 32334 45779 20518 00344 95998 54031  
79328 70742 28876 08308 70471 36990 13348 09901 23961 88051  
96437 78070 82796 21099 93366

NR 0217 GR 065

06/20/67

TO BIRCH. EDITORIAL BOARD <sup>D</sup> OF MAGAZINE PROBLEM OF PEACE AND  
SOCIALISM WANT TO KNOW WHETHER COX <sup>R</sup> COX REPRESENTATIVE WILL  
CAPTURE CONFERENCE OPENING IN OFFICE ON JUNE 22 OR YOU WILL  
SEND REPORT. EDITORIAL BOARD <sup>R</sup> DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH A  
SHASH. SS

ENCLOSURE

100-425091-6359



FBI

Date: 6/16/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-63)  
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-74560)  
 SUBJECT: CPUSA-FUNDS  
 IS-C

CG 5824-S\* advised on 6/14/67, that GUS HALL will receive \$250,000 on 6/16/67, or possibly 6/19/67, for the purpose of buying equipment to set up "The Worker" as a daily paper. Since this is such a large outlay of money, it is essential that we verify this expenditure as well as additional future expenditures.

The fact that the Party is proposing to publish a daily newspaper has been appeared in the Party press and the fact that negotiations have been conducted for the purchase of a press must, by necessity, be known to several persons in Party circles.

CG 5824-S\* has informed that expenses for printing equipment will run in the vicinity of \$200,000 at this time. NY 694-S\* advised that the CP has ordered an off-set printing press costing \$70,000 from the firm of Miehle-Goss in Chicago.

1-704 741  
 4-Bureau (100-3-63) (RM)  
 (1-100-428091) (SOLO) sent to Special Agent in Charge  
 3-Chicago (RM)  
 (1-100-134-46-Sub B) (SOLO)  
 1-NY (97-169) (PNP) (41)  
 1-NY (100-134637) (SOLO) (41)  
 1-NY (100-74560) (41)  
 JJK:rmv  
 (11)

E.E. Wick

100-428091  
 NOT RECORDED  
 140 JUN 21 1967

20 JUN 27 1967

INT. SEC.

62 JUN 26 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent: \_\_\_\_\_ M Per: \_\_\_\_\_

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-63-34-171

NY 100-74560

Chicago should review information available to CG 5824-S\* concerning specific purchases by the CP and purchases contracted for, to determine exact amounts involved in these transactions.

In addition, if secure, contact Michle-Goss to ascertain details concerning the purchase of a printing press, including price, method of payment, where and when equipment is to be shipped and other available data which may assist in locating additional purchases.

The NYO has placed stops on bank accounts used by "The Worker" and Party.

ROUTE <sup>B</sup> IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/20/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

Re previous correspondence to the Bureau and NY re the current investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of the USA, SDNY, into alleged manipulation of stocks being traded on the American Stock Exchange.

For the info of the Bureau and NY, CG 5824-S\* this date advised that he learned in conversation with [redacted] of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Ill.; that IRVING PROJANSKY, brother-in-law of the informant, and President of the Lincolnwood Bank, along with Dr. FRED WEITZ, an officer of the Lincolnwood Bank, accompanied by their lawyers, will appear voluntarily in NYC on Thurs. or Fri. of this week for an interview by the SEC lawyer and AUSA LAWRENCE NEWMAN.

[redacted] stated that he has been in recent conversation with the SEC lawyer [redacted] in which [redacted] chided [redacted] for persecution of innocent businessmen to which [redacted] replied with a sneer, "You mean that guy CHILDS?" [redacted] evinced curiosity as to why [redacted] would speak so sneeringly of CHILDS. The informant told [redacted] he had no idea why [redacted] should speak in that manner.

1-904 [redacted]  
③-Bureau (RM) REC 10 100-428091-6360  
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago  
WAB:MDW  
(5)

ST-115

6 JUN 26 1967

Approved: [Signature]  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUN 28 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

CG 5824-S\* stated that [ ] informed him that numerous businessmen have been getting letters from the government asking when they bought Hercules Galion stock, from whom, in what amount, and other questions relating to their Hercules Galion transactions. These businessmen have expressed discontent over this and at least one attorney, in Wisc., replied with a nasty note telling the SEC and the AUSA to mind their own business.

b6  
b7C

The above is for information purposes only.

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/20/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS-C

On 6/20 or 21/67, NY 694-S\* intends to pass \$250,000 to ELIZABETH HALL for delivery to GUS HALL. NY 694-S\* and CG 5824-S\* have stated that this money is to be used for the purchase of printing equipment and other items necessary to reinstitute a daily paper for the CP. Leads have been set forth for the Chicago Office under the caption of CPUSA-FUNDS to determine details of the purchase of printing equipment. Stops have been placed at banks by the NYO where it is likely some of this money may be deposited.

The NYO will institute a full security physical surveillance of both GUS HALL and ELIZABETH HALL in an attempt to determine how they dispose of the money.

GUS HALL has told informants that he wants to be given another \$250,000 towards the end of June, 1967. He has stated that he will pick up this money in Chicago, Illinois, while en route to Minnesota (apparently to vacation with his brothers).

100-90494  
 3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
 1-Chicago (134-46 Sub F) (RM)  
 1-Minneapolis (Info) (RM)  
 1-NY (134-91) (Inv) (41)  
 1-NY (100-134637) (41)  
 JJK:rmv  
 (8)

ST-115

JUN 26 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

65 JUN 28 1967

NYO to Chicago full security  
 protect informants by tel call 6/21/67  
 Messrs E.P. Brennan & Sullivan advised  
 on 6/26/67 + cc  
 RCP: and

5-R. P. Brown  
 McAnie  
 lost

NY 100-134637

In order to prepare for this withdrawal of the next \$250,000, the following is set forth:

The NYO has available (exclusive of the \$250,000 now packaged for delivery on 6/20,21/67) and processed:

\$110,000	Safe Deposit Box of NY 694-S*
<u>40,000</u>	Safe Deposit Box of NYO
\$150,000	Total

In addition, the NYO has \$718,000 now being processed.

The Chicago Office has available through CG 5824-S\* (per Chicago letter 6/1/67) \$122,320.55.

In order to comply with the Bureau's instructions as well as to assist in the smooth transfer (all processed money) of funds, the NYO proposes that the \$250,000 be prepared for delivery accordingly:

\$110,000	From safe deposit box of CG 5824-S* (money all processed)
\$100,000	From safe deposit box of NY 694-S* (money all processed)
\$40,000	From NYO safe deposit box (money all processed)

This will leave the NYO with only \$10,000 of processed money available. However, if an emergency comes up, we will check with the Voucher Statistical Section at the Bureau which has started to process \$530,000 to determine which amounts may be released. The NYO believes there will be no problem for us.

It is realized that the Chicago Office will have only \$12,000 available. However, this should not be a problem as withdrawals from CG 5824-S\* have generally not averaged over \$3,500 a month. To help to replenish the Chicago box at this time, the

NY 100-134637

NYO proposes that NY 694-S\* write a check now on the JACK BROOKS accounts for \$15,000.

Request of Bureau

No request is being made of the Bureau to release the second \$250,000 for GUS HALL. However, we should be prepared for a smooth transfer of funds.

Therefore, the NYO requests that we immediately withdraw \$100,000 from the safe deposit box of NY 694-S\* and \$40,000 from the NYO safe deposit box for a total of \$140,000.

// Authority requested to transmit the \$140,000 to Chicago by one Special Agent as courier.

Bureau authority requested to have NY 694-S\* write a check on the JACK BROOKS accounts to total \$15,000, which will be forwarded to Chicago to be cashed by CG 5824-S\* to help replenish his account. .

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

6/23/67

4/2X  
Airtel

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

To: SACs, New York (100-134637)  
Chicago (134-46 Sub F)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091)

SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

ReNYairtel 6/20/67.

Authority granted to withdraw \$150,000 from Solo funds in New York as set forth in reairtel for transfer to Chicago by Special Agent courier.

Authority is also granted to have NY 694-S\* write a check on his account totaling \$15,000 which will be forwarded to Chicago to be cashed by CG 5824-S\* to replenish Solo funds in Chicago. 712

RCP:dmk

(9) dmk

REC 10

100-428091-6362

ST-115

NOTE:

JUN 26 1967

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 6/22/67, captioned as above, prepared by RCP:dmk.

10  
pen

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Wick	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____



100-428091-6362  
MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

✓  
WELB I  
SECTION-REVDING 600X  
JUN 23 11 11 AM '67  
Dg



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*ST* Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI ( 100-428091 ) DATE: 6-20-67

*uplr*  
FROM : Legal Attache, Ottawa ( 105-684 ) ( P )SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
IS-C  
900: BU*Solo**P. J. [unclear]*

Reference: LHM dated 6-14-67, at WDC

Dissemination, as outlined below, was made on dates indicated  
to foreign agencies listed.☒ One copies of re LHM☐ Pertinent information from

Name and Location of Agency

Date Furnished

6-20-67

b7D

3 - Bureau  
(1 - Liaison Section)  
1 - OTT  
MLI:jhc  
(4)

65 JUN 30 1967

100-428091-  
NOT RECORDED

1 JUN 23 1967

INT. SEC.  
*[Signature]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI ( 100-428091 ) DATE: 6-20-67

FROM : Legal Attaché, Ottawa ( 105-684 ) ( P )

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  
IS-C  
(OO: Bureau)

Solo

Reference: LHM dated 6-5-67, re "Planned Attendance of  
Canadians at International Lenin School, Moscow, USSR, During  
1968," forwarded with Bulet dated 6-13-67, bearing instant caption.  
Dissemination, as outlined below, was made on dates indicated  
to foreign agencies listed.

☒ One copies of re LHM.

☐ Pertinent information from:

Name and Location of Agency

Date Furnished

6-20-67

b7D

100-428091 -

NOT RECORDED

16 JUN 28 1967

INT. SEC.

ANTI-AMERICAN

3 - Bureau  
(1 - Liaison Section)

1 - OTT  
MLI:jhc  
(4)

700 53 4 25 67, PJ  
INTEG DIA  
REC.D

57 JUN 28 1967

SAC, New York (100-134637)  
Attention: SAC Dillard W. Howell

9/7/67

Director, FBI (100-428091) - 6363

SOLO  
IS - C

REC- 14

EX 104

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TRAMUS

Reference is made to your airtel of 6/20/67, captioned as above, in which you forwarded 2,328 pages of Xerox reproductions of money in the amount of \$210,000.

Serial numbers of the money on the 2,328 pages have been recorded in the Automatic Data Processing Unit. These numbers will be compared and added to the index.

There are being forwarded to your office under separate cover 2,328 pages of Xerox reproductions.

JP:nls  
(6)

- 1 - SAC Dillard W. Howell (with Xerox reproductions)
- 1 - Mr. Row

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



F40

SEP 15 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

8 8  
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/20/67

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS - C

ReNYairtel 6/13/67, captioned as above.

## TRAMUS

Enclosed for the Bureau are 2328 pages of xerox of money representing \$210,000.00. Of this amount \$160,000.00 is in \$20.00 denominations and \$50,000.00 is in \$50.00 denominations. This amount along with \$240,000.00 sent to the Bureau on 6/13/67 totals \$450,000.00. This represents part of the \$530,000.00 received by NY 694-S\* from the Soviets on 5/20/67.

Records of these bills should contain the reference, "NY 65-17696-A1391". It is also requested that the record contain the page number of the xerox which number may be found on the lower right hand corner of each sheet.

The enclosed material should be returned to the NYO after processing.

- 1-904940 LX 101  
 (3) - Bureau (Encls. 2328) (RM)  
 (1 - VOUCHER STATISTICAL SECTION)  
 1 - New York (65-17696) (343)  
 1 - New York (41)

JFL:rmp  
 (6)

REC-14

JUN 21 1967

ENCLOSURE

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

STAT. SEC.  
 SPEC. MAIL RM.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/22/67

FROM : C. D. Brennan

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SUBJECT: SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, and other communist parties of the world.

## PURPOSE:

This memorandum advises that Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, has indicated he may need an additional \$250,000 for the fund to establish a daily communist newspaper by the end of June, 1967. Hall indicated he may wish to pick this money up in Chicago. It recommends a secure method to have this money available should Hall desire it.

## BACKGROUND:

My memorandum of 6/15/67 advised that Hall wanted \$250,000 to purchase supplies and equipment to re-establish a daily communist newspaper. Hall's wife Elizabeth obtained this money the night of 6/20/67 from our informant for delivery to Hall. Hall has indicated he may need an additional \$250,000 for the paper fund by the end of June, 1967, and that he would like to get this money when he is in Chicago at the end of June, 1967.

This is a favorite tactic of Hall. He has taken trips, picked up Solo funds in Chicago, and upon his return to New York implies that the money came from "Party angels." It should be noted that the \$500,000 involved represents the money turned over to the Communist Party, USA, by the Soviets through our informants in May, 1967, and is one half of what the Soviets have promised for the entire year.

100-428091

Enclosure

RCP:dmc

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-100

6 JUN 28 1967

65 JUN 30 1967

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

We are closely following this matter of the re-establishment of the daily paper. There have been continued discussions by Party leaders regarding it. Hall has said it will require one million dollars to start the paper and a \$600,000 annual subsidy to keep it going. Discussions by Party leaders have indicated that there must be substantial cash available before the move to start publishing the paper is made. Considerable equipment and supplies have been ordered and the importance of a daily newspaper was stressed at the recently completed meeting of the Party's National Committee.

Since Solo funds currently available in Chicago do not equal the amount Hall is interested in, our New York Office has proposed the following secure method to get these funds to Chicago. New York will send \$150,000 to Chicago via a Special Agent courier. This sum will be added to the approximately \$100,000 currently in Chicago in a safe deposit box to be held pending Hall's decision. Since this will deplete the funds in Chicago, NY 694-S\* will write a check on his fictitious name account in the amount of \$15,000 to help replenish Solo funds in Chicago. This transaction will serve to remove the account of NY 694-S\* from a dormant state and make it of no interest to bank officials who are interested in dormant accounts.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached is an airtel instructing New York to transfer \$150,000 from Solo funds in New York to Chicago by Special Agent courier and to have NY 694-S\* prepare the check as noted above. It is recommended this airtel be approved and sent.

*WCS* *WEL* *✓* *JS*  
*Dgh*

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

(IS) 100-428091

BY LIAISON

Date: June 27, 1967

To: Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The following was supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

James Jackson, Chairman of the International Affairs Department, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has been designated by Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, to be the Party's representative at a symposium or seminar scheduled for August, 1967, in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The meeting has been called in the name of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, a department within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by the Director of the Institute, Timur Timofeyev.

The meeting is to be a gathering of the leading theoreticians of the communist parties throughout the world to discuss the role of labor in various countries. Timofeyev had hoped that Gus Hall would attend this meeting as the CPUSA representative.

Jackson has accepted this assignment because of the following: The CPUSA had originally received an invitation to send four or five top leaders to the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution to be held in Moscow, USSR, November 7, 1967. This invitation

RCP:cst  
(6)

~~SECRET~~

100-428091-6365  
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

6 JUN 28 1967

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUN 30 1967 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

has now been increased to seven. Gus Hall and Henry Winston, National Chairman of the CPUSA, and their wives have been invited to attend this celebration. Jackson believes that he would certainly be accorded less prominence and prestige if he visited Moscow as part of a delegation including Hall and Winston than he would if he were alone. Therefore, he has decided that he could improve his prestige in the international communist movement by attending the seminar, which will be composed of leading communist theoreticians.

1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

TO  
CIA  
6/28/67  
JW

b6  
b7C

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.

Data extracted from Chicago letter 6/21/67,  
captioned "James Jackson, IS - C."

~~SECRET~~



6/23/67

AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-63)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (100-33742)

CP, USA - FUNDS  
IS-C  
(OO:NY)

ReBuairtel dated 6/16/67 captioned "SOLO; IS-C" and NYairtel to Bureau dated 6/16/67 captioned "CP, USA - FUNDS; IS-C" relative to dispensing of Solo Funds to GUS HALL and the re-establishment of a daily newspaper by the CP, USA.

As the Bureau and NY are aware, HALL was furnished \$250,000 of CP, USA funds on 6/20/67 through his wife, ELIZABETH HALL. Furthermore, HALL will pass through Chicago during the last week in June at which time he expects to pick up an additional \$250,000. CG 5324-S\* advised on 6/14/67, according to reNYairtel, that GUS HALL is gathering this money for the purpose of expenditures necessary for the re-establishment of a daily Party paper.

4-Bureau (RM)  
(1 - 100-428091) (SOLO)  
2-New York (RM)  
(1 - 100-74560) (CP, USA - Funds)  
(1 - 100-134637) (SOLO)  
2-Chicago  
(1 - 134-46 Sub B)

WAB:MDW  
(8)

100-428091-  
NOT RECORDED  
170 JUN 30 1967

56 JUL 10 1967

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-63 9170

CG 100-33742

CG 5324-S\* advised on 6/21/67 that on the basis of his past discussions with GUS HALL during the period of the informant's last trip to NY, 6/6-16/67, it appears quite obvious to the informant that HALL is putting aside these funds for the "Daily Worker." It will be recalled that CG 5324-S\* has previously advised that anticipated costs in the first year to get the "Daily Worker" started will amount to \$600,000. According to CG 5324-S\*, the Party has made only a down payment on the machinery required and thousands of additional dollars will be necessary.

CG 5324-S\* advised that GUS HALL stated he will come into Chicago during the last week in June but will stay in Chicago no more than a couple of days if he stops in Chicago at all. Then, he is going on to Minnesota for the stated purpose of straightening out a factionalist situation existing in that district. According to HALL, the trouble centers around [redacted] in Minneapolis who is charged with being too mechanical in her dealings with people and who is the cause of some problems. HALL stated that this is the reason that he is going to Minnesota. CG 5324-S\* stated that since it is his belief, based upon his discussions with HALL (although HALL did not so state specifically), that HALL is putting aside these large sums of money toward the initial year's expenses of a daily paper, this trip to Minnesota is serving a dual purpose for HALL. CG 5324-S\* believes that HALL will probably salt some of this money away with his family in Minnesota and perhaps some of it also with MATT SAVOLA in Wisconsin. Furthermore, upon his return trip, HALL might even go to Cleveland, Ohio, to secrete some of these funds.

CG 5324-S\* recalled that at an open meeting, HALL had bragged about the progress of the fund for the daily paper. HALL stated at that time that this fund is growing and will continue to grow. He said that finances are not the limiting factor in the re-establishment of a daily Party press.

CG 5324-S\* voiced the opinion that the itinerary of this trip by HALL may well indicate those areas where HALL will salt away this money. Since HALL is putting the money aside, it should not then be anticipated that there will be large immediate expenditures.

CG 100-33742

It is recalled that it is a practice of HALL, frequently observed in the past, to take trips throughout the country prior to which or during which he picks up substantial sums of CP, USA reserve funds from either CG 5324-S\* or NY 694-S\*. Upon his return to NYC, HALL then turns this substantial sum over to the National Office, CP, USA, and states that he collected this money from some of his private "angels" during the course of his trip. It would appear possible that HALL is setting up such a situation in this case utilizing his relatives and old-time associates in Minn. and perhaps Wisc. and Cleveland.

ReNYairtel requested Chicago contact Miehle-Goss, if secure, relative to details concerning the purchase of a printing press by the CP, USA.

On 6/21/67 SAs LELAND G. RICHIE and JOHN W. TOEDT contacted [redacted] (protect - requested), [redacted] Miehle-Goss-Dexter-Americus Company and Goss Company, International Division, Divisions of Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 3100 S. Central Ave., Cicero, Ill., at which time [redacted] furnished the following information:

By purchase contract dated 5/22/67, the Prompt Press Printers, Inc., 418 W. 25th St., NY, NY, agreed to purchase a Goss Suburban Off-Set newspaper press from the Goss Co., a division of Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc. This press will print up to a maximum of 24 pp. of tabloid-type printing and this press is to be shipped to the Prompt Press Printers, Inc., at the above address in NY during 10/67. The total cost of this press is \$60,625 plus \$2,425 for NY sales tax. This contract also includes an option whereby the Prompt Press Printers, Inc., can purchase an additional unit within one year from the date 5/22/67 for the price of \$13,125. If purchased, this additional unit could be utilized on the above press to increase the page capacity. The above contract was signed by KARL LEICHTMAN, Secretary-Treasurer, Prompt Press Printers, Inc., and one DAVID U. FREEDMAN signed the contract as a witness. This contract was accepted by the Goss Co. on 5/26/67. Terms of this contract are as follows:

\$6,000 was paid at the time the contract was entered into by a check dated 5/22/67 (this check is not available inasmuch as it has been processed by the Goss Co.); \$20,000 is

CG 100-33742

to be paid before 7/1/67; \$12,800 is to be paid one week prior to the shipment of the press; \$15,156 is to be placed in escrow by the Prompt Press Printers, Inc., to be paid immediately upon delivery of the press (no further info available concerning who is handling these escrow funds); and the balance of \$9,094 is to be paid 30 days after the installation of the press.

The above files also contain a letter dated 5/25/67 signed [redacted] Prompt Press Printers, Inc., 418 W. 25th St., NY, authorizing the purchase of the above press.

b6  
b7C

The above records contained no info re any purchase of any additional printing equipment and records contained no additional pertinent info.

[redacted] advised that upon the receipt of the payments in the future on this contract he will make available info re the method of payment and will make available checks if checks are used for payment. Chicago will maintain contact with [redacted] re above.

b6  
b7C

In accordance with reBuairtel, CG 5824-S\* has been instructed to determine everything possible relating to the re-establishment of the daily press with particular emphasis upon the financial commitments made by the CP, USA and/or GUS HALL toward the purchase of equipment or supplies. The Bureau and NY will be immediately advised of pertinent info as developed.

6/23/67

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (29-2790)  
SUBJECT: UNSUB; ALLEGED POSSIBLE FRA  
VIOLATIONS AT THE FIRST NATIONAL  
BANK OF LINCOLNWOOD, LINCOLNWOOD,  
ILLINOIS  
FRA

Re New York airtel to Bureau 6/12/67.

On 6/21/67 AUSA [redacted] Civil Division, Chicago, telephonically advised that he had been in contact with USA KORGENTHAU of New York regarding captioned matter. He stated that it was the desire of USA KORGENTHAU and USA HANRAHAN in Chicago that investigation be instituted in this matter as it was his understanding that such investigation would not hamper SEC investigation.

AUSA [redacted] was advised that it was the understanding of the Chicago Office that the USA's Office in New York desired that any investigation in this matter be held in abeyance pending completion of SEC investigation. AUSA [redacted] was advised that contact would be made with the USA's Office in New York to further clarify this matter.

4 - Bureau  
(1 - 100-428091)  
2 - New York  
(1 - 100-134637)  
2 - Chicago  
(1 - [redacted])  
KGC:lac  
(8)

53 JUL 24 1967

100-428091  
NOT RECORDED  
172 JUL 12 1967

45961

b6  
b7C

FILED IN  
b6  
b7C  
ORIGINAL

b7D

CG 29-2790

New York is requested to contact USA MORGENTHAU concerning this matter to insure that premature investigation is not instituted pending desires of USA, New York.

No further action being taken at Chicago pending advice from New York.

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 6/26/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

ReBulet to Chicago, 6/7/67; copy to New York, enclosing CIA letter dated 5/26/67, latter letter requesting information concerning Soviets associated with the Institute of International Workers Movement.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original and four copies of an LHM captioned "Institute of the International Workers Movement."

The information set forth in the enclosed LHM was obtained as the result of an indices check and review of pertinent files in the NYO.

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of the information set forth--in particular, that obtained originally from CG 5824-S\* and NY 694-S\* concerning TIMUR TIMOFEYEV--could result in the identification of these sources, who are furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international Communist movement, and since such disclosure could adversely affect the national security.

Also enclosed herewith for transmittal to CIA are two photographs of TIMUR TIMOFEYEV and one each of EDUARD ARAB-OGILY, YURI ZAMOSHKIN and NIKOLAY KOVALSKIY.

2 - 904 4H + D with encl. (5 photos + one LHM)  
 3 - Bureau (RM) (Encl. 10)  
 1 - New York

ACB:msb  
 (5)

REC-112

100-428091-6366  
6 JUN 28 1967

Approved

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

65 JUL 5 1967

NY 100-134637

As reflected in the LHM, no identifiable references were found in the NYO files concerning a number of Soviets associated with the Institute of the International Workers Movement, in whom CIA is interested.

In the interest of security, the LHM is being datelined Washington, D. C.





~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Washington, D. C.  
June 27, 1967

Institute of the International Workers Movement

Reference Central Intelligence Agency letter dated May 26, 1967, captioned "Institute of the International Workers Movement."

In June, 1967, a source that has furnished reliable information in the past furnished the following information concerning some of the officials of the Institute of the International Workers Movement:

Timur T. Timofeyev

Timofeyev was born November 30, 1928, in Ivanova, USSR, the son of the late Eugene Dennis, former Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CP, USA), and Peggy Dennis, currently a CP, USA functionary. He was left by his parents in the Soviet Union in 1936 or 1937 as a state ward, and was educated in Soviet schools attended also by the children of the top-level Communist Party leaders. After completing his academic education, he chose the international field as a specialty, particularly the North American area. For six years his work was related to North American radio and he became a specialist in this field.

He also taught Marxism-Leninism at a Soviet University and was on the staff of the "World Marxist Review" in Prague for a year and a half.

In February, 1960, he became a top-level executive of the World Institute of Human Affairs, which is a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and travelled extensively in the satellite countries. He has a reputation as an author and has written for "Pravda."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~  
~~GROUP 1~~

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

100-428091-6366  
~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~SECRET~~

Institute of the International Workers Movement

In October, 1960, Timofeyev came to the United States as a member of the entourage of Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who attended the 15th session of the United Nations Assembly.

In 1962 he became Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs, Academy of Science of the USSR.

He is described as having black hair, brown eyes, and being 5'6" in height. TIMOFEYEV is also known as "Timmy Dennis."

Eduard Arturovich Arab-Ogly

Arab-Ogly was born October 13, 1925, in Tbilisi, USSR. He studied at the Institute of Foreign Relations and was expelled in his third year for having returned late from a vacation. He was a very ambitious young man and completed his education as a correspondence student at Moscow University. After graduation, he studied philosophical science at the aforesaid university, and subsequently held a position in the philosophical department of the Foreign Literature Publishing House.

Thereafter, he became associated with the Institute of Philosophy and eventually was appointed to the editorial board of the "World Marxist Review" in Prague. He is known to have been in Paris and London.

Between August 31, 1962, and September 16, 1962, he was in the United States as one of a group of Soviets who attended the International Sociological Congress. At that time, he described himself as "a scientific worker."

Marat Viktorovich Baglay

Baglay, who was born March 13, 1930, in Baku, USSR, in October 1960 was a lawyer employed at the Institute on State and Law. In October 1960 he applied for a visa to visit the USA as a member of a Soviet delegation that came to the USA at the invitation of the Council on Student Travel. He was not listed, however, among the Soviet delegates who arrived in the USA on October 26, 1960. The source could furnish no additional information concerning Baglay.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Institute of the International Workers Movement

Yuri Aleksandrovich Zamoshkin

Zamoshkin, a sociologist, was in the USA between July 8, 1958, and August 28, 1958, as a Soviet delegate to an American Friends Service Convention.

Between March 29, 1961, and September 26, 1961, he was employed at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations as a scientific worker. At this time, he resided at 50 West 77th Street, New York City.

He attended an International Sociological Congress in the USA between August 31, 1962, and September 12, 1962, and was an East-West exchange student in the USA between May 23, 1966, and June 13, 1966.

After his 1958 visit to the USA, he was highly critical of all phases of life in the USA, asserting that the USSR was far more advanced, in all respects, than the USA.

He is described as follows:

Birth	Born in Moscow, USSR, September 10, 1927
Hair	Fair
Eyes	Gray
Height	5'9"
Weight	160
Build	Slight
Complexion	Medium

Nikolay Aleksandrovich Kovalskiy

Kovalskiy, a Section Chief of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, was in the USA between March 6, 1967, and March 29, 1967, as a Soviet delegate to the 18th session of the United Nations Commission on Social Development. He had Soviet diplomatic passport #016551. His description is as follows:

-3-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Institute of the International Workers Movement

Birth	Born October 12, 1925, in
	Leningrad, USSR
Height	179 cm.
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown

The source could furnish no further information concerning Kovalskiy.

The source could furnish no information concerning the following, who are mentioned in the referenced CIA communication:

- M. K. Mamardashvili
- Yu N. Davydov
- L. P. Delyusin
- V. Perevedenstsev
- N. I. Novikov
- Ye A. Ambart

~~SECRET~~

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 6/27/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

On 6/27/67, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered message, the plaintext of which is as follows:

"To Jack Brooks:

"We recommend you to burn down 40 unused groups in your code".

This message, suggestive of arson, is really innocuous and merely instructs the informant to destroy a group of gammas used in Soviet radio transmission to the CPUSA.

See New York airtels, 5/17/67 and 6/19/67.

3 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
1 - Chicago (134-46-SUB B) (AM RM)  
1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (41)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)

ACB:gmd  
(7)

6 JUN 30 1967

REC 32

ST-115

Approved: *FMB*

65 JUL 6 1967

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *sure* DATE: June 27, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S\* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 6/27/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 471 GR 23, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

## ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

*Q*  
ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

REC 22

100-428091-6368

HS:drv  
(7) *drv*

ST-110

6 JUN 29 1967

*HS*  
*Putnam*  
65 JUL 6 1967

6/27/67

NR 0471 GR 023

06/27/67

63015 22067 34508 58252 44808 09624 35886 28696 32691 09588

34222 53524 65922 68546 91358 50542 71710 13119 52806 19079

41478 24631 94870

NR 0471 GR 023

06/27/67

TO SPRING WE RECOMMEND YOU TO BURN DOWN 40% UNUSED GROUPS IN  
R D  
YOU COULD -SSSSS

100-128091-6368

ENCLOSURE

SAC, New York (100-134637)  
Attention: SAC Dillard W. Howell

September 27, 1967

Director, FBI (100-428091) - *6369*  
REC-134

SOLO  
IS - C

EX-102

*all*  
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TRAMUS

Reference is made to your letter of 6/28/67, captioned as above, in which you forwarded 1,999 pages of Xerox reproductions of money in the amount of \$80,000.


Serial numbers of the money on the 1,999 pages have been recorded in the Automatic Data Processing Unit. These numbers will be compared and added to the index.

There are being forwarded to your office under separate cover 1,999 pages of Xerox reproductions.

*JP: [initials]*  
(6)

- 1 - SAC Dillard W. Howell (with Xerox reproductions)
- 1 - Mr. Row

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



55 OCT 2 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: 6/28/67  
(ATTN: VOUCHER STATISTICAL SECTION)  
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)  
SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

*B/AM*  
*S-R. [Signature]*  
*M. [Signature]*

TRAMUS

Enclosed for the Bureau are 1,999 pages of xerox of money representing \$80,000.00 in \$10.00 denominations. This represents the final amount of the \$530,000.00 received by NY 694-S\* from the Soviets on 5/20/67.

Records of these bills should contain the reference, "NY 65-17696-A1391". It is also requested that the record contain the page numbers may be found on the lower right hand corner of each sheet.

The enclosed material should be returned to the NYO after processing.

- Enclosed 1 cc attached in Voucher - stat for processing.*
- 1-904 94D
- 3 - Bureau (100-428091) (Encls. 1,999) (RM)  
(1 - Voucher Statistical Section)  
1 - New York (65-17696) (343)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)

JFL:gmd  
(5)

REC-21

ST 101

JUL 5 1967



5010-108

ACK 9-27-67

JP:IKY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

## ROUTE-IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/23/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
 FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)  
 SUBJECT: SOLO  
 IS-C

On 6/20/67, NY 694-S\* and wife were observed at 3:30 pm, to enter the building housing International Publishers, Park Avenue South, NYC, carrying two bright orange shopping bags (total weight 25 lbs.) containing \$250,000. At 4:30 pm, ELIZABETH HALL was observed departing this building carrying two bags identical with the ones delivered by informant. She placed the bags in her car in a nearby parking lot and then drove cross town, picking up her [redacted] then drove the car up town on the West Side Drive, fisur discontinued at 92nd St. NYC. They were observed entering their basement garage, Yonkers, NY, shortly before 5:30 pm. The time interval logically precludes any stop en route.

After arriving in the garage, GUS HALL, who had returned home from the Communist Youth School that afternoon, was observed to walk around the rear of the car in the garage carrying at least one of these bags. He had apparently entered the garage through the basement entrance and exited the same way.

Fisur throughout the night and morning disclosed that [redacted] left the residence the evening of 6/20/67, in his car,

1-904 44D

1-3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
 1-Chicago (134-46-Sub F) (RM)  
 1-Minneapolis (Info) (RM)  
 1-NY (134-91) (Inv) (41)  
 1-NY (100-134637) (41)

JJK:rmv

(8)

REC-82

ST 101 JUL 3 1967

Approved: *[Signature]*

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

65 JUL 6 1967

NY 100-134637

remaining away for three hours and ELIZABETH HALL left the residence in her car, remaining away for one and a half hours. No effort made at surveillance. Since this is a basement garage, we are unable to observe activity therein.

On 6/21/67, [redacted] HALL's [redacted] arrived at the residence on time. [redacted] ELIZABETH and GUS HALL entered the car with their usual equipment, purse and envelope briefcase. There were no bulges indicating the fact that they were carrying any sizeable amount of packaged money. ~~On 6/21/67, [redacted] HALL's [redacted] arrived at the residence on time. [redacted] ELIZABETH and GUS HALL entered the car with their usual equipment, purse and envelope briefcase. There were no bulges indicating the fact that they were carrying any sizeable amount of packaged money.~~

b6  
b7C

GUS HALL was observed entering CP Headquarters at his usual 8:35 am, and ELIZABETH then proceeded to International Publishers, which is only a five minute walk. At about 9:00 am, NY 694-S\* checked with ELIZABETH HALL and found all systems A-OK. There was no unusual activity that day. Fisur maintained on residence throughout day.

On the evening of 6/21/67, GEORGE MEYERS and his son (we assume) drove GUS HALL and ELIZABETH HALL away from CP Headquarters, arriving at the Yonkers residence at the normal hour. During the evening of 6/21/67, [redacted] GEORGE MEYERS, GUS HALL and a friend of [redacted] left the residence for a period of time, but no unusual activity was observed throughout the night and early morning.

b6  
b7C

The HALLS were picked up again on the morning of 6/22/67, and on this occasion HALL was observed to be carrying a grocery bag which did have bulk. He placed it in the trunk of the car and they drove away. They were next observed to arrive at CP Headquarters on time. HALL was extremely security conscious as he drove into the block. After the car was parked, HALL was observed to go to the trunk of the car. It could not be determined whether HALL took the bag out of the car.

ELIZABETH HALL entered International Publishers carrying a purse and sweater. She had no unusual activity that day.

On 6/22/67, [redacted] an employee of "The Worker" made a deposit of \$10,478 in the Publishers New Press account and a deposit of \$20,000 in the Committee For Socialist Education (an account established for a daily paper).

b6  
b7C

NY 100-134637

Fisur discontinued afternoon of 6/22/67, as any further activity would seem to be inconclusive.

The residence of GUS HALL is a big rambling house with the basement garage holding two cars. The garage has been constructed within the past few years at a considerable expense. We must assume that HALL has retained some of the money in his house in a secure location. He is then able to act as his own depository and dispense money as needed.

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/26/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

ReBuairtel dated 6/1/67 directing that Chicago should immediately start preparations to remove all Solo Funds into safety deposit boxes entirely controlled by this office, leaving a limited amount not exceeding \$10,000 in the custody of CG 5824-S\*.

On 6/20/67 CG 5824-S\* turned over to this office the entire amount of Solo Funds in his custody with the exception of \$10,000 which remains in the "HAROLD M. JULES" safety deposit box at the Mid-America National Bank, Chicago, Illinois. Access to the "JULES" box can be effected by CG 5824-S\* under the above name; his wife, CG 6653-S, under the name GENKA E. JULES; or, by NY 694-S\* under the name of JACK BROOKS.

On 6/21/67, after a complete inventory of these funds, the entire amount was placed in safety deposit box #C1880 at the LaSalle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with access limited to the SAC and ASAC of the Chicago Office.

The above is for the information of the Bureau and New York.

③-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

2-Chicago

(1-134-46 Sub F)

WAB:MDW

(6)

ST-115 100-428091-6371

6 JUL 3 1967

Approved: 65 JUL 6 1967  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 6/27/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

ReCGairtel dated 6/23/67 concerning disposition being made by GUS HALL of Solo funds being furnished to him at this time by CG 5824-S\* and NY 694-S\*.

On 6/26/67 CG 5824-S\* was engaged in a conversation relative to the reasons which might be motivating GUS HALL to make this large demand for funds from the informants. While it can be understood that these funds are eventually to cover the expenses of setting up and running the new daily paper of the CP, USA, there still remains some question as to why HALL would ask for \$500,000 unless such an expenditure would be made in the immediate future. After all, these funds have been in the custody of our two Solo informants for many years, and whenever HALL had need of funds he had only to ask for them and the informants produced as much as he desired from the Solo funds. There has never been any delay and the funds have always been available.

CG 5824-S\* stated that he can only express his opinion on this matter since he has no way of being sure. However, he noted that HALL has always operated on the principle that he can only trust himself. By force of circumstance,

1-904 940  
3-Bureau (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago  
WAB:MDW  
(5)

ST-115

6 JUL 3 1967

Approved: 1-46 MG/aw  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUL 6 1967

CG 134-46 Sub B

he has had to rely upon NY 694-S\* and CG 5824-S\*, but this does not change his basic operating principle. Thus, HALL may have become somewhat uneasy when he thought of the growing amount of Solo funds in the sole control of these two brother informants and of the fact that an additional \$500,000 will soon be coming into their hands also.

HALL's concern for the reinstitution of a daily press is intimately involved with the future financial security of the CP, USA and himself. It must be remembered that the justification of the annual subsidy of the CP, USA by the CP of the Soviet Union has been predicated in part each year for a number of years upon the re-establishment of a daily paper. Therefore, HALL may well feel more secure himself by actually having the funds in his hands with which to insure the financial base of the paper. Granted, HALL may salt some of this money away with some members of his family, but since it is his family, HALL believes this is the same as having it in his own hands, according to the opinion of CG 5824-S\*.

As to the question of whether or not this sudden large demand by HALL is an adumbration of a diminution of trust of these informants by HALL, CG 5824-S\* stated and the Chicago Office agrees that there is no other fact or circumstance, concrete or intangible, which would presage such lessening of confidence by GUS HALL. While HALL bestows far greater trust upon these two informants than upon any other individual known to us, we are nevertheless aware that any trust by HALL is by nature of a limited character. It is possible that these informants at this time have reached the limit to which HALL's confidence can be stretched. At the same time, HALL remains to a large extent dependent upon CG 5824-S\*, and by extension upon NY 694-S\*, for the difficult task of convincing the CP of the Soviet Union to continue its subsidy of the CP, USA each year in such large amounts.

The above comments are being furnished to the Bureau for whatever assistance they may have in the Bureau's consideration of this entire matter of turning over to GUS HALL at this time the amount of \$500,000.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

DATE: 6/27/67

~~TOP SECRET~~

ReBulet dated June 21, 1967, concerning the fact that GUS HALL used Solo funds to make out a mortgage in the amount of \$16,500 on the home of his [redacted] to the benefit of CG 5824-S\*. Relet inquires how this apparent interest income accruing to CG 5824-S\* will be handled with respect to the source's income tax or how he contemplates obtaining funds to pay the additional tax necessary.

This situation was discussed in detail with CG 5824-S\* on June 22, 1967. CG 5824-S\* advised that the apparent interest income accruing to him will be reported as interest income on his 1967 income tax return as well as in ensuing years. As the Bureau is aware, CG 5824-S\* has had his personal funds entwined with the transactions involving Solo funds in the past both for the benefit of the CP, USA and for the benefit of [redacted]. Some of these investments of Solo funds have been made in the name of our Solo informant whereas the profits derived therefrom have, in fact, been turned over to the [redacted].

In such past instances these transactions for the benefit of the Party and/or the [redacted] which have been made in the informant's name have been recorded on the informant's income tax return. These transactions appear on both the "true" return and the "open" return which is filed openly with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The amount by which this apparent income increases the informant's tax payment has been deducted as a business expense from the payments made to this informant by the FBI for services and usual expenses. It is recognized, and the informant is aware, that through the use of such a device the informant does not recover the full value of the payment that is made to IRS. As a consequence, the informant has lost substantial personal income in the process.

1-904 940  
②-Bureau (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637)(Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW  
(4)

Classified by 7339 [initials]  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

6 JUL 3 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

65 JUL 6 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



CG 134-46 Sub B

~~TOP SECRET~~

For the purposes of maintaining the security of the Solo operation and precluding involvement with the United States IRS, CG 5824-S\* has been willing to accept this loss. It is noted that the informant has also accepted the loss of several hundred dollars in his recent re-purchase of investments in the name of the [redacted] in Hercules-Galion stock and stock of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood through the untimely sale of securities and premature cashing of time deposit certificates.

b6  
b7C

Such a practice of the informant absorbing such personal loss by virtue of his involvement in the CP, USA funds operation which is being converted to the benefit of GUS HALL's children cannot, of course, continue ad infinitum. However, in the present situation, CG 5824-S\* has expressed his willingness to handle the income tax liability generated by the mortgage on the [redacted] home in the same manner as in the past and to accept such personal loss as this entails. This office foresees no likelihood that this activity will result in CG 5824-S\* becoming involved with IRS.

b6  
b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE  
FBI

Date: 6/27/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

Re previous correspondence concerning the current investigation being conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the USA, SDNY into alleged manipulation of stocks being traded on the American Stock Exchange.

On 6/26/67 CG 5824-S\* advised that he had engaged in a telephonic conversation with his brother-in-law, IRVING PROJANSKY, President and Chairman of the Board of the First National Bank of Lincolnwood, Ill., earlier that same date. PROJANSKY informed CG 5824-S\* that he had been in NYC on Thurs., 6/22/67, for an interview by the SEC and USA, SDNY, re the above-mentioned investigation. He further stated that the interview had been conducted by three "young kids" in their twenties rather than by the USA. They talked about general problems and never did get down to a concrete discussion of the problem in which he is involved. According to PROJANSKY, the whole thing was a waste of time. As a result, PROJANSKY is to go back to NYC for another interview sometime during the week of 6/26/67, the exact date depending upon the office of the USA.

The above is being submitted for info purposes only.

1-904  
③-Bureau (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW  
(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Classified by 7339  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2/3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

REC-82

ST 101

JUL 3 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

65 JUL 6 1967

Document downgraded to Secret  
Declassify on: 10/23/2004

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : *mf* SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

DATE: 6/26/67

*QW*  
*5*

ReBulet to Chicago, cc to New York, dated June 7, 1967, which enclosed a letter dated May 26, 1967, from CIA concerning the Institute of the International Workers Movement (IIWM). ReCIAlet classified "~~Secret~~" set forth information concerning individuals connected with the IIWM and requested any additional information or photographs which the FBI might have concerning the leading functionaries and/or activities of the Institute.

On June 21, 1967, CG 5824-S\* advised that he could furnish no additional information concerning the Institute, its activities and/or its leading functionaries beyond that previously furnished and which has already been disseminated to CIA.

In light of the negative character of the information furnished by CG 5824-S\*, no LHM is being prepared setting forth this negative contact.

*Q*

*1-904 945*

②-Bureau (RM)  
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)  
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW  
(4)

REC-23

*100-428091-6375*

6 JUL 5 1967

SI-106



6 JUL 7 1967

5010-106

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

6/16/67

SAC, NEW YORK (ADM)

ReNYlet, 2/14/67.

## 1. Recommendation.

It is recommended that  
be continued in the [redacted]

## 2. Residence and Employment

[redacted] resides at [redacted]  
[redacted] New York, and is [redacted]  
[redacted] New Jersey.

### 3. Current Membership in Organizations

[redacted] is presently a [redacted] of the Communist Party (CP) and [redacted] in the [redacted] of the CP.

#### 4. Summary of Information Furnished During Pertinent Period

NY 694-S\* and has been advised by NY 694-S\* to [redacted]  
[redacted] and that he, NY 694-S\*, would determine what  
[redacted] could do in the future.

[redacted] continues to be in [redacted]  
[redacted] and has had [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] will extend and offer to both [redacted]  
[redacted] with informant and his [redacted]

3 - Bureau (RM)

(100-428091)

(SOLO)

1 - New York

APPROVED JUN 28 1967  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

NOT RECORDED  
172 JUN 19 1967

56 JUN 30 1967 JPH:jaw

[redacted]

b7D

family at his residence in [redacted] New York.  
Informant's association with [redacted] is being made with  
view of developing an association between informant and  
[redacted] which will be beneficial to the Bureau in the  
investigation of [redacted] matters.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] of the  
[redacted] of the CP and has [redacted]  
[redacted] on same.

5. Amounts Paid for Services

<u>Date</u>	<u>Services</u>	<u>Expenses</u>
February, 1967	\$200.00	--
March, 1967	\$200.00	--
April, 1967	\$200.00	--
May, 1967	\$250.00	\$15.00

6. Type and Number of Meetings  
Attended and Other Activities

[redacted] of the [redacted]  
[redacted] of the CP and has [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] above  
[redacted] at his residence.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

7. Number of Reports Submitted

[redacted]

b7D

8. Information Furnished of  
Unusual Value

During this period, [redacted]  
[redacted] of the [redacted] of the

b7D

[redacted]

CP and has [redacted] of this  
Section of the CP.

b7D

9. Approximate Number of Persons  
on Whom Informant Furnished  
Information

Informant furnished information on sixteen (16)  
people.

10. Steps Being Taken to  
Advance Informant

[redacted] NY 694-S\* and  
is in [redacted] to obtain information from [redacted]  
[redacted]

It should be noted that [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Section of the CP, which is a [redacted]  
[redacted] continues to be encouraged  
to [redacted]  
of the CP, as well as [redacted] at his residence. During  
this period, [redacted]  
and [redacted] on [redacted] at his  
residence for dinner.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

11. Stability and Reliability

During contacts with [redacted] nothing has come  
to the attention of contacting agents indicating [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

b7D

12. Indoctrination Against  
Disclosure

Every opportunity has been taken to properly  
indoctrinate this informant against making any disclosure  
of his relationship with the Bureau by any means whatsoever.



b7D

13. Action on Information  
Furnished

Appropriate action has been taken on all information furnished by this informant.

14. Miscellaneous

None.

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 6/30/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

Re New York airtel, 6/26/67.

On 6/29/67, SA THOMAS J. DEVINE as courier transported \$140,000 in cash and a \$15,000 certified check to the Chicago Office.

\$100,000 was taken from the safe deposit box maintained by NY 694-S\* and \$40,000 was taken from the safe deposit box maintained by the NYO.

The check of \$15,000 represents funds drawn from the JACK BROOKS checking account. This money is to help replenish Chicago Solo funds.

3 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
1 - Chicago (134-46) (AM RM)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)

JJK:gmd  
(6)

REC-23

100-428091-6376

SI-106

6 JUL 5 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUL 7

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad *Sub*

DATE: June 30, 1967

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*OW.*  
*sr*  
On 6/29/67, the New York Office furnished the text of two messages which the informant desired to send and requested that they be enciphered. The cipher text was furnished to New York on 6/30/67.

The plain text and cipher text are attached. *Putnam*

## ACTION:

For information.

## Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

*WHP*  
PWP:cca

(7) cca

*2*  
ENCLOSURE

REC-23 100-428091-6377  
ST-106  
6 JUL 5 1967

65 JUL 7 1967  
FIVE

6/30/67

79344 00691 43284 29261 55182 80625 09003 36503 59206 28652  
66692 61876 34398 70962 34148 99978 31283 40017 14167 84121  
56711 81682 53820 59552 87918 86466 86303 35575 61055 83969  
24083 98834 80632 27765 08645 51618 18869 41260 74374 43378  
31935 94977 79596 66972 76145 47417 24041 62394 28108 12902  
57039 80415 42843 75829

ABLE-|KIT-|CONFIDENTIAL-|HEARTFELTFRATERNALTHANKSFOR|  
OUR|ORAL|REPORT|ON|THE|MID-EAST|CRISIS-|.IT|WAS|MOST|HELPFUL-|  
AND|I|FULLY|AGREE|WITH|IT-|.IT|HELPED|GREATLY|TO|INTERPRET|THE|  
SERIOUS|EVENTS|IN|THAT|SPHERE-|.IVY-|

90375 77471 42921 36357 80967 89388 51095 76180 03137 36352  
48875 37391 24290 36434 85245 42801 42478 67255 00647 84714  
60542 44170 23453 16122 70471 33763 13725

SISTER MILLIE CLOSED-|URGENT-|GO TO SISTER ELLA MONDAY JULY|

#3# #1# .|#30#P|.M|.SHARP|.SPRING|

100-428091-6377

ENCLOSURE

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FBI

Date: 6/27/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO  
IS-C

ReNYairtel to Bureau dated 6/19/67 setting forth results of personal contact by NY 694-S\* of his Soviet principal on 6/16/67.

On page 17 thereof is set forth a message to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from GUS HALL concerning a CPSU request that HALL write an introduction to a book being assembled by PHIL FONER. According to New York, that office has no further information regarding the above. On 6/22/67 CG 5824-S\* furnished the following information concerning this message:

HELEN WINTER, who led the CP, USA May Day Delegation to Moscow, and HYMAN LUMER, who was a fraternal delegate to the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, had both brought back word to HALL concerning this matter. In conjunction with activities planned in connection with the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the CPSU intends to publish a Russian language edition of a book being published in the U.S. by International Publishers. This book is being assembled by PHIL FONER and is to be published under the title "Attitudes of Americans Toward the Soviet Revolution." FONER is collecting material on the

③-Bureau (RM)

1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MDW

(5)

REC-100

100-428091-6378

6 JUL 6 1967

Approved: 7/10/67  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUL 10 1967

See to State, CIA, and Yangley  
RHH:edw  
7/5/67

B/100  
R. [Signature]  
5-

CG 134-46 Sub B

reactions to the Russian Revolution of 1917 of prominent Americans such as LINCOLN STEFFENS, WILLIAM C. BULLITT, RAYMOND ROBINS, General WILLIAM S. GRAVES, etc. The American edition of this book will contain an introduction by FONER. For the Russian edition, the Russians want an introduction written by GUS HALL in addition to the introduction written by FONER. The message from HALL to the CPSU merely asks for additional verifying information relative to the type of introduction the Russians wish him to write for the Russian edition of the book.

Another message which appears on page 17 of reNYairtel concerns a "Montreal Trade Union Delegation," concerning which the New York Office also states that details are known to CG 5824-S\* who requested this message be sent to the Soviets. CG 5824-S\* advised that he learned from HALL that a message had been received by the CP, USA that the CPSU wanted a delegation made up of five trade union people to come to the USSR. CG 5824-S\* does not know how this message was received nor by whom. The CPSU wanted the delegation to be in Montreal by 6/28/67 and the CPSU was to pay all expenses. Other details are unknown to CG 5824-S\*. According to the message, itself, HALL had only received this message on 6/15/67 and he was "raving" to CG 5824-S\* that two weeks was not enough notice to get such a delegation together because people like that cannot just drop everything and run off to the USSR on such short notice. CG 5824-S\* does not know what efforts are being made to assemble this delegation nor who is getting it together.

For the information of the Bureau and New York, it is noted that 6/28/67 is a Wednesday and on that day, each week, Aeroflot Flight #2 leaves Montreal at 3:45 p.m., arriving non-stop at Moscow, USSR, at 9:20 a.m. each Thursday.

VIA TELETYPE

JUN 29 1967

ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

WA -1- 4:11 PM EH

URGENT 6-29-67 EH

TO DIRECTOR AND NEW YORK

NEW YORK VIA WASHINGTON -ENCODED-

FROM CHICAGO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

SOLO; IS-C.

THE BUREAU IS AWARE THAT GUS HALL IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE  
CHICAGO MOMENTARILY EN ROUTE MINN. AND WILL DEMAND TWO HUNDRED  
FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS OF SOLO FUNDS FROM CG FIVE EIGHT TWO  
FOUR DASH S ASTERISK. THIS AMOUNT AND LIKE AMOUNT DELIVERED TO HALL BY  
NY SIX NINE FOUR -S ASTERISK JUNE TWENTY, LAST, BELIEVED FOR PURPOSE  
OF FINANCING NEW DAILY PAPER OF CPUSA INFO AVAILABLE CHICAGO  
INDICATES ESTABLISHMENT AND FIRST YEAR EXPENSES OF DAILY PRESS  
EXPECTED TO COST SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. INVESTIGATION  
AT MIEHLE-GOSS CO., CHICAGO, REVEALS CPUSA PURCHASING ONE  
PRESS FOR MORE THAN SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLARS. NEW YORK  
INVESTIGATION REVEALS RECENT DEPOSITS TO ACCOUNTS OF PUBLISHERS  
NEW PRESS AND "THE WORKER" FUND AMOUNT TO MORE THAN THIRTY THOUSAND  
DOLLARS. CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR-S ASTERISK OF FIRM OPINION HALL  
ACCUMULATING THESE FUNDS FOR PAYMENT ABOVE AND ADDITIONAL  
END PAGE ONE

REC-100

6 JUL 6 1967

RELAYED TO

65 JUL 10 1967

TIME 1000  
10:10:00 AM

PAGE TWO

EXPENSES OF DAILY PAPER. REQUEST BUREAU AUTHORITY FOR CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR-S ASTERISK TO FURNISH TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS TO HALL.

POSSIBILITY EXISTS HALL MAY ARRIVE CHICAGO DURING THIS WEEK END OR JULY

FOURTH, NEXT WHICH ARE DAYS BANK IS CLOSED AND FUNDS IN CHICAGO OFFICE SAFE DEPOSIT VAULT ARE NOT AVAILABLE. HALL WILL EXPECT FUNDS TO BE AVAILABLE ON HIS ARRIVAL. BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO FURNISH FUNDS TO CG FIVE EIGHT TWO FOUR-S ASTERISK JUNE THIRTY NEXT SO FUNDS WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN BANK CLOSED. REQUEST BUREAU SUTEL AUTHORITY BY NOON, JUNE THIRTY, NEXT.

SEND TELETYPE

ENDADK

JRL R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

CC- MR. SULLIVAN

*Mr. Putnam*

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

6/30/67

airtel

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

To: SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091) <sup>REC-100</sup> 6380

ST  
RP  
SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurtel June 29, 1967.

This is to confirm Bureau telephone call 6/30/67 to SAC Marlin Johnson which granted authority to furnish CG 5824-S\* with funds as set out in retel.

1 - New York (100-134637)


RCP:cst  
(5)

NOTE:

Memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 6/30/67 recommended authority be granted to transfer Solo funds to informant for eventual transfer to Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). Chicago needed approval prior to noon 6/30/67. Therefore, matter was handled by phone 11:15 a.m., 6/30/67, after memorandum was approved.

8

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



FILED  
JUL 10 1967  
MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan *CB/ST*

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: June 30, 1967

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Solo is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world.

### PURPOSE:

To recommend Chicago be granted authority to furnish CG 5824-S\* with \$250,000 from Solo funds for eventual transfer to Gus Hall, General Secretary, CPUSA, upon his request.

### BACKGROUND:

My memorandum of 6/22/67 advised that Gus Hall indicated he may need an additional \$250,000 for the fund to establish a daily newspaper by the end of June, 1967. Memorandum recommended a secure method to transfer needed funds from New York to Chicago in order that it could be available on Hall's request.

This is a favorite tactic of Hall. He has taken trips and picked up Solo funds in Chicago and upon his return to New York implies that the money came from "Party angels." Hall has said that it will require \$1,000,000 to start the paper and a \$600,000 annual subsidy to keep it going. Information available indicates that supplies and equipment for this paper are being purchased by the Party.

Chicago has requested authority by noon today, 6/30/67, to turn this money over to CG 5824-S\* from funds furnished the CPUSA by the Soviets through our informants so that the informant would have it available in the event Hall contacts him on Saturday, Sunday, or Tuesday (holiday)

Enclosure

100-428091

RCP:cst

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

6 JUL 6 1967

REC-100

100-428091-6380

REC'D-INT. SEC. OFFICE

100-428091-6380



Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

when banks are closed and there is no way to get into our safe-deposit box where the money is held. The informant must give this money to Hall on request or the entire Solo Operation will come to an end. It should be noted that the Soviets have promised to furnish the Party with an additional \$500,000 this year through our informants.

Attached is an "immediate" teletype authorizing Chicago to make this money available to the informant.

RECOMMENDATION:

*Handled by Phone*  
That the attached teletype be approved and sent.

*WCS* ✓ *DGM* *h*  
6/30/67 - 11<sup>15</sup> a.m.

*SAC Johnson, Chicago, was telephonically advised of approval.*  
*[Signature]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *June*

DATE: July 3, 1967

FROM: C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S\* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 7/3/67, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at which time a message, NR 357 GR 29, was intercepted.

The plain text and cipher text are attached.

The New York Office is aware of the contents.

## ACTION:

For information.

## Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. R. C. Putnam)
- 1 - Mr. Downing
- 1 - Mr. Newpher
- 1 - Mr. Paddock

HS:cspeep  
(7)

REC-100

100-428091-6381

6 JUL 6 1967

65 JUL 10 1967

NR 0357 GR 029

07/03/67

79365 49920 88663 64704 35476 21808 49727 71036 46901 13426  
49214 32026 57645 25935 08577 71385 8/426 27023 52651 45047  
54125 83009 06150 35112 32756 48771 0/191 28212 12580

NR 0357 GR 029

07/03/67

|IN|ACCORDANCE|WITH|YOUR|WISHES|,|SPEED|OF|DUKE|WILL|BE|INCREA  
SED|TWO|TIMES|STARTING|NEXT|DUKE|.GET|PREPARED|. |

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-6381

## BOITE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 7/3/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)  
(ATTN: FBI LABORATORY)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

On 7/3/67, there was received from the Soviets, via radio, a ciphered message, the plaintext of which is as follows:

"In accordance with your wishes, speed of Radio will be increased two times starting next Radio. Get prepared."

Regarding the above message, NY 694-S\* advises that at the time of his last contact with TALANOV, the latter inquired whether the informant used a tape recorder in connection with the monitoring of radio messages from Moscow. The informant advised TALANOV that he did; the latter stated that he would arrange that the speed of radio messages be increased in order that more information might be transmitted during a single transmission.

1- 904, 944, 2D

- 4 Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
(1 - FBI Laboratory)  
1 - Chicago (134-46-SUB B) (AM RM)  
1 - New York (134-91) (INV) (41)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)

ACB:gmd  
(8)

6 JUL 6 1967

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUL 10 1967

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

7/6/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

*SR*  
*BR*  
**SOLO**  
**IS - C**

Reurairtel 7/3/67 which advised that the manager of 17 Battery Place, New York City, location of plant utilized in the Solo Operation, has inquired if there would be objections to our moving because of the urgent need for additional space by a neighboring tenant.

In view of the lack of specific information relating to cost, the Bureau is unable to authorize a commitment in this matter at this time. As soon as specific details are available, the Bureau should be advised and your request for such a move should be fully justified.

RCP:cst  
(4)

NOTE:

*pen*  
[redacted] of the Whitehall Building, has been most cooperative. His continued cooperation is absolutely essential for the full security of our operation in his building which is utilized for the reception of radio messages from the Soviet Union. [redacted] inquired if we would accommodate him by moving in view of a request for space for a neighbor and what our requirements would be. [redacted] was told that we would need similar space but on a higher level, probably the 19th floor. He was unable to quote prices, lease, moving expenses, and so forth, until consulting with his superior. The present location is undesirable and any location higher in the building would add to our security and improved radio reception. The tenant who wants us to release our space has a personal interest and could become an unpleasant neighbor. Our present location has been in operation for several years and a move to another office could provide adequate security. No definite commitment can be made until specific details are available within the next month or so.

*b6*  
*b7c*

MAILED 3  
JUL 15 1967  
COMM-FBI

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

REC-100

100-428091-6383  
JUL 6 1967

65 JUL 10 1967  
TELETYPE UNIT ☐

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, New York (100-134637)

7/6/67

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ST  
BP  
The matter of locating a suitable replacement for CG 5824-S\* has been considered under numerous programs and has been the subject of considerable correspondence over the years. In order to afford this vital matter the meticulous attention it deserves, the following instructions are being placed in effect.

1. New York and Chicago are to submit a concise, succinct summary of all steps taken to develop a suitable replacement for CG 5824-S\* during the month of July by 7/31/67.

2. At the same time, each office is to set forth additional activity to be undertaken during August, 1967, to attain the same end.

3. Similar communications are to be submitted monthly until instructions to the contrary are issued by the Bureau.

These communications are not to be wordy documents of explanation but factual descriptions of results. Assign sufficient, competent personnel to this project to insure it is afforded continuous, imaginative, aggressive attention.

Since Chicago covers the residence of CG 5824-S\*, it is being designated coordinator of this project. The purpose of this project is to centralize our efforts to develop a possible replacement for CG 5824-S\* under one caption, in one letter.

As an initial step, Chicago is formulating a plan of action directed toward enlisting the cooperation of selected major offices in this endeavor. Chicago has noted that there is but a limited number of national leaders of

2 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

RCP:cst  
(6)

6 JUL 6 1967

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAILED 2  
JUL - 5 1967  
COMM-FBI  
Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

65 JUL 10 1967

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to SAC, New York  
RE: SOLO  
100-428091

the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), in the Illinois District, while the preponderance of national leaders is located in New York City, and it is from such leaders that the eventual replacement for CG 5824-S\* will come.

While this statement is valid, our horizons should not be narrowed to utilizing only national leaders as eventual replacements. It could be that there are alternatives. The assignments of CG 5824-S\* are many, varied, and complicated. The informant, himself, is a most unusual individual. It may well be necessary to locate several individuals who each have some of CG 5824-S\*'s attributes and utilize each in separate spheres of our informant's activities.

In instituting this project, we are making a fresh start and we are searching for fresh ideas, new imaginative approaches, and sophisticated techniques. Each office should concentrate on developing some means which will enable us to locate the individual or individuals who can be used to keep this operation on a continuing basis.

NOTE:

Plagued by problems of ill health and advancing years, CG 5824-S\* must be replaced or the Solo Operation will come to an end at least from the political intelligence standpoint. The problem of locating a suitable replacement has been given attention in the past under various captions. The project set forth above should insure that this matter is given continuous guidance, both in the field and at Seat of Government. Chicago has previously been advised of institution of this program by letters dated 6/10 and 6/19/67.

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

05040

BY LIAISON

Date: July 5, 1967  
To: Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Handwritten:* All as Putnam In R  
7-6-67

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised as follows.

As part of the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union intends to print a Russian-language edition of the book being published in the United States by International Publishers, a Communist Party, USA, publishing house. The book, entitled "Attitudes of Americans Toward the Soviet Revolution," is being assembled by Phillip Foner, a communist writer.

Foner reportedly is collecting material concerning reactions to the Russian Revolution of 1917 of such prominent Americans as Lincoln Steffens, William C. Bullitt, Raymond Robins, and General William S. Graves.

According to this source, the American edition of this book will contain an introduction by Foner. The Soviets, however, want the Russian edition to contain an introduction by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, in addition to Foner's.

- 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley  
Assistant Attorney General  
1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans  
100-428091

RHH:cst  
(7)

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 12 1967

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

EX-115

BEC-9

100-428091-6385

6 JUL 7 1967

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

BEC. 10/10/67  
JUL 3 2 03 PM '67



~~SECRET~~

Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source (CG 5824-S\*) who is of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.

Information contained in this letter was extracted from Chicago airtel to the Bureau dated 6/27/67, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

~~SECRET~~

## ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 7/3/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

ReBuairtel, 6/30/67.

SAC HOWELL and SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON, case agent, will attend conference on 7/18,19/67.

Bureau is also requested to approve the attendance of Supervisor JOHN J. KEARNEY. SAC HOWELL has just arrived in the NYO and has instituted a program to familiarize himself with all aspects of the Solo operations. However, this is a most involved and complicated operation, particularly as regards the apparatus work of Solo, which is based in the NYC area. Decisions will be made which will bear on the overall operation for a long period of time. Supervisor KEARNEY has been most familiar with the operation for an extended period of years as Supervisor of the CPUSA, and has been the immediate supervisor of the Solo operation for nine months. It is felt he will be able to materially contribute to this conference. Further, it is felt that since he participates in the day to day problems of the apparatus, it would be most desirable to have him present and the NYO would materially benefit thereby.

100-428091, 4th + D

EX-103

REC 17

3 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)

100-428091-6386

JJK:gmd  
(5)

6 JUL 7 1967

Approved: 65 JUL 12 1967 JFM  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

## NOTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 7/3/67

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

On 6/29/67, Mr. [redacted] of the Whitehall Building, 17 Battery Place, New York City, the location of our plant, under the name of WARREN THOMAS, for use of the Solo apparatus, advised that his corporation has a critical space problem and requested that we move our office to another location in the building. He stated he realizes we have a lease. Mr. [redacted] stated that the occupant of the suite of rooms adjoining our plant has an immediate and critical need for expansion. This tenant has been with the building for a long time and the management feels an obligation to that tenant. He said he realizes that we have a very important operation and it must remain discreet. He would not have asked us to move except as a last resort, but he has no alternative but to seek our assistance.

By way of background, the following is noted. When we first obtained our plant, Mr. [redacted] was extremely cooperative and afforded us first consideration in obtaining space. He has remained most cooperative ever since. His continued cooperation is absolutely essential for full security of our operation. He provides our necessary backup for all questions and acts as a buffer to situations which may arise.

1 - 904 9th. + D

3 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM)  
1 - New York (100-134637) (41)REC 17/100-428091-6 389  
EX-103JJK:gmd  
(5)

JUL 7 1967

Approved: [Signature]  
Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7CLab to SAC, NY  
1-774

Ref: 7/6/67

65

JUL 13 1967

NY 100-134637

Mr. [ ] has stated the occupant who desires the space has noted that he has never personally seen WARREN THOMAS but knows that THOMAS uses the office infrequently.

In addition, one of the purposes of the plant is for the use of monitoring the Tug Schedule. Our present location for monitoring purposes is described by the monitor as one of the worst locations in the building.

Mr. [ ] was advised that we are most appreciative of his problem and the fact that he would not ask us to move unless it was deemed essential to his successful management. He was advised that because of our relationship over the years, we would like to be of assistance to him at this time, but no firm commitment could be made until we received authorization from our superiors. It was explained that we would need space similar to our present facilities, that we could not accept space on a floor lower than our present office (11th Floor), that the safe in our office has become a necessary item (Mr. [ ] originally gave us this safe). Mr. [ ] advised that he believes that an office may be available within a month or two on the 19th floor which should be suitable to our needs. He was unable to quote prices, lease, moving expenses, etc., until he consults with a Vice-President of the Sheraton-Whitehall Corporation, owners of the building. His line of request was to determine only if: 1. will we accommodate him; and 2. what are our requirements.

No firm commitment has been given to Mr. [ ] in this matter, however, we must consider the following:

1. Without the full cooperation of management the Solo operation as relating to our plant could become compromised.

2. Our present location for monitoring Tug is undesirable and a move to any location several floors higher is desirable and will add to our security in this phase.

NY 100-134637

3. The tenant who wants us to release our space now has a personal interest in the activity of WARREN THOMAS. He could become a most unpleasant neighbor and conduct inquiry through usual credit sources available.

4. We have been in our plant location for several years and a move to another office in the building could prove beneficial.

It is recommended that we accommodate Mr. [REDACTED] in this matter if possible. New office space may be slightly more expensive, however, it will benefit our operation and provide additional security. When details become available a specific request will be made of the Bureau.

b6  
b7c

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

05040

BY LIAISON

Date: July 5, 1967

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS MOVEMENT

Reference is made to my letter dated June 8, 1967, captioned as above, (your file CSCI-316/02416-67), which advised that sources were being contacted in connection with your request for additional information regarding individuals connected with captioned organization. The following was supplied by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past.

## Timur Timofeyev

Timofeyev was born November 30, 1928, in Ivanova, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the son of the late Eugene Dennis, former Chairman of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Peggy Dennis, currently a CPUSA functionary. He was left by his parents in the Soviet Union in 1936 or 1937 as a state ward. He was educated in Soviet schools which were attended by the children of top-level Communist Party of the Soviet Union leaders. After completing his academic education, he chose work in the international field as a speciality with emphasis on the North American area. For six years, he worked in matters relating to radio usage in the North American area, and he became a specialist in this field.

Timofeyev also taught Marxism-Leninism in a Soviet university and served on the staff of the "World Marxist Review," official theoretical organ of the international communist movement, at its headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, for a year and one half.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Wick \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

RCP:est  
(5)

100-428091

65 JUL 12 1967 TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

In February, 1960, Timofeyev became a top-level executive of the World Institute of Human Affairs, a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and he traveled extensively in the communist countries. He has a reputation as an author and has written articles for "Pravda," a newspaper published in the Soviet Union.

In October, 1960, Timofeyev came to the United States as a member of the entourage of then Premier Nikita Khrushchev when Khrushchev attended the 15th Session of the United Nations Assembly in New York City.

In 1962, Timofeyev became Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs of the Academy of Science of the USSR. Timofeyev's current association with captioned organization has been previously furnished to you.

Timofeyev is described as having black hair, brown eyes, and being five feet, eight inches tall. He is also known as "Timmy Dennis."

Eduard Arturovich Arab-Ogly

Arab-Ogly was born October 13, 1925, Tbilisi, USSR. He studied at the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow and was expelled in his third year for having returned late from vacation. He is known to have been a very ambitious young man. He completed his education as a correspondence student at Moscow University. After graduation, he studied philosophical science and, subsequently, held a position in the "Philosophical Department" of the Foreign Literature Publishing House.

Later he became associated with the Institute of Philosophy and eventually was appointed to the editorial board of the "World Marxist Review" in Prague, Czechoslovakia. He is known to have visited Paris, France, and London, England.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Between August 31, 1962, and September 16, 1962, he was in the United States as one of a group of Soviet citizens who attended the International Sociological Congress.

At that time, he described himself as "a scientific worker."

Marat Viktorovich Baglay

Baglay was born March 13, 1930, in Baku, USSR. In October, 1960, he was a lawyer employed at the Institute on State and Law in Moscow. In October, 1960, he applied for a visa to visit the United States as a member of a Soviet delegation which was to come to the United States upon the invitation of the Council on Student Travel. He was not listed among the Soviet delegates who arrived in the United States on October 26, 1960.

Yuri Aleksandrovich Zamoshkin

Zamoshkin, a sociologist, was in the United States between July 8, 1958, and August 28, 1958, as a Soviet delegate to the American Friends Service Convention.

Between March 29, 1961, and September 26, 1961, he was employed at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations as a scientific worker. At this time, he resided at 50 West 77th Street, New York City.

He attended an International Sociological Congress in the United States between August 31, 1962, and September 12, 1962, and was an East-West exchange student in the United States between May 23, 1966, and June 13, 1966. After his 1958 visit to the United States, Zamoshkin was highly critical of all phases of life in the United States. He constantly asserted that the Soviet Union was far more advanced than the United States in all respects. Zamoshkin is described as follows:

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Birth:	Born in Moscow, USSR, September 10, 1927
Hair:	Fair
Eyes:	Gray
Height:	5'9"
Weight:	160
Build:	Medium
Complexion:	Medium

Nikolay Aleksandrovich Kovalskiy

Kovalskiy, a Section Chief of captioned organization, was in the United States between March 6, 1967, and March 29, 1967, as a Soviet delegate to the 18th Session of the United Nations Commission on Social Development. He had Soviet Diplomatic Passport Number 016551. His description is as follows:

Birth:	Born in Leningrad, USSR, October 12, 1925
Hair:	Brown
Eyes:	Brown

Enclosed for your information are two photographs of Timur Timofeyev and one each of Eduard Arab-Ogly, Yuri Zamoshkin, and Nikolay Kovalskiy.

In the event other information concerning individuals connected with captioned organization is developed, you will be promptly advised.

Enclosures (5)

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" since unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the sources (CG 5824-S\* and NY 694-S\*) who are of continuing value and such revelation could result in grave damage to the nation.

Data extracted from New York airtel 6/26/67, captioned "Solo, IS - C."

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: SOLO  
IS-C

DATE: 6/30/67

ReBulet dated June 6, 1967; CGlet dated June 8, 1967; and Bulet dated June 19, 1967, all captioned "SOLO," and all concerned with the task of securing a replacement for CG 5824-S\* in the Solo operation. Bulet dated June 6, 1967, specifically instructed that Chicago submit on June 30, 1967, and monthly thereafter, a concise, succinct summary of steps taken to developing suitable replacement for CG 5824-S\* during the preceding month and additional activity to be undertaken during the succeeding month.

## 1. Steps taken during June, 1967

a. During the month of June, 1967, [redacted] was reinterviewed, bringing these contacts to a total of seven such interviews during the past year (see CGairtel to Bureau June 21, 1967, captioned "High Level Informant Development, CP, USA"). Chicago advised the Bureau that it is the opinion of this office that further interviews of [redacted] at this time would not be fruitful. Chicago is presently considering all aspects of an appropriate counter-intelligence program against [redacted] with the purpose of further softening him up for additional interviews. It is noted that development attempts directed toward [redacted] are for the purpose of making him a legman or assistant for CG 5824-S\* rather than a replacement for which he is not qualified.

b. As the Bureau is aware, the interview of [redacted] was temporarily postponed to allow the events in the Middle East to have maximum impact upon [redacted] and at the most opportune moment he would be interviewed.

On June 21, 1967, CG 5824-S\* reported that [redacted] is suffering serious health problems, is experiencing severe pain, and may soon enter the hospital for examination, diagnosis, and treatment. In light of this fact, the interview of [redacted] has been postponed until [redacted] health problems have been resolved.

②-Bureau (RM)

1-Chicago

WAB:MD

(3)

6 JUL 10 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 134-46 Sub B

2. Activities to be undertaken during  
July, 1967

a. As noted above, counterintelligence recommendations regarding [redacted] will be submitted to the Bureau in order to soften him up for reinterview. b7D

b. As noted above [redacted] will be interviewed providing his health permits.

c. In light of the broad responsibilities for field-wide coordination and direction of this program delegated to Chicago in reBulet dated June 19, 1967, Chicago is currently conducting file reviews in appropriate files wherein activity in this program has taken place and will direct communications to those offices where it is believed further action is indicated with specific instructions as to programs to be undertaken. The Bureau will be furnished copies of all such communications.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 7  
Page 74 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 75 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 76 ~ Referral/Consult  
Page 148 ~ b7D  
Page 149 ~ b7D  
Page 207 ~ Referral/Direct  
Page 208 ~ Referral/Direct